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When preparing a research article, Economists receive feedback from other academics,
present on conference and give talks in seminars. This form of collaboration is termed informal
because informal collaborators have, unlike authors, no formal property rights associated with
their contribution. However, informal collaboration is so widespread that it appears to be part
of the academic production function. Yet, it has received little attention in academia, least in
Economics where patterns of informal collaboration differ from that of natural sciences.
Social informal collaboration, the provision of direct feedback, gives rise to a social net-
work. This thesis examines this network. The analysis focuses on the role of individual scientists
in the network, which is estimated by different network centralities. Data originate from about
6000 published research articles from six Financial Economics journals between 1997 and 2011.
A theoretical model describes how network centrality proxies the effort informal collab-
orators exert informally in a project, and how this improves the citation count of the research
paper. We then investigate how observable characteristics of authors determine this and other
centrality measures and find that common metrics such as productivity and number of cita-
tions correlate little with network centrality. As information transmission is an important as-
pect of social networks we study how network centrality of Economists relates to placement
outcomes of their students in the academic job market.
These findings suggest that even informal networks matter in the production of academic
research; that these networks contain information above currently used measures of scholarly
influence in the profession; and that these networks are used to decrease information asymme-
try in the academic labor market.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
Understanding research is not only research about research, but also an endeavor into innova-
tion phenomena: How do innovators innovate? What are the elements of the innovation pro-
duction function? How close should innovators collaborate with others? Do innovators work
better alone or in groups? These questions have relevance for academics because collaboration
in academia is indeed the norm: Wuchty et al. (2007) document that by the early 2000s most
research articles and patents were coauthored by teams, irrespective of field or discipline. At
the same time, it takes longer for innovators to innovate (Jones, 2009) and it takes longer for
many research articles to be published (Ellison, 2002). The group of innovators I chose to study
are academic Economists themselves. While learning about innovation, I wish to contribute to
the understanding of the Economics profession itself, where some relevant characteristics are
known (Coupé, 2004). The question that I strive to answer in this thesis is: How do Economist’s
collaborations impact their research and their careers?
Since it studies innovation and collaboration in Economics, this thesis belongs to the
small but emerging field of Economics of Science (or Science of Science, or Sociology of Sci-
ence). Furthering our understanding of the functioning of Science not only guides and informs
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
decisions of individual academics or departments, but also helps organizing science more effi-
ciently, e.g., by improving group formation and talent allocation. The topic of this thesis thus
caters to a growing need of funding agencies and the scientific community. Funding agencies
are interested to monitor and evaluate the impact of research activities they fund, while the sci-
entific community seeks to understand itself and current inefficiencies in the scientific market.
Dedicated funding schemes to study Economics of Science by e.g. Horowitz Foundation, INET,
ESRC, CSIC, the European Commission, and NSF give proof of this interest.1 Finally, there are
large-scale gains, too: Improved scientific research and a higher rate of innovation has a direct
impact on economic growth (Jaffe, 1989; Adams, 1990; Mansfield, 1991; Cohen et al., 2002).
When individuals interact or when information flows between individuals, there is a so-
cial network. In a social network, two individuals are connected and their connections indicate
some form of interaction or exchange of information. The same individuals might be connected
with other individuals as well, giving rise to complex structures. These structures need to be
taken into account: Not only the immediate neighbor’s actions or information matter, but also
those of individuals somewhere in the network. For example, I might pass on information that I
learned from my network neighbor. The appropriate tool to study social interaction and infor-
mation diffusion is hence social network analysis. Jackson (2014); Jackson et al. (2017) observe
that social network analysis has become a popular tool in Economics to study phenomena that
involve flow of information and/or social interaction. Social networks are a necessary con-
duit for the diffusion of information, especially for non-codified (so-called tacit) knowledge, for
which there is no other way to diffuse (Singh, 2005). For example, Conley and Udry (2010) and
Banerjee et al. (2013) show how social networks impact the diffusion of new opportunities, be
it new agricultural technologies or investment decisions. This is exemplified by the anecdotal
importance of face-to-face contact in managerial decisions (Storper and Venables, 2004).
Social network analysis not only uncovers information flows among individuals, it also
helps understanding spillovers between individuals. Individuals may influence each other in
a variety of ways (Jackson and Zenou, 2015). Examples include education, crime, fertility and
1Further examples of policies targeted at collaboration networks include the EU-funded Innovative Training
Networks and the national Spanish Consolider Program-Ingenio 2010.
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market participation (Ioannides, 2012). Social network analysis in the Economics literature bor-
rows from game theoretic insights and from sociological theory. Games on networks start with
the basic game theoretic assumption that someone’s action’s payoff depend on the actions of
others. Games on networks generalize those games by considering a diverse set of neighbors:
The individuals whose actions I take into account are different from those that these individuals
take into account. The classic game theory textbook example, in which two individuals engage
in a game, would, if rephrased in network lingo, consider one symmetric link only.
Among the first sociologists to study networks and use social network analysis was Gra-
novetter (1973), who documented how social networks impact job searches. Moreover, he de-
velops a theory according to which individuals usually receive new information from individu-
als that they rarely meet. This is because network neighbors to which individuals maintain fre-
quent contacts share the same information, simply because they meet often and new sources
of information are quickly shaken down. Two large strands of literature then sparked, one that
studies social networks in labor markets2 and one that furthers our understanding of the way
social networks diffuse information.
An important question in both the Sociological and Economic literature on social net-
works, and also in this thesis, is the understanding of the role of particular individuals and their
connections. This is a necessary step to foster and shape networks to achieve given ends, since
most policies can only target individuals. Various centrality measures help discriminate among
individuals Freeman (1978); Friedkin (2015); Ballester et al. (2006). These centrality measures
commonly take into account the links between individuals in the entire network, and not just
the immediate surrounding of the individual under consideration. As an example, Cruz et al.
(2017) recently documented how the centrality of an individual and thus its position in the net-
work predicts that individual’s election outcome. Similarly, the network position of the first
informed individual predicts the spread of information (Banerjee et al., 2013). It is often "just"
predictive power because social networks are inherently endogenous as they may be both cause
and consequence of one’s action (Graham, 2015).
2A more detailed review of this literature is given in chapter 4.
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Formally, a social network is a set of individuals, so-called nodes (in graph theory also
referred to as vertices), V . Their links, the so-called edges, are denoted by E . The network is
then represented by the adjacency matrix G := (V ,E). G is a square matrix of dimension n ×n
where n is the length of V , or the number of individuals in the graph. G’s entries represent links
between individual to which row and column indices correspond: Gi , j = 1 means that nodes
i and j are connected. If the graph is unweighted, the entries are binary and take values of 0
or 1, where 1 means that a link exists. If self-links are allowed, the diagonal can take values
of 1 as well. If the graph is symmetric, that is, a connection from i to j implies a connection
from j to i , the upper triangular mirrors the lower-triangular matrix. In this case the links are
said to be undirected. Network links can also differ in weight, e.g. to reflect different intensi-
ties of exchange among the linked nodes. In this case the corresponding entry in G can take
any non-negative value.3 Since all information is stored in square matrix G , eigenvalues and
corresponding eigenvectors of G are investigated very often. Some eigenvalues of G have an
immediate interpretation: The largest eigenvalue is seen as average degree, the second can be
interpreted as spectral homophily4 and the second-smallest eigenvalue (of connected graphs)
represents algebraic connectivity. The eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue con-
tains so-called Eigenvector centralities, which we will meet more often later.
Several authors have investigated social networks in the Economics profession itself. Spurred
by the rise in co-authored publications, Goyal et al. (2006) document the corresponding growth
of the co-author network for the 1970-1999 period. They find that a small world emerges only
by the 1990s. A network with small world properties is one with a high clustering (a high share
of network neighbors that know each other), a small average distance and the fact that a large
share of authors are somehow connected via intermediate steps. Such a graph would be pic-
tured as dense groups interconnected by few members of the groups: While most authors do
not co-author with many different people, most also have someone in their vicinity that does.
Small-world networks have unique information transfer capabilities which makes them so spe-
cial. Understanding the network formation process hence became an emerging topic that still
3For some analyses it makes sense to assume negative link weights, but not for this thesis, which is why I refrain
from further discussing graphs with negative weights.
4Homophily is the tendency of individuals to interact more with each other when they share attributes.
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sparks a lot of interest. Theoretical analyses include Li et al. (2013) and Hsieh et al. (2018).
This literature borrows heavily from the somewhat older literature on R&D networks of firms.5
Empirical analyses focus on co-author group formation and try to identify optimal group com-
positions (Haeussler and Sauermann, 2016; Dahlander and McFarland, 2013).
Parallel to the literature understanding network formation in Economics emerges a lit-
erature that estimates the effect of networks on scientifically relevant outcomes. Ductor et al.
(2014) show that one’s position in the network has predictive power over future research output.
Both Azoulay et al. (2010) and Oettl (2012) show that being connected to eminent scholars im-
proves one’s own scientific impact, and that this impact consequently diminishes if those em-
inent scholar pass away. A possible mechanism is that eminent scholars are a source of ideas
and conceptual help, that only immediate collaborators have access to. Ductor et al. (2014)
bring forward the same explanation for their finding. Colussi (2017) adds to this strand of liter-
ature the importance of knowing an editor. This is a network-backed finding that complements
Brogaard et al. (2014) who show that authors are more likely to publish in an editor’s journal
while she is a temporary colleague of the author.
Social networks in science usually mean co-author networks. Few examples have tran-
scended from that and constructed networks based on other characteristics, such as joint fac-
ulty positions (Colussi, 2017; Bian et al., 2016). This thesis (in particular in the next two chap-
ters) takes a new step because it infers social networks based on informal collaboration. In-
formal collaboration refers to the provision of commentary and feedback. It is called informal
because – as opposed to coauthorship – there are no formal property rights attached to the pro-
duction of the research article (Laband and Tollison, 2000). The interesting aspect of informal
collaboration is that it likely captures the group of scientists that have contributed to a given
research article better than a look at co-authors alone. Ponomariov and Boardman (2016) cor-
respondingly note that often co-authorship is mistaken as the complete research group, which
it is not: There are collaborators that provide guidance and are not authors (because authors
are those that do the work, which is not necessarily the same as those that have the idea). And
there are honorary authors that own critical piece (of lab equipment or data) necessary for the
5It will be subject to discussion in chapter 3.
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generation of that article.
Informal collaboration becomes visible in a special section of the research article upon
publication, namely the acknowledgements section. This section is usually positioned as ti-
tlepage footnote, sometimes also at the article’s end. Cronin (1995) describes and classifies
three types of acknowledgments, namely concept-related (ideas, feedback and critique), resource-
related (funding, data and materials) and procedure-related (editorial help). For his field of in-
formation science he notes that concept-related acknowledgements have been on the rise to
the detriment of procedure-related acknowledgements.
This thesis uses hand-collected acknowledgments from 6,401 articles published between
1997 and 2011 in six scholarly journals in finance with a similar focus:6 The Journal of Finance
(JF), the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), The Review of Financial Studies (RFS), the Jour-
nal of Financial Intermediation (JFI), the Journal of Money, Credit, & Banking (JMCB), and the
Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF). The first three journals are commonly regarded as the top
journals in financial economics. Borokhovich et al. (2000) and annual reports of The Journal of
Finance refer to these journals as top journals, too. The vast majority of published research
articles in the sample acknowledges informal input by colleagues: Of the 6,401 articles in our
dataset, 5,641 (≈ 90%) articles do acknowledge at least one commenter or one seminar or one
conference. From each article’s acknowledgement section, I collect the number of seminars and
conferences, and, crucially, the names of the colleagues that are acknowledged for intellectual
input.7 I focus on concept-related acknowledgments, that Cronin (1995) characterizes as provi-
sion of ideas, feedback and commentary. A manual internet-based consolidation procedure for
all 19,368 names in the database is necessary because the same name is frequently spelled in
different ways. I am left with 14,531 distinct Economists. Figure 1.1 shows that these are mostly
commenters who are not authors (8,123), with the remaining 6,408 being mostly authors who
do not appear in any acknowledgement section in our dataset. That is, for every author in our
dataset there are 1.3 researchers just commenting on others’ work.
6The full dataset is available at https://github.com/Michael-E-Rose/CoFE.
7The words that authors use to indicate input by their colleagues are usually: comments, insights, encourage-
ments, discussions.
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Figure 1.1: Number of authors and commenters in our dataset.
Notes: Graph shows the number of authors of papers and acknowledged commenters in the ac-
knowledgement sections in those papers in our dataset. A commenter is a named researchers
mentioned for feedback, advice and discussion (unless she’s the journal’s managing editor of
this or the previous year) in the acknowledgement section of a paper in our dataset. This
excludes referees, research assistants and industry professionals, if they are acknowledged as
such.
Despite its importance in the academic Economist’s daily life, informal collaboration has
sparked little research interest. Notable exceptions include Laband and Tollison (2000) and
Brown (2005).8 Laband and Tollison (2000) use 251 featured articles published in the Review
of Economics and Statistics during the years 1976-1980. They show a strong positive correla-
tion between the number of acknowledged commenters and the number of citations the article
garners. The caliber of a commenter measured in citation count mediates this effect. Brown
(2005) tests a sample of 256 research articles published in The Accounting Review, the Journal
of Accounting Research, and the Journal of Accounting and Economics during 2000-2002 and
show that not only citation count increases, but also acceptance probability at one journal.9 It
is maybe for that reason that Economists are prominently advised to "circulate their papers and
give seminars" (Green et al., 2002, p. 1032), to present "work at seminars, professional meetings
and conferences" (Hamermesh, 1992, p. 170) and to be "generous" in the acknowledgements
section (Thomson, 1999, p. 158).
A major concern with this novel data is that informal collaboration may reflect strategic
acknowledging, according to which authors try to influence editors and/or referees by putting
down names which they deem helpful to that end. A number of observations speak against the
view that the motive to signal quality or steer the editor is the dominant motive, yet the only
8Being a pioneer in the study of acknowledgements, Cronin (1995) discusses reasons and implications of what
he calls "scholarly courtesy", though not in Economics.
9These studies are replicated in chapter 2.4.2.
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motive: Names of authors are not sorted by their reputation or prolificness but alphabetically,
the list of names often doesn’t come first in the acknowledgement section, and it often includes
individuals only acknowledged once or twice in the dataset.
Investigating the network of informal collaboration further, chapter 2 starts with interest-
ing descriptives and facts surrounding informal collaboration in financial economics. I show
the value of the network derived from informal collaboration in two ways: Variables obtained
from the network improve productivity forecasts for focal researchers, above a variables de-
rived from a pure co-author network. The same holds true for explaining academic impact of
a research article: Commenter’s centrality scores explain a paper’s ciation count better than
those of the authors, and centrality scores computed in the network of informal collabora-
tion perform better than those compute in a pure co-author network. We document a sharp
quality-dispersion within the sample: Publications in higher-ranked journals display display
more informal collaboration (comments by colleagues, seminar presentations and conference
participations) than those from lower ranked journals.
We then turn to the the individual position of researchers in the network, the so-called
centrality, and its determinants. One finding is that citation and publication stock correlate
weakly with being acknowledged often. On the other hand, more cited researchers tend to rank
higher according to different centrality measures, but less so over time. Most interestingly is
however the robust disadvantage that female researchers face. In nearly all years under con-
sideration, female researchers were less often acknowledged on research articles. They were
also less central, even for same levels of academic experience and productivity, as their male
counterparts, up until the mid-2000s. They continue to be acknowledged less often, but cease
to be less central (than comparable males). This leaves a puzzle for future research, and adds
to the current debate of females in science (Gaulé and Piacentini, 2017; Chari and Goldsmith-
Pinkham, 2017; Wu, 2018; Ductor et al., 2018).
In ranking Economists from the 1997-2011 period, chapter 2 provides a ranking that up-
dates and complements Laband and Tollison (2003) in so far as Economists are not only ranked
by the number of times they have been acknowledged, but also by their position in this net-
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work.10 This is contrasted with a ranking based on common metrics such as citations and pro-
duction of articles. Rankings according to centrality in the network and author metrics hardly
overlap, suggesting that the former constitutes a new measure of scholarly influence. This cor-
responds to the notion of Oettl (2012), who terms often acknowledged individuals helpful.
Chapter 3 lays out a structural equilibrium model where agents’ actions are strategic com-
plements (and strategic substitutes) and where knowledge spillovers occur via collaboration.
Knowledge spillovers here are modeled as positive complementaries. The model’s implication,
simply put, is that an academic’s return to scientific effort increases if she is connected to in-
dividuals with high absorptive capacity. On the project level, this means that informally col-
laborating with a well-connected commenter increases the impact of that project. Building on
the findings of Bramoullé et al. (2014), the model also implies that an informal collaborator’s
effort brought forward to the project can be approximated in a special centrality measure, the
Katz-Bonacich centrality.
We test for this process by hypothesizing that the quality of a research project depends
on the Katz-Bonacich centrality of those contributing informally to its development. A major
econometric challenge is the endogeneity inherent to all social networks. If not in controlled ex-
periments, researchers employ exogenous variations to the network structure in order to iden-
tify network effects.11 An exogenous variation to network structure is the death of individuals,
which has for example been used by Azoulay et al. (2010); Oettl (2012) and Mohnen (2016).
We use the exogenous network variation as well and construct two networks, one in which de-
ceased authors are removed and one counterfactual network in which they are still present. The
difference in Katz-Bonacich centrality of researchers is then purely due to death, which we use
to show that the centrality of informal collaborators matter for the citation count of a research
article.
This finding emphasizes the importance of networking and informal collaborating as it
shows that even informal networks matter for the production of academic science. It also con-
10The complete ranking can be found at http://www.central-places.net/index.
11A special form of network effects are peer effects, in which characteristics of my network neighbors (the peers)
influence mine. Those can be identified exploiting homophiliy and network structure (Bramoullé et al., 2009;
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013; Manski, 1993).
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tributes theoretically to the debate on the origin of gains from collaboration. Both Wuchty
et al. (2007) and Ductor (2015) show that there is a positive relationship between co-authorship
and productivity, besides documenting increased levels of formal intellectual collaboration in
academia. According to the model outlined in 3, the positive relationship between intellectual
collaboration and research output can be explained by the relationship between information
spillover and complementarities in efforts.
Finally chapter 4 turns to the question as to whether social networks matter for scientific
careers as well. The particular research question we address is whether students receive bet-
ter placement outcomes when their adviser is better connected in the Economics co-author
network. Identification exploits the longitudinal nature of the dataset, keeping adviser-effects
fixed. Those fixed effects capture general helpfulness and maybe other unobserved variables
that directly influence her connectedness and student placement simultaneously. Addition-
ally, the regression uses the centrality of the adviser’s coauthors as instrument. Combined in a
panel, we find that centrality changes positively impact the student’s placement. The findings
are replicated in the above introduced network of informal collaboration, albeit without explicit
identification (for the lack of panel data). The chapter provides supportive evidence to argue
that connectedness and improved placement outcomes could result from more central advis-
ers being better suited to disseminate information in the network, which ultimately decreases
information asymmetry regarding the student. This evidence results from an investigation of
another network, where universities are connected whenever its faculty members coauthor. Ex-
ogenous variation due to the death of faculty members or authors somewhere in the network
confirm that both link strength between neighboring universities and social proximity between
adviser and faculty are associated with a higher placement probability.
These findings are relevant for understanding the student placement process in the job
market for academic Economists. The effort dedicated to understanding it can hardly be over-
stated, because, as Oyer (2006) shows, initial placement matters for an Economists career. The
American Economic Association for example devoted an entire ad-hoc committee to the study
of this market (Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, 2011). Looming open questions include
whether new PhDs are allocated efficiently initially and whether market corrections take place.
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An interesting puzzle for example is the observation of Smeets et al. (2006), namely that median
students of top departments are often worse placed then top students of median universities.
Our results provide one possible explanation to this puzzle, namely that advisors from the same
university are differently connected.
Furthermore, our results that the connectedness of the adviser matters for the placement
of Economics graduates has insights into possible results in the general labor market, too. For
example, due to the characteristics of the Economics Job Market, one of which is that there is no
information asymmetry regarding job openings, chapter 4 presents some evidence to argue that
social networks serve as conduit of information regarding an applicant’s quality. While social
networks have long been shown to matter in hiring processes (see above), it can be due to two
functions of social networks: Providing information of job openings to possible applicants, and
providing information on the quality of applicants to possible hirers.
The three chapters use Economics (in particular Financial Economics) as case study. The
reasons for this as manifold. For one, I and my coauthors consider ourselves as Economists and
believe we have some insights that help us understand the data-generating process better. Sec-
ondly, Economics is an interesting field for the study of informal collaboration because there is
– unlike in natural sciences – a high importance of informal collaboration (Laband and Tolli-
son, 2000). Natural sciences differ because capital is relatively more important and because the
threshold to becoming co-author is lower (as stated in the observation of Haeussler and Sauer-
mann (2016) that co-authors in science publications often don’t know each other). This makes
Economics an appropriate, if not the most appropriate, field to study informal collaboration.
Thirdly, Economics is also regarded by many (not only Economists) as the dominating social
science (Fourcade et al., 2015), making it somewhat representative for the other social sciences.
1.2 Organisation of this Thesis
Since my dissertation is by publication, the following three chapters correspond to working pa-
pers. The study "What 5,000 Acknowledgements Tell Us About Informal Collaboration in Finan-
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cial Economics", which is joint work with Co-Pierre Georg, compromises chapter 2. The study
"Informal Collaboration with Central Colleagues", which is joint work with Co-Pierre Georg and
Daniel Opolot, forms chapter 3. Finally, chapter 4 presents the study "Informal Contacts in Hir-
ing: The Economic Job Market", which is joint work with Suraj Shekhar. Chapter 5 concludes
by summarising the findings of the three chapters and discussing ideas for further research.
Chapter 2
What 5,000 Acknowledgements Tell Us
About Informal Collaboration in Financial
Economics
2.1 Introduction
Collaboration is a crucial ingredient of academic research. Co-authorship has become the norm
and leads to research with higher scientific impact, measured by the number of citations re-
search papers receive.1 Co-authorship is a formal way of collaboration, but it is not the only
way in which researchers collaborate. In fact, already Laband and Tollison (2000) highlight that
informal intellectual collaboration—commenting on a paper or discussing it at a conference or
seminar—is prevalent in academic research in Economics.2 And Colander (1989, p. 146) con-
cludes in his seminal study on research in Economics that "[i]n studying the Economics Profes-
sion, one quickly learns the importance of informal networks, contacts and the exchange of ideas.
1See Beaver and Rosen (1979) for the rise of teamwork in academia and Wuchty et al. (2007) for an analysis of
the scientific impact of research produced by teams.
2In financial economics, informal collaborations are widespread and occur in the form of verbal and written
feedback by other researchers, extended directly, in research seminars or in conferences. Authors are prominently
advised by Green et al. (2002, p. 1032) in a joint editorial to "circulate their papers and give seminars to colleagues
to receive constructive criticism before submitting to a journal."
13
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Much if not most of the debate and discussion about economic ideas take place at the pre-working
paper, workshop and working paper stages." The benefits of such informal intellectual collab-
oration are emphasized by Brogaard et al. (2014), who show that colleagues of editors publish
more in the editor’s journal during his tenure and that these articles receive significantly more
subsequent citations than the average article in the journal. However, this study is an excep-
tion and while formal collaboration in Economics has been widely studied (Goyal et al., 2006;
Azoulay et al., 2010; Ductor et al., 2014), informal collaboration is much less understood.
In this paper we present the first study of informal collaboration in Financial Economics
derived from 6,401 full research papers published between 1997 and 2011.3 We study Financial
Economics because it is both a large and a homogeneous sub-field of Economics. Economics
is itself a very good discipline to study informal collaboration because the relation of informal
collaboration to formal collaboration tends to be higher for social sciences as compared to nat-
ural or life sciences (Laband and Tollison, 2000). We focus on research papers in the “top three”
finance journals (the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, and the Review of
Financial Studies) and three journals with a lower impact factor (the Journal of Financial Inter-
mediation, the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, and the Journal of Banking and Finance).
The papers reveal the collaboration patterns of 14,531 researchers, of which only 6,408 are au-
thors. The remaining researchers are acknowledged for helpful input but not having published
in our dataset.
We obtain a number of novel results that help us understand collaboration in Financial
Economics, and group them along three blocks. The first block studies whether patterns of
informal collaboration contain information of interest to economists. We show that this indeed
is the case and that a researcher’s centrality in the network of informal collaboration correlates
with her future productivity and the scientific impact of papers she comments on. This is very
useful information for anyone on a hiring committee, in particular when assessing job market
candidates who usually do not have a publication yet. The second block of results then studies
the network of informal collaboration in more detail. We show that academics who connect
disparate research communities are less likely to publish in top finance journals, but if they do,
3Of which more than 5,000 actually acknowledge informal collaboration.
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their papers receive an above journal-average number of citations. We also show that many
more researchers are involved in the production of research in finance than just the authors of
research papers. The consequence of this is that the (social) network of informal collaboration
is much more connected than the network of formal collaboration alone, which implies that
studying formal collaboration patterns only might miss important aspects of collaboration in
finance. Finally, in our third block we combine the researcher and the network perspective by
studying what determines a researcher’s position in the network of informal collaboration and
give a list of the most central researchers in our dataset.
Each of our blocks contains a number of results, to which we now turn one by one. First,
we show that the pattern of how a researcher collaborates informally with others contains infor-
mation about her future productivity, measured as the journal-quality weighted number of fu-
ture publications. We construct the network of informal intellectual collaboration, where each
node is a researcher and each link is an instance of informal intellectual collaboration between
two researchers, i.e. one commenting on others’ work. We show that including network cen-
trality measures4 of a researcher computed in the network of informal collaboration, and the
researcher’s commenters’ productivity measures, more than doubles the accuracy of a forecast
of the researcher’s future productivity, compared to the same measures derived from the net-
work of formal intellectual collaboration.5
Second, networks of informal collaboration not only contain information about an au-
thor’s future productivity, but also about a paper’s future academic impact. We find that know-
ing the average eigenvector centrality of the researchers who have commented on a paper im-
proves the prediction of the future academic impact of the paper over and above the authors’
eigenvector centrality–which in itself has predictive power for the paper’s future academic im-
pact. Academic impact is measured through the number of citations and whether the paper was
published in one of the top three Finance journals. The eigenvector centrality of a researcher
4Eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, degree (number of neighbors in the net-
work), and degree of order two (number of neighbors’ neighbors in the network).
5This analysis follows Ductor (2015), who used a co-author network in Economics. Based on their finding, the
authors emphasize that productivity and network position of early collaborators is especially helpful for young
researchers, where few other other quality signals are available.
CHAPTER 2. WHAT 5,000 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TELL US ABOUT INFORMAL ... 16
is a well-established measure of influence and power in a network (Bonacich, 1987).6 Com-
menters with a high eigenvector centrality are colleagues with a strong influence in the scien-
tific community. Their feedback can thus help authors to better align their paper with what the
community considers important and relevant, both in style and content.7
Third, authors with a high betweenness centrality in the network of informal collabora-
tion are less likely to publish in one of the top journals in finance, but their articles receive above
journal-average citations. Betweenness centrality is an alternative centrality concept which
captures how important a researcher is for the flow of information within the network of infor-
mal intellectual collaboration (Freeman, 1978). Researchers with high betweenness centrality
often connect otherwise disparate research communities. Our result highlights the important
role researchers who connect different communities have for the production of research.
Fourth, many more researchers are involved in the production of research in financial
economics than “just” the authors of research papers. Some researchers in our dataset provide
a lot of commentary and input to other’s work, but do not publish a lot themselves. Oettl (2012)
calls this trait a researcher’s helpfulness and distinguishes it from existing measures of perfor-
mance. He shows that researchers experience a decrease in output quality due to the death of
co-authors, and more so if the co-authors were helpful, i.e. often acknowledged. We take this
analysis one step further and show that already informal intellectual collaboration with helpful
researchers is associated with an increase in the number of citations a paper receives.8 This is
also reflected in the patterns of informal intellectual collaboration of publications in journals
with different impact factor: Papers published in the top three finance journals acknowledge
substantially more researchers for helpful input, and have been presented at more seminars
and conferences.
6Banerjee et al. (2013, 2014) for example show how individuals tend to approach well-connected individuals for
information sharing and gossip. Ballester et al. (2006) show how effort dedicated in a social network is proportional
to someone’s eigenvector centrality.
7Research papers that receive feedback from more eigenvector central academics are likely to have a higher
academic impact than research papers that receive feedback only from colleagues with low eigenvector centrality,
all else equal. Identifying the precise mechanism through which feedback from central colleagues helps to improve
the academic impact of a paper is beyond the scope of our paper, though. Our goal, instead, is to document this
relationship as clearly as possible.
8Our setup does not allow us to identify the underlying mechanism, though, so we restrict ourselves to reporting
correlations.
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Closely related is our fifth finding: The inclusion of networks of informal collaboration
dramatically increases the connectivity of the social network. While the network of co-authors
is loosely connected and scattered into many different subcomponents, almost all researchers
are at least indirectly connected when accounting for informal collaboration. This has implica-
tions for the transmission of information and knowledge. For example, small-world networks,
which have a high clustering (many researchers work with researchers that also work with each
other) and at the same time a small average distance (because some researchers work with oth-
ers that their collaborators don’t work with), emerge more easily than when restricting to formal
collaboration only. These small-world networks have unique information diffusion properties
and characterize many real-world networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Watts, 1999).
A natural next question then is to ask what determines a researcher’s centrality in the net-
work of informal intellectual collaboration. Therefore we, sixth, study what covariates are as-
sociated with different centralities. We find that experience is negatively associated with having
a high eigenvector centrality, controlling for academic prolificness and gender: For every year
since the first publication, the researcher is expected to rank 16 ranks worse. By contrast, we
find that being very prolific (i.e. having a high Euclidean index of citations) is positively asso-
ciated with betweenness centrality. Being productive, i.e. having more publications correlates
positively both with eigenvector centrality (about 2 ranks per publication) and betweenness
centrality (about 7 ranks per publication). Taken together, these findings show that less experi-
enced researchers with more publications have a more dominant position in the social network
of informal intellectual collaboration (eigenvector centrality), but those with more publications
are more important for the flow of information within the network, irrespective of their senior-
ity. Finally, we find that female researchers are acknowledged less often in our dataset–even
after controlling for academic productivity and experience. Over a three year period, a female
reseracher is expected to be acknowledged on 0.3 papers and by 0.5 authors less than male
counterparts with similar academic experience and prolificness. Female researchers also have a
statistical malus in eigenvector (about 100 ranks) and betweenness centrality (about 120 ranks)
less than their equivalent male counterparts, but only until around 2006 and 2005, respectively.
This descriptive finding adds to recent debates regarding the role of females in informal collab-
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oration (Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2017) and collaboration networks (Ductor et al., 2018).
We contrast these findings with those for traditional co-author networks. Here, we find no
significant correlation between experience or citation stock with either eigenvector or between-
ness centrality. How prolific a researcher is, is mildly negatively correlated with her eigenvector
and betweenness centrality. The only variable that significantly and positively correlates with
eigenvector and betweenness centrality is a researcher’s publication stock, but this correlation
is mostly mechanical given how we construct the network. For the network of formal intel-
lectual collaboration, being female has no significant impact on eigenvector or betweenness
centrality.
Lastly, we use our dataset to compile a list of the thirty researchers with the highest cen-
tralities in the networks of formal and informal intellectual collaboration at different points in
time, and include those which have been acknowledged most often. We provide this list to build
some intuition about our dataset and also to shine a light on those researchers who have been
particularly helpful in the profession.
To date, few studies have investigated the impact of informal collaboration on either the
research paper or the author. Cronin (1995) provides a taxonomy of informal collaboration,
stating that authors acknowledge individuals for various outsourced tasks (in our study we
solely focus on help with conceptual tasks, in Cronin’s terminology). Focusing on informal in-
tellectual collaboration in Economics and Biology, Laband and Tollison (2000) find that a higher
number of commenters is associated with a higher citation count over seven years. Brown
(2005) includes other forms of informal intellectual collaboration, such as seminar presenta-
tions and finds that the number of acknowledged seminars is more relevant for citation count
than the number of commenters. The same is true for the acceptance probability at prestigious
Accounting journals. (To check the external validity of our data, we replicate these studies in
section 2.4.2.) Oettl (2012) investigates the impact of informal collaboration on authors in im-
munology and coins the terms ’helpfulness’ for researchers who are often acknowledged on
other authors’ papers. He finds that losing co-authors with high degree of helpfulness leads to
a drop in the quality of a researcher’s output by 14%. All three papers point to the relevance of
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informal intellectual collaboration for productivity.
A growing literature highlights the importance of “knowledge networks” (for a review, see
Phelps et al. (2012)). An important variant of these networks are (social) networks of formal
collaboration, in which co-authors are linked based on joint publications. The rich literature
on co-author networks expands to questions such as (i) how co-author links emerge (McDowell
and Melvin, 1983; Freeman and Huang, 2015); (ii) what the individual benefits of network links
are to authors (Azoulay et al., 2010; Ductor, 2015); (iii) and whether teams are more productive
or influential than solo-authors (Medoff, 2003; Wuchty et al., 2007). But also the topology of
the network is of interest, because it affects the speed of learning and the diffusion of informa-
tion (Alatas et al., 2016). We contribute to this literature by adding the perspective of informal
collaboration among researchers which, while less studied, is the more prevalent form of col-
laboration.
2.2 Data and Variables
2.2.1 Informal Collaboration
To estimate informal collaboration, we manually collect acknowledgments from 6,401 papers
published between 1997 and 2011 in six journals in finance with similar focus:9 The Journal of
Finance (JF), the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), The Review of Financial Studies (RFS),
the Journal of Financial Intermediation (JFI), the Journal of Money, Credit, & Banking (JMCB),
and the Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF). JF, RFS and JFE are commonly regarded as the
top journals in financial economics and the other three journals are comparable in total size.10
The period was chosen to be in accordance with the coverage of the Scopus database.
From each paper’s acknowledgement section or title footnote, we collect the number of
9For 4098 of the papers we know the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes from either the published
or a previous version. 92% of them belong to general category G (Financial Economics). Additional 6% list E
(Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics), but not G.
10Borokhovich et al. (2000) and annual reports of The Journal of Finance refer to these journals as top journals,
too.
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seminars and conferences, and, crucially, the names of the commenters that are acknowledged
for intellectual input.11 We focus on concept-related acknowledgments, that Cronin (1995)
characterizes as provision of ideas, feedback and commentary.12 Like Brown (2005) we omit
research assistants, editorial support and non-academic commenters (industry professionals,
central bankers) if they are acknowledged as such. If individuals are not thanked for a specific
role, we assumed they are acknowledged for concept-related help. From each paper’s list of
commenters, we also remove the journal’s managing editors of the current and the previous
two years. This is to avoid a technical overestimation of their importance in the network.13
In removing editors from the list of acknowledged individuals we also remain comparable to
Brown (2005). A manual consolidation procedure for all 19,368 names in our database is nec-
essary because the same name is frequently spelled in different ways.14 We are left with 14,531
distinct researchers. Figure 1.1 shows that these are mostly commenters who are not authors
(8,123), with the remaining 6,408 being mostly authors who do not appear in any acknowledge-
ment section in our dataset. That is, for every author in our dataset there are 1.3 researchers
just commenting on others’ work.
2.2.2 Researcher Characteristics
In order to compute productivity metrics and the number of current projects, we use informa-
tion on publication records of both authors and commenters from Elsevier’s citation database
Scopus. Scopus provides the yearly number of citations for each indexed paper of any author
of indexed journal volumes.15
A procedure is necessary to link researchers in our dataset with the Scopus database. For
11The words that authors use are usually: comments, insights, encouragements, discussions.
12Two other forms, which we omit altogether, are resource-related (funding, data and materials) and procedure-
related (editorial and moral support).
13The vast majority of papers acknowledges the editor of the respective journal. If we calculate an editor’s posi-
tion within the social network of informal collaboration, we are likely to be biased towards more frequently pub-
lishing journals. The more paper a journal publishes, the higher is its editor’s observed centrality in the uncorrected
data.
14The Journal of Finance’s longtime editor Campbell R. Harvey, for example, is being acknowledged as Cam Har-
vey, Campbell Harvey, Campbell R. Harvey, and Campell Harvey (with a typo). To avoid wrong aggregations based
on typos, we conducted an internet search for every name to obtain the correct one.
15Due to Scopus’ editorial policy, only select volumes are included. See here for the 2017 Coverage Guide.
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researchers that authored a paper in our database we simply use the title of the publication(s)
to match author and corresponding Scopus profile. The match of acknowledged commenters
who are not also authors in our database follows a more sophisticated procedure because there
is no ground truth against which we could evaluate the match. There are two general conditions
to match a commenter with a Scopus Author profile: First, the profile is classified by Scopus as
working in at least one of the fields "Economics, Econometrics and Finance", "Business, Man-
agement and Accounting", and second it does not include more than 2 or 5% of publications in
journals outsides these fields. If only one match is found against the Scopus database via a sim-
ple name search, we match name and profile. If the search returns less than 5 profiles satisfying
above conditions, and they are identical in name and affiliation, we take the profile with the
highest publication count. In case more profiles are returned, or the returned profiles do not
match in affiliation and/or name, we perform a manual search for all individuals that are ac-
knowledged more than 3 times. As a final quality assessment, we manually look into all profiles
that published in an journal where no one else in our database published in, and if necessary
correct accordingly.
Following this procedure we match all 6,408 authors and 9,070 out of 11,883 (76.32%) of
the acknowledged commenters. If we instead count the number of comments given by re-
searchers that we linked to Scopus and compare it to the total number of comments given,
we obtain a coverage of 93.07%.16 Note that not all acknowledged commenters are represented
in the Scopus database: In order to have a Scopus profile, an author must have published at
least once in a journal or book that Scopus indexed. Many acknowledged commenters do not
satisfy these criteria as they are not academics but industry professionals or research assistants
not marked as such. In total we link 11,718 (80.64%) of the researchers in the database to their
Scopus profile.
For all researchers in our database which we can map to Scopus, we count the yearly
publication stock,17 and the yearly citation count to these papers.
16There are a total of 47,238 comments given or informal collaboration links. 43,966 (or 93.07%) of these are
involving an author and a commenter which we could identify on Scopus.
17Includes original research articles, books, book chapters and conference proceedings.
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As a combination of the two we compute the Euclidean index of citations of an author.
The Euclidean index of citations has desirable properties that other indices (such as the h-
index) do not possess, and follows the definition of Perry and Reny (2016): For each year t ,
count the total number of citations to each of i ’s m publications published until including t ,







where ck,t is the citation count until t of publication k. An author’s Euclidean index of
citations hence increases monotonically in the number of publications with positive citation
count. Consider for example an author with two publications in t , one which received 5 cita-
tions and the other one 50. Her Euclidean index of citations obtains as
p
52 +502 ≈ 50.25. If
the first paper receives 5 more citations in t +1, and the author publishes another paper that
garnered 2 citations, the Euclidean index of citations increases to
p
102 +502 +22 ≈ 51.03.
Using the year of the first publication, we compute the number of years since then for each
t between [1997, · · · ,2011]. We call this variable experience. Using the researcher’s firstname we
estimate her gender using the genderize.io database.18 We obtain gender estimates for 93% of
the 11,718 researchers in our network. Researchers without gender estimate are assumed to be
male.
2.2.3 Centrality in the Networks of Intellectual Collaboration
Using acknowledgements of papers and authorship information, we construct two types of net-
works: In the co-author network (or network of formal collaboration) researchers are connected
by an undirected and weighted link whenever they have co-authored a paper in our dataset.
Links between two academics are weighted with the number of joint papers. In the network of
informal collaboration, two researchers are connected with a weighted and directed link when-
18See the genderize.io website.
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ever one acknowledges the other as a commenter on a published paper in our dataset. Even
though information and spillovers occur in both directions (The commenter provides feedback
to the author, and the commenter learns about yet unpublished results to build her own re-
search on), we choose to analyze directed networks because the directionality allows us to eas-
ier trace who researchers acknowledge and who they are acknowledged by.
Both networks account for different dimensions of scientific collaboration. A researcher
with many links in the co-author network is likely someone who publishes and collaborates
often with different individuals. Therefore, the formal network mainly captures productivity.
The network of informal collaboration additionally captures a dimension that Oettl (2012) de-
notes as "helpfulness". This is plausible because a researcher with many outgoing links in the
network of informal collaboration represents a frequent commenter. As we show later, a very
productive researcher is not necessarily a very helpful researcher in the sense that she is often
acknowledged for providing feedback during others’ publication process.
Next, we formalize the network construction. For each year t we construct the network
using the publications published in that year, as well as in the two previous years, t −1 and t −2.
We construct thirteen networks for all t = 1999,2001, . . . ,2011, which are all constructed in the
same way.19 Let At be the set of papers published in years {t , t −1, t −2}. To each paper a ∈ {At },
there is a non-empty set of authors κa and a not necessarily non-empty set of commenters
ιa . The resulting network G is weighted in such a way that for each pair (i , j ) of academics,
gi j increases by 1/|κa |. Consider for example a paper by two authors that acknowledged one
commenter. We create two directed links between the commenter and each author of weight
1/2 as well as one undirected (or bidirectional) link with weight 1 connecting the two authors.
If one of the authors acknowledges this commenter on another solo-paper, the weight of the
link connecting them would increase by 1 to 3/2. Our weighting scheme thus reflects frequency
and intensity of interaction and also corrects for possible misreporting on papers with many
authors, i.e. with a large κa .
Given the above networks, various centrality measures discriminate among researchers
19For this reason we omit the time index when no confusion can arise.
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with respect to to their hypothetical access to information traversing the network or according
to their possible influence on peers. (Jackson, 2014). Banerjee et al. (2013, 2014) for exam-
ple show how individuals tend to approach well-connected individuals for information sharing
and gossip. The centrality measures we study are degree, betweenness centrality, eigenvector
centrality and closeness centrality.
Networks can have different components and, formally, two researchers belong to the
same network component if there exists an alternating sequence of researchers and links, called
a path, between them. The size of a component is the number of researchers that belong to it.
The component containing the most researchers is called the giant component, if at the same
time it is also large compared to the rest of the network (Goyal et al., 2006; Jackson, 2014). For
technical reasons, we compute all centralities (except degree) in each network’s giant compo-
nent and omit nodes in the other components. This is because the computation of the central-
ities relies on paths and is hence a component-specific measure. Centralities are not compa-
rable across components: If node i belongs to a small network component, all other nodes are
fairly close. In contrast, a node in a large component might have a potentially much smaller
centrality because many other nodes are far away.
Degree is a very simple and informative measure in undirected networks, and out- and
in-degree in directed networks. Degree takes into account the immediate neighborhood only,
leaving aside the global structure of the network. It simply counts the number of links in undi-
rected networks (our co-author networks), or more formally is the size of the neighborhood
Ni (G) = j : gi j > 0 of researcher i given network G :
degreei =
∣∣Ni (Gi )∣∣, (2.2)
Out-degree in the networks of informal collaboration, which are directed (gi j is not nec-
essarily the same as g j i ), is the number of unique authors that acknowledge a researcher. In-
degree of 1 means that there is only one link directed from the commenter to an author. In-
degree is the number of unique commenters an author has acknowledged.
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Eigenvector centrality was introduced by Bonacich (1987) and is a measure of influence
and power in the network. The vector of Eigenvector centralities of network G is the vector b
satisfying the following relation:
bA =µ1(G)b (2.3)







Gi j eigenvector j (2.4)
Eigenvector centrality is hence the weighted count of collaborating researcher, where the
weights correspond to their respective eigenvector centralities. Unlike degree, eigenvector cen-
trality captures reach and influence beyond immediate neighbors. Ballester et al. (2006), Ho-
jman and Szeidl (2008) and Elliott and Golub (n.d.) among others show theoretically how an
individual’s eigenvector centrality is related to equilibrium outcomes in games on networks, as
it is directly linked to influence and effort. For these reasons, eigenvector centrality is partic-
ularly relevant in provisions of public goods such as knowledge provision, because the effort
brought forward in equilibrium corresponds to someone’s eigenvector centrality.
Since eigenvector centrality focuses on connectivity and influence only, but remains silent
about the importance of a researcher for knowledge flows, we also study betweenness centrality.
Betweenness centrality was introduced by Freeman (1978) and is defined as the frequency with
which a researcher is on the shortest path between any two researchers (denoted as σ( j ,k) for




σ( j ,k|i )
σ( j ,k)
(2.5)
Betweenness centrality is often used to measure the individual influence on information
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flows within a network (Jackson, 2014). A high betweenness central researcher could hold au-
thority over, or control collaboration between, disparate clusters in a network; or indicate they
bridge between two otherwise sparsely connected clusters.
In one part of the analysis we use closeness centrality as a measure of a researcher’s rela-
tive distance to the network (Bavelas, 1950). For n researchers, closeness centrality is the inverse
of the average distance of a researcher to other researchers:
closenessi = n −1∑
j 6=i σ(i , j )
(2.6)
In order to measure and compare networks in terms of their connectedness, we use net-
work density and average clustering. Density is defined as the share of realized paths
∑G
i , j si j to







Density measures the network’s efficiency in information transmission. The higher the
number, the more potential connections are realized and thus the faster the transmission.
Clustering refers to the connectedness of a researcher’s collaborators: How often do a
researcher’s collaborators collaborate with each other? Formally, a researcher i ’s clustering co-
efficient zi is the share of neighbors that are are connected to each other, over the number of
possible pair. For the directed networks of informal collaboration, zi is defined as:
zi =
|{e j k : v j , vk ∈ Ni ,e j k ∈ E }|
degree(i )(degree(i )−1) , (2.8)
while for the undirected co-author networks it is defined as
zi =
2|{e j k : v j , vk ∈ Ni ,e j k ∈ E }|
degree(i )(degree(i )−1) . (2.9)
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For network G with number of researchers n, the average clustering is the sum of all re-
searcher’s clustering coefficients divided by their number, n:





2.3 Informal Intellectual Collaboration in Financial Economics
2.3.1 Improved productivity forecasts
Ductor et al. (2014) show that an economist’s future productivity can be forecasted using vari-
ables derived from the network of formal collaboration (co-authorship). The productivity of
current coauthors of a researcher as well as the researcher’s network centrality measures con-
tain information about her future productivity. Future productivity in any given year is the
log-transformed journal impact factor-weighted publication count over the next three years.
One underlying mechanism may be that researchers become more productive when they have
better access to information traversing the network. Such forecasts are relevant for first-time
hiring decisions, which in for economics and finance job-market candidates are often based
on a limited number of signals, usually the job market paper and maybe a handful of other
manuscripts. By looking at coauthors of a job applicant, hiring departments can improve their
information about that applicant. Productivity is approximated as weighted publication count,
where weights correspond to Journal Impact Factors. Network centralities include degree, sec-
ond degree, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality, all measured in a co-author net-
work derived from publications in about 100 journals listed in EconLit for a 29-year period.
We follow this method to show that the productivity and network measures derived from
a network including informal collaborators (as opposed to just co-authors) increases the pre-
diction power even further. We construct two networks which are not directly comparable
to Ductor et al. (2014), but which allow comparison with each other: The first is a co-author
network derived from 6,401 research papers published between 1997 and 2011 in our set of
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six financial economics journals. This network is called "Author network" and links two re-
searchers whenever they have jointly published a paper. The second network, the "Commenter
network", is derived from a subset of 5,641 papers, namely all those that include acknowledge-
ments of informal collaboration with other researchers. Two researchers are connected when-
ever one acknowledges the other on a published paper and follows the construction outlined
in the previous section. For each researcher, we compute the following network centralities,
network statistics and network neighbor productivity measures: degree, degree of order two,
membership in the giant component, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, the network
neighbors’ log-transformed sum of individual productivities, and the log-transformed sum of
individual productivities of the network neighbors’ neighbors.
Table 2.1 presents the result of this exercise. Following Ductor et al. (2014) we use the
Root Mean Square Errror (RMSE) as measure of forecast accuracy. A Diebold-Mariano test
tests the hypothesis, that a given model and the baseline model are statistically the same. The
baseline regression uses observable past output only: (i) cumulative output since the start of
a researcher’s career until t −5, (ii) career time dummies, (iii) a dummy for each year, and (iv)
number of years since last publication. The first model then adds a variable measuring recent
individual output (the log-transformed weighted count of publications in this and the next two
years). This captures a researcher’s current projects, which for example are observable to hiring
committees, but as a noisy signal since the projects are not yet published papers. Hence this
model predicts future productivity if the quality of current projects could be perfectly assessed.
The third model includes variables derived from the co-author network. It increases predic-
tion accuracy by 4.2% over the baseline model. The fourth model uses variables derived from
the network of informal collaboration instead. Its prediction accuracy increases by more than
8.3%. Combining variables derived from both networks increases prediction accuracy by more
than 9.7% over the baseline.
We use the exact same variable definitions as Ductor et al. (2014) but differ in sample size.
While Ductor et al. (2014) use publications over 29 years from journals listed in the EconLit
database, we include 6,401 publications from 6 journals over 15 years. Our measure of pro-
ductivity however includes all publications listed on Scopus (weighted with the same Journal
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Table 2.1: Comparison of forecasts of researcher productivity akin to Ductor et al. (2014).
Adj. R2 RMSE RMSE Differential
Benchmark 0.17 1.43
Recent past output 0.57 1.03 27.97∗∗∗
Author network variables 0.23 1.37 4.20∗∗∗
Commenter network variables 0.30 1.31 8.39∗∗∗
Auth. net. and com. net. variables 0.32 1.29 9.79∗∗∗
All 0.57 1.02 28.67∗∗∗
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level in Diebold-
Mariano tests, respectively. Table compares different forecasts for academic productivity to a
benchmark forecast, according to Ductor et al. (2014). RMSE is the root-mean-square error of
the corresponding regression. "RMSE Differential" is the difference in the RMSE over the base-
line. Statistical significance levels correspond to a which a Diebold-Mariano test, whose Null
Hypothesis is that the model is the same as the benchmark model. Variable construction cor-
responds to Ductor et al. (2014) but uses our set of papers derived from six financial economics
journals over a 15-year period.
Impact Factors as used by Ductor et al. (2014), if available), not just those listed in EconLit. As
more publications are captured, productivity measures are thus possibly more complete.
2.3.2 Predicting a paper’s academic success
Laband and Tollison (2000) and Brown (2005) both relate a paper’s academic impact to the
amount of informal collaboration. Laband and Tollison (2000) show that a paper’s citation
count correlates strongly with the number of acknowledged commenters and the commenters’
past academic productivity. They study a sample of 251 feature articles from The Review of
Economists and Statistics. Brown (2005) shows that acceptance probability increases with the
number of acknowledged conferences, while controlling for the number of acknowledged sem-
inars and commenters. He studies a sample of 305 papers submitted to The Accounting Re-
view. In section 2.4.2 we show that these observations hold for Financial Economics too, using
a much larger sample. Starting from these results, we show that the centrality of authors and
acknowledged commenters in the network of informal intellectual collaboration contains in-
formation about the paper’s scientific impact, over and above the measures of the author’s and
commenters’ past academic productivity. As networks are a necessary conduit for information,
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more central commenters are better able to grasp information, which is potentially critical for
ongoing or future research projects. Interestingly, the author’s and commenters’ centrality in
the network of informal intellectual collaboration correlates stronger with the paper’s academic
success than the centrality in the network of formal collaboration (the co-author network). A
plausible reason for the higher information content of networks of informal collaboration is that
they capture a researcher’s connectedness – and hence ability to receive traversing information
– better than co-author networks.
We model the success of paper p published in year t as:
Successp = Characteristicsp +Author centralityp,t−1 +Commenter centralityp,t−1 +Dt +εt ,
(2.11)
where we measure Success in two ways, as the citation count of paper p according to Scopus
in July 201820 and as an indicator variable that equals one if the paper was published in a top
three finance journal and zero otherwise. Characteristics is a vector with the following controls
per paper p: Number of pages, number of authors, number of acknowledged commenters, the
author’s total Euclidean index of citations according to equation (2.1) in the year before publi-
cation, and the commenter’s total Euclidean index of citations in the year before publication.
When citation count is the dependent variable, we also include a fixed effect for each journal
to pick up journal-specific effects such as popularity, topic, and quality of the editorial process.
Author position is either the authors’ sum of betweenness centralities (equation (2.5)) or sum
of eigenvector centralities (equation (2.4)). We first use centralities derived from the network
of formal collaboration corresponding to t −1, and compare them to centralities derived from
the network of informal collaboration corresponding to t −1. We use the network in the year
before publication to avoid that the links observed from the paper itself in some way influence
the network position of either authors or commenters. In either case, centralities are computed
in the network’s largest component. Finally we add fixed effects for the publication year, to e.g.
account for a different number of years an article could garner citations.21
20Using citations according to Web of Science do not materially change our results.
21Using the paper’s citation count over the next six years and removing journal-fixed effects leaves the regression
results almost unchanged.
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We study two samples. The first sample uses the co-author network’s giant component
and consists of 363 papers where the author(s) and at least one author is in the previous year’s
network. The second sample uses the commenter network and consists of 3,432 papers where
the author(s) and at least one of the acknowledged commenters has also been acknowledged
in the previous three years (which is a requirement to be member in the network of informal
collaboration for the year before publication).
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report estimation results of the model above, using centralities com-
puted in the largest component of the co-author network and the commenter network, respec-
tively. Models (1) and (2) are marginal effects of a negative binomial regression with citation
count in July 2018 as the dependent variable. Models (3) and (4) are marginal effects of a logis-
tic regression model with top journal publication dummy as the dependent variable. Marginal
effects give the expected percentage increase in the number of citations if the explanatory vari-
able was to increase by 1 unit, holding all other variables constant at their mean and setting
binary variables equal to 0.
There are three observations we would like to highlight based on these correlations. First,
the sum of commenters’ network centrality contains information for both citation count and
journal publication probability, above the information embedded in the aggregated network
centralities of authors. This can be seen from the fact that coefficients for commenters’ central-
ities are statistically significant in all models. In some cases commenters’ network positions are
statistically significantly correlated with our dependent variables, while the network positions
of co-authors are not.
Second, and most importantly, models with centralities computed in the commenter net-
work outperform those models with centralities computed in the co-author network. Direct
comparison of tables 2.2 and 2.3 shows that measures of goodness-of-fit (Akaike Information
Criterion for models (1) and (2), and R2 for models (3) and (4)) indicate better fit, albeit the dif-
ference is small in some cases. The exception is model (4) which correlates eigenvector central-
ity of commenters with top journal publication. This model explains about 50% more variance
when computed in the commenter network as compared to the co-author network.
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Finally, the centrality of authors and commenters matter in crucial ways. Specifically, be-
tweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality of authors and commenters in both networks
are correlated in different ways with the dependent variables. Comparing model (2) of tables
2.2 and 2.3, we see for example that the commenters’ sum of eigenvector centralities (ability to
influence the network) in the co-author network explains statistically significantly the paper’s
academic impact, but only when computed in the commenter network. The effect is econom-
ically significant, too. If the commenter’s total eigenvector centrality increases by one stan-
dard deviation, the average paper’s citation count is expected to increase by roughly four cita-
tions. Comparison of models (1) and (3) of table 2.3 shows that the betweenness centrality in
the commenter network of both authors matters positively for citation count, but is associated
negatively with top journal publication. On the other hand, eigenvector centrality is positively
associated with publishing in a top three finance journal and with citation count. Recalling the
definitions of the two centralities, this finding suggests that authors and commenters that con-
nect different communities (high betweenness centrality) are less likely to publish in one of the
top journals but once published, their papers are cited more than the average of the journal.
Authors and commenters that are well connected in the community and better positioned to
exert influence (high eigenvector centrality) are more likely to publish in one of Finance’s top
journals and also to get cited more than the journal’s average.
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Table 2.2: Results of citation count and journal publication correlation using network measures
of the co-author network.
Total citation count Top publication
negative binomial logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Auth. total betweenness −0.110 −0.274
p = 0.696 p = 0.811
Com. total betweenness −0.159 1.638∗
p = 0.381 p = 0.082
Auth. total eigenvector 0.734∗∗ −1.992∗
p = 0.027 p = 0.095
Com. total eigenvector 0.382 −1.265
p = 0.129 p = 0.160
Constant 4.192∗∗∗ 4.261∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Means 91 91 0.501 0.501
Article characteristics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Journal-fixed effects Y es Y es No No
Publication year-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
N 363 363 363 363
R2 0.347 0.357
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,955.394 3,945.847
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Total citation count is the paper’s sum of citations until July 2018. Top publication equals 1 if the
paper was published in either the JF, RFS or the JFE, and 0 otherwise. Auth. total betweenness
and Com. total betweenness is the authors’ resp. acknowledged commenters’ combined be-
tweenness centrality (equation (2.5)). Auth. total eigenvector and Com. total eigenvector is the
authors’ resp. acknowledged commenters’ combined eigenvector centrality (equation (2.4)).
All values are measured in the giant component of the co-author network corresponding to the
year before publication. Article characteristics includes the number of pages, the number of
authors, the number of acknowledged commenters, the authors’ combined Euclidean index of
citations and the commenter’s combined Euclidean index of citations (equation (2.1), both of
which are measured in the year before publication using data from Scopus. Only papers pub-
lished in six financial economics journals published between 1997 and 2011 considered con-
sidered where the author(s) and at least one of the acknowledged commenters (excludes the
journal’s managing editor) is part of the giant component of the co-author network in the year
before publication.
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Table 2.3: Results of citation count and journal publication correlation using network measures
of the commenter network.
Total citation count Top publication
negative binomial logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Auth. total betweenness 8.380∗∗∗ −10.055∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.036
Com. total betweenness 1.882∗∗∗ 11.252∗∗∗
p = 0.0003 p = 0.00000
Auth. total eigenvector 1.137∗∗∗ 13.602∗∗∗
p = 0.002 p = 0.000
Com. total eigenvector 0.313∗∗ 9.214∗∗∗
p = 0.015 p = 0.000
Constant 4.012∗∗∗ 3.934∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Means 91 91 0.501 0.501
Article characteristics Y es Y es Y es Y es
Journal-fixed effects Y es Y es No No
Publication year-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
N 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432
R2 0.468 0.544
Akaike Inf. Crit. 37,071.510 37,103.170
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Total citation count is the paper’s sum of citations until July 2018. Top publication equals 1 if the
paper was published in either the JF, RFS or the JFE, and 0 otherwise. Auth. total betweenness
and Com. total betweenness is the authors’ resp. acknowledged commenters’ combined be-
tweenness centrality (equation (2.5)). Auth. total eigenvector and Com. total eigenvector is the
authors’ resp. acknowledged commenters’ combined eigenvector centrality (equation (2.4)).
All values are measured in the giant component of the commenter network corresponding to
the year before publication. Article characteristics includes the number of pages, the number
of authors, the number of acknowledged commenters, the authors’ combined Euclidean index
of citations and the commenter’s combined Euclidean index of citations (equation (2.1), both
of which are measured in the year before publication using data from Scopus. Only papers
published in six financial economics journals published between 1997 and 2011 considered
where the author(s) and at least one of the acknowledged commenters (excludes the journal’s
managing editor) is part of the giant component of the commenter network in the year before
publication.
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2.3.3 Social Networks of Informal Intellectual Collaboration
Having investigated how centrality in the network of informal collaboration relates to academic
outcomes, we now turn to an analysis of the network structure itself. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present
basic statistics regarding the two network types. There are several things we want to point out
with these tables. First, as the number of publications grows, the number of researchers (au-
thors, commenters) grows too, and at about the same pace. The 1999 network of informal col-
laboration is generated from 854 papers published in either 1997, 1998 or 1999 and consists of
3,142 researchers. In comparison, the 2011 network connects 7,028 researchers that have col-
laborated on 1,889 papers. This is not a trivial result. Rather, it could have been the case that
authors tend to collaborate informally with researchers already in the network, i.e. those other















































Table 2.4: Global network measures for the networks of informal collaboration.
Overall Giant
Size Links Avg. clustering Components Size Density Avg. path length Diameter rho
1999 3142 10639 0.099 30 3001 0.0023 4.59 12 0.48***
2000 3286 11171 0.099 33 3115 0.0022 4.62 13 0.49***
2001 3399 11382 0.112 34 3234 0.0021 4.67 13 0.49***
2002 3559 12071 0.105 37 3381 0.002 4.74 14 0.50***
2003 3815 13498 0.105 31 3671 0.0019 4.73 13 0.48***
2004 4191 15234 0.103 34 3989 0.0018 4.64 13 0.52***
2005 4521 16909 0.103 31 4388 0.0017 4.67 13 0.50***
2006 4838 17868 0.086 37 4693 0.0016 4.76 14 0.52***
2007 5265 20930 0.091 40 5102 0.0016 4.72 16 0.51***
2008 5725 23662 0.1 43 5535 0.0015 4.66 14 0.54***
2009 6220 28353 0.105 44 6016 0.0015 4.53 14 0.54***
2010 6661 30567 0.097 48 6445 0.0014 4.57 13 0.53***
2011 7028 33248 0.103 54 6783 0.0014 4.50 15 0.54***
Notes: Table presents global network statistics for all three-year co-author networks of informal collaboration. Each network con-
nects researcher that have that collaborated formally (co-authoring) or informally on papers published in year t , t −1 or t −2. Size is
the number of researchers in the network resp. largest component. Links is the number of links connecting the researchers. Compo-
nents is the number of distinct network components. Density is the share of realized to potential paths (equation (2.7)) in the largest
component. Avg. path length is the average length of all possible paths between any two researchers in the largest component.
Diameter is the longest of all shortest paths between all researchers in the largest component. Avg. clustering is the average clus-
tering coefficient of all nodes in the network’s largest component (2.10). rho is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between
all researchers’ betweenness centrality (2.5) and Eigenvector centrality (2.4) in the largest component, with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicating















































Table 2.5: Global network measures for the co-author networks.
Overall Giant
Size Links Avg. clustering Components Size Density Avg. path length Diameter rho
1999 1201 966 0.374 481 33 0.0909 3.64 8 0.37**
2000 1255 1017 0.376 498 53 0.0581 5.16 13 0.30**
2001 1324 1082 0.374 524 45 0.0616 5.97 15 0.28*
2002 1416 1156 0.365 556 61 0.0443 6.26 15 0.35***
2003 1478 1237 0.371 565 66 0.0434 5.71 13 0.29**
2004 1659 1431 0.385 603 68 0.0435 6.14 14 0.35***
2005 1794 1581 0.409 647 131 0.0222 8.34 20 0.28***
2006 2044 1789 0.41 744 65 0.0529 3.71 8 0.53***
2007 2272 2171 0.455 747 264 0.0123 9.91 26 0.15**
2008 2551 2546 0.479 792 128 0.025 5.76 12 0.32***
2009 2762 2904 0.495 788 591 0.0054 12.26 34 0.15***
2010 2959 3063 0.497 860 505 0.0064 12.64 32 0.13***
2011 3109 3236 0.488 898 601 0.0053 10.76 27 0.20***
Notes: Table presents global network statistics for all three-year co-author networks. Each network connects researchers that have
jointly published a paper in year t , t −1 or t −2. Size is the number of researchers in the network resp. largest component. Links is
the number of links connecting the researchers. Components is the number of distinct network components. Density is the share
of realized to potential paths (equation (2.7)) in the largest component. Avg. path length is the average length of all possible paths
between any two researchers in the largest component. Diameter is the longest of all shortest paths between all researchers in the
largest component. Avg. clustering is the average clustering coefficient of all nodes in the network’s largest component (2.10). rho
is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between all researchers’ betweenness centrality (2.5) and Eigenvector centrality (2.4) in
the largest component, with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicating statistical significance to the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.
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Second, the co-author networks are sparse and unconnected in all years, but the inclu-
sion of links of informal collaboration drastically improves connectivity: (i) There are up to
898 distinct components in the co-author networks but at most 54 in the networks of informal
collaboration; (ii) In the co-author networks less than a fifth of all researchers are connected
within one component; In the networks of informal collaboration, however, the largest compo-
nent consistently captures at least 95% of all researchers; (iii) Average path length and diameters
are usually lower in the largest component of the network of informal collaboration compared
to the network of formal collaboration’s largest component. Figure 2.1 visualizes the dramatic
increase in connectedness due to the inclusion of links representing informal collaboration.
From left to right, i.e. going from the 1997-1999 period to the 2009-2011 period, the network
size and number of components increase. Going from top to bottom, i.e. going from co-author
networks to networks of informal collaboration, the number of nodes increases, the number
of components decreases, and the size of the giant component increases. These differences
in network size and connectivity have implications for the study of the flow of information or
spillovers due to collaboration.
Third, despite becoming more inclusive, both networks become less dense over time.
Looking at the network of informal collaboration only, density decreased from 0.0023 in 1999 to
0.0014 in 2011. This is because the growth rate of links (in this case a proxy for collaborations)
does not keep up with the growth rate of the number of participating researchers.
Fourth, a direct comparison suggests that for our period of analysis, the social network
of informal collaboration always exhibits small-world properties, while the social network of
formal collaboration never. Small-world networks, whose name is based on the small-world
phenomenon, have unique information transfer capabilities (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Watts,
1999). A network with small world properties is one with a high clustering, a small average
distance, a high number of nodes as compared to the number of links, and the fact that a large
share of authors are somehow connected via a series intermediate steps (i.e. a giant component
exists). Goyal et al. (2006) report how the world of academic economists has only become a
small world by the 1990-2000 period, as compared to the two previous decades.22 We find that
22The authors study co-author networks covering 10 years of publications in up to 105 journals listed in EconLit.
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none of the networks under consideration in our study display small-world properties: The co-
author networks have high average distance and giant component does not exist, while for the
networks of informal collaboration clustering is too low.
Fifth, in the network of informal collaboration, betweenness centrality and eigenvector
centrality of the same researcher do not strongly correlate. This is indicated by the Spearman
correlation coefficient ("rho") between eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality in the
last column of table 2.4, which never exceeds 0.54. Researchers that are important for the flow
of information (high betweenness centrality) are not often also well-suited to influence the net-
work (high eigenvector centrality).
Sixth, figure 2.1 furthermore shows a hierarchy in the flow of information. Links are col-
ored according to which journal an article was published in: Red indicates a top journal pub-
lication, while blue links indicate that the paper was published in one of the three other jour-
nals. The few links occurring in both groups of journals are colored purple. For both networks
it holds that the center of the network is dominated by links that originate from top journals.
This is indicative of a higher connectedness of the collaborators involved in publications in top
journals.
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of networks of informal and formal collaboration, 1997-1999 and 2009-
2011.
(a) Network of formal collaboration, 1997-1999 (b) Network of formal collaboration, 2009-2011
(c) Network of informal collaboration 1997-1999 (d) Network of informal collaboration, 2009-2011
Notes: Figures show networks of formal collaboration (top) and network of informal collabora-
tion (bottom) for publications in six financial economics journals published between 1997 and
1999 (left) and 2009 and 2011 (right). In the network of formal collaboration, a link is drawn
between every author of a published paper. In the network of informal collaboration, a link
is drawn between an acknowledged commenter and every author of a published paper. Red
links indicate that the paper was published in a top journal, while blue indicates a publica-
tion on other journals. If a link occurs in both a top journal and other journals, which is a rare
event, the link is colored in purple. Position in the network was computed according to the
Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm.
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2.3.4 Intensive and Extensive Margin of Informal Collaboration
The vast majority of published research papers acknowledges informal input by commenters.
Of the 6,401 papers in our sample, 5,641 (≈ 90%) papers acknowledge at least one commenter,
one seminar, or one conference (Figure 2.2).23 While we do not find much time-variation in this
share, there is a substantial variation on the journal-level (figure 2.2). In top journals almost
every paper reports at least one form of informal collaboration.
Figure 2.2: Share of papers with and without acknowledgements, by journal and year.































































































JF RFS JFE JFI JMCB JBF
Notes: Graph shows share of papers with (left bar) and without acknowledgment section (right
bar) for each year. An acknowledgement may contain named researchers mentioned for feed-
back, advice and discussion (unless she’s the journal’s managing editor), universities or confer-
ences where the paper was presented. Colors correspond to journals, where red-ish colors refer
to the three top journals (JF, JFE, RFS) and blue-ish colors refer to the three other journals (JFI,
JMCB, JBF).
Top journal publications not only acknowledge informal collaboration more often, they
also report a higher intensity thereof. On average, top journal publications acknowledge almost
twice as many commenters as papers published by the other journals, and are presented more
than twice as often at seminars and conferences (Figure 2.3). It is remarkable how well the rank-
ing of these six journals according to their impact factors is reflected in the average intensity of
informal collaboration. Another interesting feature is the similarity of the JFI (blue dotted line)
to the group of top journals (red lines) in terms of informal collaboration. One plausible expla-
nation is that papers, that aimed for the top journals but got rejected were then submitted to
the JFI.
23The remaining papers may acknowledge the editor, anonymous referees, funding, data exchange and research
assistance.
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Figure 2.3: Mean number of author-normalized commenters, seminars and conferences over
































































































































































































Notes: Graph shows mean number of acknowledged commenters (without the journal’s manag-
ing editor) (left plot), seminars (center plot) and conferences (right plot) per journal over time,
divided by the number of authors. Colors correspond to journals, where red-ish colors refer to
the three top journals (JF, JFE, RFS) and blue-ish colors refer to the three other journals (JFI,
JMCB, JBF).
Finally the three types of informal collaboration do not appear to be substitutes to each
other, as almost half of all the papers report all three forms, as the Venn diagram in figure 2.4
shows, and very few papers report only one form.
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Notes: Venn diagram shows share of papers that acknowledge commenters (excluding the jour-
nal’s managing editor), seminars and conferences.
2.3.5 Life-cycle effects and Reciprocity
Another interesting question about informal collaboration in financial economics is to ask who
is being acknowledged. Giving comments to authors is not evenly distributed across a re-
searcher’s life-cycle. The two histograms in figure 2.5 and the accompanying cumulative density
functions make it clear that the majority of comments are given by researchers with 3 to 20 years
of academic experience. This finding is irrespective of whether we use the simple count of com-
menters at a given academic experience (green bars and green line) or whether we weigh the
count with the number of given comments in a year (blue bars and blue line). If we do not weigh
the commenters by the number of commenters, we find the mode commenter to have 2 years
of academic experience. In the weighted case, the modal commenter has 7 years of academic
experience.
Figure 2.6 tracks for each commenter the number of papers acknowledging her over her
academic lifecyle. Very few researchers are acknowledged at a very high age. Among them are
Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson, who are represented by the rightmost lines.
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Figure 2.5: Histogram and CDF for number of commenters and comments by academic expe-
rience.
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Notes: Histogram showing the number of commenters (green) and comments (blue) by aca-
demic experience on the left axis. Right axis shows corresponding cumulative distribution func-
tions in percent. Experience is the number of years between first publication, as measured by
Scopus, and the publication year of the paper that acknowledges the commenter.
Figure 2.7 plots the joint density of author experience and commenter experience, mea-
sured in the year of the publication of the paper. The dashed line indicates a line of equal age: If
authors would mainly acknowledge commenters of the same age we would expect the mass of
the joint distribution along this line. This is not the case: The highest mass is for authors with
no experience and commenters with between three and 11 years since their first publication.
These are authors who publish for the first time. The joint distribution has a fatter upper tail
along the commenter’s experience as opposed to the author’s experience. The reason is that it
is more common to find informal collaboration where the author is less senior than the com-
menter rather than the other way around.
The observation that commenting on each others work is prevalent raises the question
as to why researchers invest their scarce time to read manuscripts when they do not receive
tangible credit for it. One possible explanation is that researchers are following a quid-pro-quo
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Figure 2.6: Number of comments in our dataset over the academic lifecycle, by researcher.
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Notes: Plot shows the relation between the number of papers that acknowledge a given re-
searcher to her experience. Experience is the number of years between first publication, as
measured by Scopus, and the publication year of the paper that acknowledges the commenter.
strategy, that is to help researchers who have helped them. Reciprocity in informal collabora-
tion takes two forms: First, comment on the work of one’s coauthors, and second, comment on
the work of one’s commenters. Accordingly, we define a paper a as exhibiting reciprocity if it
satisfies one of two conditions: 1) An acknowledged commenter is a co-author of at least one
of the authors of paper a; 2) An acknowledged commenter publishes a paper in our dataset not
jointly with an author in κa , and one of the authors of a is acknowledged. Of course, for con-
dition 1) or 2) to hold, at least one of the acknowledged commenters must be an author in the
dataset, and at least one paper is not single-authored. For this reason we only consider papers
with this prerequisite.
We find 455 papers that acknowledge informal input from co-authors of other papers—
out of 5,031 papers where this is possible, i.e. where at least one of the author’s coauthors is
an author in our dataset. There are 3,098 papers where at least one acknowledged commenter
acknowledges at least one of the authors on her papers. To put this into perspective, there are
CHAPTER 2. WHAT 5,000 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TELL US ABOUT INFORMAL ... 46
Figure 2.7: Heatmap showing joint distribution of author’s experience and commenter’s expe-
rience.



















Notes: Heatmaps displays the joint distribution of academic experience of authors (left axis,
right marginal plot) and of academic experience of commenters (bottom axis, top marginal
plot). Dark areas indicate higher density. Experience is the number of years between first pub-
lication, as measured by Scopus, and the publication year of the paper that acknowledges the
commenter.
5,012 papers where we could observe reciprocity by acknowledged commenters, i.e. where at
least one commenter authors a paper without the authors who acknowledged her. In total,
3,214 (about 70% of 5,031) papers fulfill one of the above reciprocity conditions.
One caveat is in order, as we only observe commenter links within a set of six Financial
Economics journals. This is not necessarily the natural domain of all commenters. For exam-
ple, the Nobel laureate in Economics in 2014, Lars Peter Hansen, has been acknowledged by
more than 20 papers in our dataset, while he didn’t author one paper in our dataset. The same
holds true for the 1993 Nobel laureate Douglass North, who appears in two acknowledgement
sections. Both might well acknowledge any of the authors that acknowledged them in papers
published in other journals.
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2.3.6 Covariates of Centrality Rank and Number of Acknowledgments
Next, we want to understand how centralities in the networks are related to one another and–
more importantly–with observable characteristics of researchers. Considering researcher i in
the network corresponding to year t , we thus estimate the following empirical model
Centralityi ,t =β0 +β1femalei +β2Euclidi t +β3PublicationStocki t+
β3CitationStocki t +β4Experiencei t +β4ExperienceSQi t +Dt +εi (2.12)
where Centrality is one of eigenvector centrality rank, betweenness centrality rank, out-
degree, and number of thanks. Though correlated, out-degree and the number of thanks differ:
out-degree measures the number of authors acknowledging a researcher, number of thanks the
number of papers. This accounts for the fact that the commenter possibly spoke to multiple
authors of a paper on which she is acknowledged. Each variable is measured in the network
corresponding to year t , i.e. the network inferred from acknowledged commenters on papers
published in t , t−1, and t−2. All other variables are measured in t . We include fixed effects for t
to account for the growth of the network over time. We cluster standard errors on the researcher
level to capture unobserved heterogeneity. There are two sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
One is a different frequency in the data: Some researcher occur in all networks, while others
only in one network. The other source of unobserved heterogeneity is different individual net-
works that authors can draw from. If the dependent variable is a rank (for eigenvector centrality
rank and betweenness centrality rank), a negative β indicates a positive relationship.
Table 2.6 presents summary statistics for the sample. Since we pool all researchers in
all networks for all years, there are 65,800 observations (where the same researcher can show
up with different centrality in different years). Table 2.7 presents Spearman correlation coeffi-
cients of the variables. It is noteworthy how weakly eigenvector centrality rank correlates with
author characteristics, as no coefficient surpasses −0.12.24 The number of thanks correlates
with productivity measures only weakly, too: Of all the Spearman correlations between number
24A negative correlation indicates a positive relationship between better centrality ranks (lower numbers) and
productivity.
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of thanks and any of the author metrics, the highest is with the Euclidean index of citations and
equals 0.37. Being central in the network of informal collaboration is hence not the same as
being a prolific author.25
Table 2.6: Summary statistics for all variables continued variables used in the pooled centrality
sample.
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
Characteristics
Euclid. Index 56997 98.8 27 265.38 0 9676
Publication stock 56997 13.8 8 17.75 0 339
Citation stock 56997 1712.4 180 5961.26 0 326129
Experience 56997 11.8 10 10.38 −18 70
Experience SQ 56997 247.8 100 364.82 0 4900
Informal Collaboration
Eigenvector centrality 51893 2358.3 2139 1612.04 1 6783
Betweenness centrality 51893 2232.5 2070 1492.46 1 5766
Out-Degree 56997 4.0 2 6.64 0 123
No. of Thanks 56997 2.0 1 3.40 0 98
Notes: Summary statistics for pooled centrality sample, where the unit of observation is the
combination of researcher i and year t . Euclid. Index is the Euclidean index of citations of a
researcher (equation (2.1)) in year t . Publication Stock is the count of all publications published
until year t (including). Citation Stock is the count of all citations to all publications until year t
(including). Experience is the number of years between the year of first publication and t . Expe-
rience SQ is its square. These five variables are computed using data from Scopus. Eigenvector
centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s Eigenvector centrality in the network
corresponding to year t . Betweenness centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s
betweenness centrality in the network corresponding to year t . Out-Degree is the number of
distinct authors that acknowledge this researcher in t , t − 1 and t − 2. No. of Thanks is the
number of papers published in t , t −1 and t −2 that acknowledge this researcher.
Table 2.8 presents results of a pooled OLS regression for model (2.12) with different de-
pendent variables. The first striking observation is that females are acknowledged less often
and have a lower out-degree, even at the same level of academic productivity and experience.
Female researchers also rank worse in terms of eigenvector centrality (≈ 91 ranks) and between-
ness centrality (≈ 120 ranks), but only when excluding the year-fixed effects in models (2) and
(4). The statistical malus for female researchers is hence time-varying. The Euclidean index of
citations is statistically significantly associated with higher betweenness centrality ranks, higher
25These correlations hold for the pooled sample. Looking at period-wise levels, we find the same pattern.
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Citation stock 0.97 0.87
Experience 0.77 0.81 0.87
Experience SQ 0.75 0.78 0.86 0.98
Informal Collaboration
Eigenvector centrality 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.16
Betweenness centrality -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.64
Out-Degree 0.36 0.21 0.33 0.23 0.25 -0.02 -0.31
No. of Thanks 0.38 0.23 0.35 0.25 0.26 -0.05 -0.33 0.93
Notes: Spearman correlation coefficients for pooled centrality sample, where the unit of obser-
vation is the combination of researcher i and year t . Euclid. Index is the Euclidean index of cita-
tions of a researcher (equation (2.1)) in year t . Publication Stock is the count of all publications
published until year t (including). Citation Stock is the count of all citations to all publications
until year t (including). Experience is the number of years between the year of first publication
and t . Experience SQ is its square. These five variables are computed using data from Scopus.
Eigenvector centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s Eigenvector centrality in
the network corresponding to year t . Betweenness centrality rank is the rank according to the
researcher’s betweenness centrality in the network corresponding to year t . Out-Degree is the
number of distinct authors that acknowledge this researcher in t , t −1 and t −2. No. of Thanks
is the number of papers published in t , t −1 and t −2 that acknowledge this researcher.
out-degree and a higher number of thanks. Publication stock is statistically significantly associ-
ated with higher eigenvector centrality ranks and higher betweenness centrality ranks. Citation
stock is only statistically significantly associated with lower betweenness centrality ranks. There
are interesting life-cycle effects at work. More experienced authors tend to be less eigenvector
central (one more year ≈ -16 eigenvector centrality ranks), have a higher out-degree and are
thanked more often, but they are not more betweenness central. The relationship between ex-
perience and eigenvector centrality rank appears to be increasing, the relationships with the
other variables are decreasing. Finally, as expected, a higher number of thanks is statistically















































Table 2.8: Regression results for pooled OLS estimation explaining centrality in the network of informal collaboration and number
of thanks.
Eigenvector centrality rank Betweenness centrality rank Out-Degree No. of Thanks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female −17.769 91.218∗∗∗ 8.835 120.675∗∗∗ −0.542∗∗∗ −0.499∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗
(29.799) (31.513) (28.130) (30.201) (0.171) (0.169) (0.084) (0.084)
Euclid. Index −0.044 0.265∗∗ −0.194∗∗ 0.124 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.088) (0.106) (0.087) (0.123) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Publication stock −1.723∗∗ 0.434 −6.975∗∗∗ −4.759∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.756) (0.852) (0.819) (0.900) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Citation stock 0.002 −0.005 0.012∗∗∗ 0.005 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience 16.028∗∗∗ 17.564∗∗∗ −1.179 0.379 0.202∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(2.384) (2.789) (2.537) (2.977) (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011)
Experience SQ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.078) (0.071) (0.085) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
No. of Thanks −96.683∗∗∗ −96.934∗∗∗ −157.451∗∗∗ −157.698∗∗∗
(6.424) (5.776) (12.489) (11.710)
Constant 2,261.929∗∗∗ 2,458.945∗∗∗ 2.325∗∗∗ 1.148∗∗∗
(21.457) (25.287) (0.082) (0.042)
Year-FE Y es No Y es No Y es No Y es No
Clustered SE Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual
Mean 2358 2358 2232 2232 4.01 4.01 2 2
N 51,893 51,893 51,893 51,893 56,997 56,997 56,997 56,997
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.062 0.311 0.144 0.099 0.098 0.097 0.097
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Eigenvector
centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s Eigenvector centrality in the network of informal collaboration corresponding to year t
(equation (2.4)). Betweenness centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s betweenness centrality in the network of informal collab-
oration corresponding to year t (equation (2.5)). Out-Degree is the number of distinct authors that acknowledge this researcher in t , t −1 and
t −2. No. of Thanks is the number of papers published in t , t −1 and t −2 that acknowledge this researcher. Female indicates that the researcher’s
first name is estimated to be female. Euclid. Index is the Euclidean index of citations in year t . Publication Stock is the count of all publications
published until year t (including). Citation Stock is the count of all citations to all publications until year t (including). Experience is the number
of years between the year of first publication and t . Experience SQ is its square. These five variables are computed using data from Scopus. These
five variables are computed using data from Scopus.
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Table 2.9 shows that the malus for female academics is vanishing over time in our dataset–
female researchers are no longer significantly less central than their male counterparts. The
table shows the coefficients for interactions of the female variable and the year variable, relative
to year 2011. In both models, we include all individual characteristics and cluster standard
errors around the indivdual researcher. After 2006, the interaction coefficient is not statistically
significant anymore. Put differently, past 2006 we don’t find evidence of a female malus for
eigenvector centrality rank in the network of informal collaboration. For betweenness centrality
the last year with signs of a statistical malus is 2005, although the malus has always been weak.
Figure 2.8 plots the time-varying relationship and thus gives a better grasp of the magnitude.
For comparison we conduct a similar regression for eigenvector centrality rank, between-
ness centrality rank and degree measured in the network of formal collaboration. The results
are reported in table 2.10. The number of observations for the first two columns (eigenvector
centrality rank and betweenness centrality rank) is very low because we only consider centrality
ranks of authors in the networks’ giant components. The first row indicates that female authors
do not rank worse. The Euclidean index of citations impacts eigenvector centrality rank and
betweenness centrality rank negatively. Authors that publish more are more eigenvector- and
betweenness central, and also have a higher degree.26 We find that citation stock furthermore
negatively affects degree, i.e. authors who are cited more have fewer distinct co-authors hold-
ing constant the number of papers they have published. More experienced authors also have
more distinct coauthors, albeit at a decreasing rate. This can be seen from the positive coeffi-
cient for Experience and the negative coefficient for Experience2. Finally, authors who are more
often thanked also tend to be more eigenvector central, more betweenness central and have a
higher degree: For each additional paper that thanks the author, the author is expected to be 1
rank position more eigenvector central, 3 rank positions more betweenness central, and have
0.1 more distinct co-authors.
26These effects may partly be mechanical since publishing often is correlated with having distinct coauthors.
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Figure 2.8: Coefficient plot for different centrality values of female researchers interacted with
years.





































Notes: Figures depict coefficients and standard deviations from table 2.9. Coefficients are inter-
actions of female*year, with 2011 as reference category. Eigenvector cent. rank is the researcher’s
eigenvector centrality in the giant component of the network of informal collaboration accord-
ing to equation (2.4). Betweenness cent. rank is the researcher’s betweenness centrality in the
giant component of the network of informal collaboration according to equation (2.5).
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Table 2.9: Interaction effects of Female*year of pooled OLS estimation explaining centrality in
the network of informal collaboration.




























Controls Y es Y es
Clustered SE Individual Individual
Mean 2358 2232
N 51,893 51,893
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.311
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1,
5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Eigenvector centrality rank is the rank according to the
researcher’s Eigenvector centrality in the network of informal collaboration corresponding to
year t (equation (2.4)). Betweenness centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s be-
tweenness centrality in the network of informal collaboration corresponding to year t (equation















































Table 2.10: Regression results for pooled OLS estimation explaining centrality in the network of formal collaboration.
Eigenvector centrality rank Betweenness centrality rank Degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female −6.045 9.092 −1.308 8.620 0.014 0.048
(9.172) (11.793) (3.823) (6.058) (0.039) (0.039)
Euclid. Index 0.001 0.063∗ −0.007 0.034∗ 0.0002 0.0004
(0.024) (0.036) (0.012) (0.018) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Publication stock −0.802∗∗∗ −1.222∗∗∗ −0.886∗∗∗ −1.183∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.304) (0.396) (0.179) (0.223) (0.002) (0.002)
Citation stock 0.001 0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ −0.00002∗ −0.00003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Experience 0.091 −0.088 −0.395 −0.487 0.014∗∗ 0.011∗
(1.151) (1.523) (0.578) (0.876) (0.006) (0.006)
Experience SQ −0.006 −0.001 0.036∗ 0.038 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗
(0.032) (0.042) (0.019) (0.026) (0.0002) (0.0002)
No. of Thanks −0.538 −1.066∗ −2.383∗∗∗ −2.712∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.446) (0.622) (0.598) (0.428) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 220.080∗∗∗ 159.506∗∗∗ 1.463∗∗∗
(9.527) (5.281) (0.026)
Year-FE Y es No Y es No Y es No
Clustered SE Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual
Mean 210 210 140 140 1.87 1.87
N 2,611 2,611 2,611 2,611 25,824 25,824
Adjusted R2 0.385 0.011 0.620 0.067 0.130 0.116
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Eigenvector
centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s Eigenvector centrality in the network of formal collaboration corresponding to year t
(equation (2.4)). Betweenness centrality rank is the rank according to the researcher’s betweenness centrality in the network of formal collabo-
ration corresponding to year t (equation (2.5)). Degree is the researcher’s degree in the network of formal collaboration corresponding to year t
(equation (2.2)). Female indicates that the researcher’s first name is estimated to be female. Euclid. Index is the Euclidean index of citations in
year t . Publication Stock is the count of all publications published until year t (including). These five variables are computed using data from
Scopus. Citation Stock is the count of all citations to all publications until year t (including). Experience is the number of years between the year
of first publication and t . Experience SQ is its square.
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Centrality in the network of informal collaboration is only mildly correlated with exist-
ing measures of academic influence such as publication count or a joint measure of citations
and publications. We therefore argue that centralities provide an alternative ranking method to
assess the influence a scholar has on the profession.
2.3.7 Who are the most central authors and commenters?
Laband and Tollison (2003) compile a list of the most often thanked authors from a sample of
three general interest Economics journals over forty years. Our sample however uses a more
homogeneous sample27 and adopts a network view. Table 2.11 ranks researchers based on their
average rankings according to different measures (the full list is available online). We rank re-
searchers according to how often they have been acknowledged, their betweenness centrality
in the co-author network, their betweenness centrality in the commenter network, eigenvector
centrality in the co-author network and their eigenvector centrality in the commenter network.
We add corresponding statistics derived from the co-author network as a contrast.
Some of the greatest financial economists of our time are prominently featured in the
ranking. Stulz, R. M. has been acknowledged most often, followed by Stein, J. C. and Ritter, J. R.
Both Stein, J. C. and Stulz, R. M. are also very eigenvector central: Stulz, R. M. is the most eigen-
vector central in the Co-Author network (followed by Berger, A. N. and Titman, S. D.), while
Stein, J. C. is the most eigenvector central researcher in the Commenter network (followed by
Shleifer, A. and Zingales, L.). However, other researchers are most betweenness central: In the
Co-Author network, Shivdasani, A., Chen, J. and Lemmon, M. L. are the most betweenness cen-
tral researchers. In the Commenter network, the three most betweenness central researchers
are Lin, C., Liu, J. and Ma, Y.
An interesting observation is the high placements of editors. Note that we do not count
informal collaboration with editors on papers that fall within her tenure; all counts of acknowl-
edgements of editors and the resulting links in the network of informal collaboration thus result
27General interest journals in Economics publish papers from a wider range of topics than do journals in Finan-
cial Economics.
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Table 2.11: Top 30 researchers according to average rankings according to different centrality
measures in all co-author and commenter networks.
Thanks Betweenness centrality Eigenvector centrality
Co-Author network Commenter network Co-Author network Commenter network
1 Stulz, R. M. Shivdasani, A. Lin, C. Stulz, R. M. Sensoy, B. A.
2 Stein, J. C. Chen, J. Liu, J. Berger, A. N. Yun, H.
3 Ritter, J. R. Lemmon, M. L. Ma, Y. Titman, S. D. Korteweg, A.
4 Shleifer, A. Altman, E. I. Cull, R. Shleifer, A. Stulz, R. M.
5 Titman, S. D. Okunev, J. Xuan, Y. Ritter, J. R. Kim, C.
6 Campbell, J. Y. Cao, C. Q. Cummins, J. D. Harvey, C. R. Hsu, P. H.
7 Amihud, Y. Chordia, T. Lim, T. Flannery, M. J. Xuan, Y.
8 Zingales, L. Goldstein, I. Weiss, M. A. Graham, J. R. Chen, H.
9 Green, R. C. Liu, J. Walter, I. Ferson, W. E. Ghent, A. C.
10 Ferson, W. E. Cooney, J. W. Lin, P. Zingales, L. Lyon, J. D.
11 Harvey, C. R. Walter, I. Clarke, G. R. Karolyi, G. A. Baker, M. P.
12 Duffie, J. D. Haubrich, J. G. Chen, J. Amihud, Y. Duchin, R. A.
13 Fama, E. F. Hancock, D. G. Zou, H. Duffie, J. D. Wurgler, J.
14 Jagannathan, R. Ryngaert, M. D. Scalise, J. M. Stein, J. C. Purnanandam, A. K.
15 Petersen, M. A. Lo, A. Hancock, D. G. Subrahmanyam, A. Sevick, M.
16 Schwert, G. W. Brav, A. Mithal, S. Hirshleifer, D. Kim, Y. C.
17 Flannery, M. J. Subrahmanyam, A. Zi, H. Saunders, A. Zhang, L.
18 Brennan, M. J. Mester, L. J. Neis, E. Campbell, J. Y. Tsai, C. L.
19 Rajan, R. G. Stulz, R. M. Kashyap, A. K. Fohlin, C. Chava, S.
20 Berger, A. N. Kang, J. K. Haubrich, J. G. Boudreaux, D. J. Seru, A.
21 French, K. R. Davidson, I. R. Song, F. M. Khan, M. A. Laeven, L.
22 Cochrane, J. H. Berlin, M. Wang, A. W. Petersen, M. A. Woo, S. J.
23 Daniel, K. D. Sias, R. W. Cao, C. Q. Levine, R. L. Subrahmanyam, A.
24 Allen, F. Moon, C. Covitz, D. M. Brav, A. Graham, J. R.
25 Kaplan, S. N. Gosnell, T. F. Piazzesi, M. Ongena, S. Roussanov, N.
26 Diamond, D. W. Chiang, R. C. Bonime, S. D. Woo, D. Tian, X.
27 Karolyi, G. A. Hughes, J. P. Ahn, H. Lemmon, M. L. Van Hemert, O.
28 O’Hara, M. Berger, A. N. Lo, A. Servaes, H. Kuehn, L. A.
29 Scharfstein, D. S. Cull, R. Michael, F. A. Weisbach, M. S. Knoeber, C. R.
30 Thakor, A. V. Wilson, B. K. Liu, P. Starks, L. T. Huang, J.
Notes: Table ranks researchers based on their average ranking according to various measures
derived from publications in six financial economics journals published between 1997 and
2011. "Thanks" is the number of publications in this period that acknowledge the researcher for
feedback, unless she was managing editor of the journal the paper got published in. "Between-
ness centrality" (equation (2.5)) and "Eigenvector centrality" (equation (2.4)) are measured in
the network connecting co-coauthors only resp. authors and commenters.
from papers published in journals other than those the editor is serving for. Editors are thus ap-
proached by other researchers even when the paper is not being published in their journal,
suggesting an exposed role for editors in the profession (Brogaard et al., 2014).28
28An alternative explanation is that editors are being acknowledged even in the case of a desk-rejection on the
paper.
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Figure 2.9: Spearman rank correlation coefficients over period between various variables.
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Notes: Figures depict Spearman rank correlation coefficients over time for various variables. For each
year t , the sample includes publications in six financial economics journals published in t , t − 1 and
t −2. Euclidean index is the researcher’s Euclidean index of citations according to equation (2.1). Thanks
is the number of papers that acknowledge this researcher. Eigenvector cent. rank is the researcher’s
eigenvector centrality in the giant component of the network of informal (com) and formal (auth) col-
laboration according to equation (2.4). Betweenness cent. rank is the researcher’s betweenness centrality
in the giant component of the network of informal (com) and formal (auth) collaboration according to
equation (2.5).
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Table 2.11 highlights that often thanked scientists are not necessarily the most relevant
for the flow of information, nor the most connected authors. This is corroborated by the corre-
lation coefficients depicted in figure 2.9. It shows Spearman correlations over time between all
centralities, the Euclidean index of citations and the number of thanks. Subfigure 2.9a confirms
that being thanked often and being a very prolific academic is not the same, as the Spearman
rank correlation coefficient never surpasses 0.3. A low correlation also exists between being
thanked often and being central in the co-author network (subfigure 2.9b). All correlation coef-
ficients are very stable over time.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Strategic Acknowledging
An important question to address is whether authors use their acknowledgements (predom-
inantly) strategically. In this case acknowledgements would not necessarily reflect informal
collaboration between authors and acknowledged commenters. Following Hamermesh (1992,
p. 171), we define strategic acknowledging as an author’s attempt to influence an editor in
her choice of referees by acknowledging "someone who has not seen the paper, as a talisman
against that person being chosen." Even though there might be conflicting views,29 the general
assumption seems to be that editors do not pick already acknowledged commenters. Accord-
ing to this assumption, authors would want to thank someone that has a reputation of being
a tough referee.30 Irrespective of whether editors actually behave according to this view, ac-
knowledging someone who has not actually given a comment carries a high reputation risk. If
that person learns about it (e.g. during the review process), it will reflect badly on the author.31
While we have no doubt that some authors use the acknowledgement section of their pa-
29Other authors have indicated they believe that editors would prefer to pick someone who is acknowledged.
30This strategy is summarized in "Cite your friends, acknowledge your foes." Editors of various journals, however,
have indicated to us that they seldom exclude a potential referee simply because this person is acknowledged.
Also, not all editors explicitly look into the acknowledgment section when selecting a referee.
31Because of this risk, Hamermesh (1992, p. 171) writes in his "Guide to Professional Etiquette": "DON’T PLAY
THESE GAMES - the gains are not worth the potential cost of being caught" (emphasis in the original).
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per as a signaling device (e.g. to influence the editor), we observe a number of stylized facts
which indicate that this is not a systemic phenomenon. First, authors do not put the names of
senior and prominent researchers first in the acknowledgment section. Rather, authors usually
order the names of commenters alphabetically. Second, the list of commenters is not always
first in the acknowledgement section (which in total may well span more than 10 lines). Sem-
inars, conferences, research assistance or funding are listed before commenters. Third, more
than half of all papers acknowledge individuals that no other publication acknowledges. This
speaks against the view that all acknowledged commenters are put down for strategic reasons,
as there is little signaling value in thanking researchers that are relatively unknown to Financial
Economics as a field. The low correlation between being frequently acknowledged and being
prolific reported earlier also shows that authors do not predominantly acknowledge prolific au-
thors.
Another form of intentional acknowledging could still exist in our data. Authors could
strategically seek advice from senior and well-known researchers. This variant of strategic ac-
knowledging, however, is precisely what we want to capture. Authors identify scholars that they
think might be of help for an ongoing research project and with whom they subsequently try to
collaborate. For our analysis it is not relevant why scholars discuss with each other, as long as
they actually collaborate.
2.4.2 Relation to Other Studies in the Field and External Validity of our Data
In order to establish more confidence in our novel data, we report replication for major stud-
ies in the field. We replicate two studies with our data, Laband and Tollison (2000) and Brown
(2005). Both estimate the impact of informal intellectual collaboration on the number of ci-
tations of published papers. We are able to replicate the results and sometimes find stronger
correlations. Thus our data are akin to the data used in the existing literature.
Laband and Tollison (2000) use 251 featured articles published in the Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics during the years 1976-1980. They estimate the effect of the number of
acknowledged commenters to explain the number of citations the paper receives over the fol-
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lowing six years. They control for the cumulative stock of citations from the previous five years
for all authors, as well as the number of pages. They show that the number of commenters
is statistically significantly and positively associated with the paper’s citation count. In alter-
ations to the model they add the commenters’ joint citation stock over the previous five years,
and the count of commenters that are a) not at the same department as the authors, b) on one
of the author’s dissertation committee, c) at the same department as one of the authors, and
d) commenter not belonging to one of the previous groups. Columns (1) through (3) in table
2.12 replicate model (1) through (3) of table 4 of Laband and Tollison (2000). While models (1)
and (2) are similar, in model (3) we find the number of acknowledged commenters still to be
statistically and economically significant after controlling for their caliber.
Brown (2005) uses a negative binomial regression similar to ours and a sample of 256
papers published in The Accounting Review, the Journal of Accounting Research, and the Jour-
nal of Accounting and Economics during 2000-2002. The dependent variable to measure pub-
lication success is the number of citations since publication according to the Social Science
Citation Index. His main explanatory variables are the number of commenters, the number
of conferences, and the number of seminars. Brown (2005) controls for the number of pages,
the number of authors, whether the paper was highly downloaded from SSRN, and also uses
journal- and time-fixed effects. He finds that only seminars have a statistically significant and
positive impact on citation count. Estimating the impact of acceptance probability on the jour-
nal he edited—The Accounting Review—he finds that all forms of informal intellectual collab-
oration matter. Column (4) table 2.12 reports replicates of estimates presented in Brown (2005,
Table 8C), with the difference that we do not control for the number of downloads from SSRN.
However, for our sample we find a statistically significant relationship between the number of
commenters and citation count, even after controlling for the number of acknowledged semi-
nars and conferences.
CHAPTER 2. WHAT 5,000 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TELL US ABOUT INFORMAL ... 61
Table 2.12: Regression results replicating Laband and Tollison (2000) and Brown (2005)
.
Six-year citations Total citations
OLS negative
binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Authors’ 5-year cites 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
No. of pages 0.756∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.065) (0.066)
No. of authors 0.171∗∗∗
(0.015)
No. of commenters 1.181∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.126) (0.002)
Commenters’ 5-year cites 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003)
No. of seminars 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
No. of conferences 0.0003
(0.008)
Constant 0.984 2.866 −0.212 4.092∗∗∗
(1.431) (1.792) (1.846) (0.067)
Journal-fixed effects No No No Y es
Publication year-fixed effects No No No Y es
N 6,356 5,291 5,291 6,370
R2 0.141 0.132 0.139
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.132 0.138
Log Likelihood -33,448.640
Residual Std. Error 43.815 (df = 6352) 46.796 (df = 5287) 46.614 (df = 5286)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Column
1 through 3 replicate models 1 through 3 of Laband and Tollison (2000, Table 4). Column 3 replicates
Panel B of Brown (2005, Table 8), with a slightly different variable definition and without the SSRN con-
trol variable. Reported coefficients in column 4 are marginal effects and show the per cent increase in
the citation count in response to a 1 unit increase in the independent variable, holding all variables at
their mean and setting binary variables to 0. Authors’ 5-year cites is the sum of individual citation stocks
(according to Scopus) for all authors for the five years prior to the publication year. No. of pages and No.
of pages is the count of pages and authors, respectively. No. of commenters s the count of all commenters
acknowledged for concept-related input (excluding editors). Commenters’ 5-year cites is the sum of indi-
vidual citation stocks (according to Scopus) for all commenters acknowledged for concept-related input
(excluding editors) for the five years prior to the publication year. No. of seminars and No. of conferences
is the count of seminars resp. conferences acknowledged in the papers’ acknowledgment section.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter highlights the importance of informal collaboration among financial economists.
The nascent literature on collaboration in academia focuses mostly on formal collaboration, i.e.
co-authorship, but most collaboration among researchers in financial economics is informal,
in the form of commentary and feedback. We use a novel and unique dataset obtained from
the acknowledgement sections of 6,401 research papers published in six scholarly journals in
financial economics between 1997 and 2011. Using this data set, we present a number of novel
results about informal collaboration, focusing on the social network formed when researchers
collaborate informally. Specifically, we show that a researcher’s position in this network of in-
formal collaboration–measured as her eigenvector centrality, a well-established network of in-
fluence in netowrks–correlates with her future productivity and also with the academic impact
of papers she comments on. This is particularly useful information in case of young researchers
who have no or only few publications when applying for a job.
Once we have established that the network of informal collaboration is more than just a
random collection of bilateral collaborations and that a researcher’s position actually contains
useful information, we study this network in more detail. We show that researchers with a high
betweenness centrality in the network of informal collaboration, i.e. researchers who connect
disparate research communities, are less likely to publish in top finance journals, but if they do,
their papers receive more citations than the average paper published in the same journal. We
then show that the number of researchers who are involved in producing research in financial
economics is roughly twice as large as the number of authors who publish themselves. This
results in the network of informal collaboration being much more densely connected than the
network of formal collaboration.
Finally, we turn to an analysis of what makes a researcher more central in the network
of informal collaboration and then provide a list of the most central financial economists from
1997 to 2011. We show that more senior researchers are less eigenvector central, while more
prolific researchers have a higher betweenness centrality and thus are more likely to connect
otherwise disparate research communities. We provide the list of the most central researchers
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to build intuition for our results and to highlight those researchers who are, in the terminology
of Oettl (2012), more helpful.
Informal collaboration is vital in other disciplines as well (Cronin, 1995). Studying infor-
mal collaboration, as well as the flow of information it reveals, can help understand differences
in (perceived) quality among journals, papers, authors and affiliations. One aspect of this chap-
ter, and the entire dissertation, is to take on a network perspective, and to show how networks
of formal and informal collaboration differ. The growing literature on “knowledge networks”,
reviewed by Phelps et al. (2012), highlights this nicely. We demonstrate the informational con-
tent of networks of informal collaboration and show how they differ from co-author networks.
The topology of these networks is of interest, because it affects the speed of learning and the
diffusion of information (Alatas et al., 2016).
The analysis of collaboration adds new insights into the division of labor in academic
teams. There is a wide range of activities that are necessary for scientific innovation (Haeussler
and Sauermann, 2016). Not all of these need to be performed by formal collaboration: Authors
can extend the team to outsource activities that do not justify co-authorship alone. Put differ-
ently, a group of researchers produces an academic paper, but this research group may be larger
than the actual authors (Ponomariov and Boardman, 2016).
This chapter does not aim to causally identify what determines patterns of formal or infor-
mal collaboration. Rather, it highlights a number of interesting observations based on our novel
data. These observations give rise to an array of interesting questions, though. What is the un-
derlying mechanism for the correlation between eigenvector centrality and a researchers’ future
productivity? What is the mechanism through which researchers improve the academic impact
of a research paper with their commentary? What incentivizes researchers to comment on each
others work, given that we do not find strong evidence for reciprocity? What explains the age
effects in the provision of commentary? Why are female researchers statistically significantly
less often acknowledged at same levels of academic productivity and experience? What caused
the statistical malus for female researchers in eigenvector centrality to disappear around 2006?
When do researchers decide to collaborate informally? When do they collaborate formally? Is
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there a transition from informal to formal collaboration, or vice versa? These questions are rel-
evant to the profession and our study is a first step towards a broader understanding of the role
informal collaboration plays in the creation of knowledge.
Chapter 3
Informal Collaboration with Central
Colleagues
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we show that intellectual collaboration positively influences research output
through information spillover and complementarities in research efforts. A researcher absorbs
more information about the work of other researchers when she exerts more effort on her re-
search activities–she becomes more knowledgeable. Collaborating with a more knowledgeable
researcher implies access to more accumulated knowledge and hence greater benefits from in-
formation spillover.
Several authors have taken steps to explain the sources of increase in collaboration (Hud-
son, 1996; Laband and Tollison, 2000; Goyal et al., 2006) and show that intellectual collaboration
among researchers has a positive impact on their productivity (Wuchty et al., 2007; Waldinger,
2012; Ductor et al., 2014; Ductor, 2015). By intellectual collaboration we mean both formal col-
laboration in the form of co-authorship, and informal collaboration in form of advice and feed-
back on an ongoing project.1 Besides its positive impact on productivity, understanding how
1See Laband and Tollison (2000) for a similar characterization of the term. Economists are prominently advised
to seek feedback and commentary from their colleagues on a research article prior to publication (Green et al.,
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the social network of intellectual collaboration affects the outcome of research projects is also
relevant in light of recent trends in academia, such as the increasing competition for space in
top scholarly journals (Card and DellaVigna, 2013), the increasing time lag until publication (El-
lison, 2002), the increasing duration of education of researchers (Jones, 2009). The mechanisms
that drive the positive relationship between collaboration and research output are, however, not
clearly understood.
Our notion of intellectual collaboration is akin to the notion of absorptive capacity in the
literature on R&D investment by firms. This notion was first developed by Cohen and Levinthal
(1989) who show that not only does R&D generate new information, it also enhances the firm’s
ability to assimilate and exploit existing information. The latter leads to complementarities in
R&D investments through information spillovers. We argue that the same principle applies to
intellectual collaboration in fundamental scientific research.
We develop a simple model of intellectual collaboration in academia that incorporates the
notion of strategic complementarity in efforts. In our model, academics collaborate in a social
network of intellectual collaboration. They derive utility from the net output from research
activities. That is, the total quality and quantity of their output less the opportunity cost of not
working, i.e. enjoying leisure time. We control for the quality of research output by normalizing
effort by the number of projects a researcher undertakes in a given period of time. To model
strategic complementarity in efforts, we assume that the marginal output depends positively
on a researcher’s intrinsic characteristics, and the effort exerted by her collaborators.
The existence of a term capturing complementarity in efforts implies that equilibrium al-
location of effort exercised by an academic is a function of the academic’s Bonacich network
centrality (Ballester et al., 2006). The aggregate equilibrium effort and hence total output in-
creases with connectivity. Overall, in equilibrium, researchers with the highest centrality are
also those with the highest effort. This implies that collaborating with central colleagues leads
to higher level (quantity and quality) of individual output. At the project level, it follows that
collaborating with central colleagues leads to a high quality project, and hence higher scientific
2002).
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impact, measured by the number of citations a research article receives.
We test this hypothesis in the academic field of financial economics, which has the ad-
vantage of being a large and a relatively homogeneous sub-field of economics. Our main data
source, which was introduced in the previous chapter 2 ,are the title pages of 6,401 full research
articles from six scholarly journals in financial economics published between 1997 and 2011.
From these articles we manually construct a novel and unique data set consisting of all authors
and commenters acknowledged in a research article. Each network consists of three consecu-
tive years of publications and connects authors to acknowledged commenters and vice-verse.
Links in the network are directed and weighted. Weights correspond to the frequency of inter-
action and by the productivity of the target node, where productivity is defined as Euclidean
index of citations divided by number of years since first publication (experience).
To overcome endogeneity inherent to social networks (Graham, 2015), we compute cen-
trality scores in a network where deceased authors have been removed with a network where
they have not. The change between two centrality scores is then purely due to the exogenous
removal of deceases authors.
We assess the impact of commenter centrality change on citation count in a negative bi-
nomial regression and find significant support for our hypothesis. We find, in our main result,
that an increase in Bonacich centrality by 2% of the average most central commenter is as-
sociated with an increase by about 1 citation for the average article–after addressing inherent
network endogeneity and after controlling for an extensive set of author, discussant, and biblio-
metric characteristics. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, including
different attenuation factors in the computation of the Boncich centrality, different centralities
and different network specifications.
The chapter contributes to various strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the lit-
erature that studies the impact of intellectual collaboration on research output. Hollis (2001)
finds that academic teamwork has positive effects on quality, length and the number of pub-
lished articles. In addition, he finds that increasing co-authorship in the past (conditioning on
current average co-authorship and the lifetime number of articles) increases the likelihood that
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an academic is prolific today. Hollis (2001) attributes this to learning that occurs in the collab-
orative process. A similar result is reflected upon in Ductor et al. (2014), who find that an early
career academic’s network of formal intellectual collaboration helps predict their future pro-
ductivity. Azoulay et al. (2010) provide evidence of information spillovers and find that the loss
of a superstar academic leads to a lasting 5−8% average decline in the quality-adjusted publica-
tion rates of co-authors. Waldinger (2012) shows that professors’ productivity drops after they
lose a co-author due to dismissal. The chapter contributes to this debate by showing that the
positive relationship between intellectual collaboration and research output can be explained
by the relationship between information spillover and complementarities in efforts.2
Secondly, the chapter contributes to the theoretical literature on collaboration networks
in academia and R&D (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-González (2001), König et al. (2014) and Hsieh
et al. (2018)). Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) study collaboration in R&D in the presence
of externalities and show that under strong market rivalry, R&D effort declines with the level of
collaborative activity. In the absence of firm rivalry, however, R&D effort increases with the level
of collaborative activity. Under a similar set up König et al. (2014) show that Nash equilibrium
output of firms is proportional to their Katz-Bonacich centrality in R&D network. The respec-
tive optimal output choice depends on the competition intensity the firm faces in the product
market. Hsieh et al. (2018) study a model similar to ours and provide conditions for existence
and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium. We differ from their model along an important line:
we control for the quality of research output, and we show how equilibrium efforts depend on
the distribution of individual productivities. More generally, our model contributes to the lit-
erature of network games that identify the role of individual centrality in the network on their
equilibrium behavior (e.g. Ballester et al. (2006), Bramoullé et al. (2014) and for a comprehen-
sive survey of the literature, see Jackson and Zenou (2015)).
Finally, the chapter complements a small number of papers that investigate the relation-
ship between informal intellectual collaboration and the research process: Laband and Tollison
2Management literature also studies whether collaboration can improve the quality and economic value of
knowledge produced. Examples include Singh and Fleming (2010) who show that collaboration reduces the prob-
ability of very poor outcomes while simultaneously increasing the probability of extremely successful outcomes.
Girotra et al. (2010) find that hybrid team structures, in which individuals first work alone then work together, are
able to generate more ideas, generate better ideas, and to better discern the quality of ideas they generate.
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(2000) focus on the social aspect of informal intellectual collaboration in Economics and Biol-
ogy. They find that a higher number of commenters is associated with a higher citation count
over seven years. But the benefit increases in the citation count–the so-called "caliber"–of the
commenter (in our nomenclature: how prolific a commenter is). Unlike Laband and Tollison
(2000), Brown (2005) also includes other forms of informal intellectual collaboration, such as
seminar presentations. He finds that the number of acknowledged seminars is more relevant
for citation count than the number of commenters. The same is true for the acceptance prob-
ability at prestigious Accounting journals. But neither of these studies, which we have repli-
cated in section 2.4.2, take into account the network structure of the social network prevalent
in Economics and its sub-fields. Oettl (2012) takes a near-network perspective by estimating
the malus co-authors of very eminent life scientists experience when these eminent scientists
die. The former co-authors’ drop in quality-adjusted research-output amounts to 20% in this
measure. Interestingly, the most important channel in Oettl (2012) is not formal, but informal
intellectual collaboration. For this reason, Oettl (2012) terms this dimension "helpfulness". Our
main contribution to this literature, besides being the first to study informal intellectual collab-
oration in an entire academic field, is that we address endogeneity through our empirical setup.
Furthermore, our theoretical model provides a conceptual framework that allows us to empiri-
cally disentangle information spillovers from strategic complementarities.
3.2 A Simple Model of Collaboration in Academia
The goal of this section is to provide a simple model framework for intellectual collaboration
with complementarity in efforts. We model a set N = {1, · · · , i , · · · ,n} of researchers who engage
in research to increase the quantity and quality of their output Yi . The production process in-
volves individual effort as well as effort of others through intellectual collaboration; that is both
formal collaboration in the form of co-authorship and informal collaboration in form of receiv-
ing feedback from other researchers. In addition to responding to a request from a colleague to
provide feedback on an ongoing project, informal collaboration also includes being a discus-
sant at a conference, as well as inter-departmental collaboration through research seminars.
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Intellectual collaboration contributes to output Yi by exposing an ongoing research project to
other scholars who potentially give feedback. Such feedback not only improves the quality of
the current project but may also give insights to ideas for new projects, and hence even increase
the total number of projects.
We assume that total output is linearly decomposable into a direct contribution and an
indirect contribution from complementarities. As discussed in Section 3.1, complementarity in
efforts contributes to research output through information spillover. At the level of an individ-
ual researcher, information spillovers with co-authors forces one to increase their effort to be
able to assimilate the knowledge and techniques of co-authors. The knowledge and techniques
learned not only improve the quality of the paper in progress but will also be used as input to
future projects. At the level of the paper, the same notion applies with contributions from infor-
mal collaborators. A direct consequence of such interactions is an increase in the overall pro-
ductivity of a researcher; that is, the marginal output. As discussed in section 3.1, several papers
have documented strong evidence of such externalities in collaboration. For example Ductor
(2015) finds a positive effect of intellectual collaboration on individual productivity. Wuchty
et al. (2007) find an increasing dominance of teams in knowledge production, and show that
teams produce exceptionally high impact research compared to solo authored work. They also
find that research produced in teams tends to be more cited than that by individual authors.
Formally, let ei denote the effort of researcher i and e the vector of efforts. Let G be a col-
laboration network among researchers. With slight abuse of notation, we also write G for the
adjacency matrix of G . That is, each element gi j of G is defined in such a way that gi j = g j i = 1
if researcher i collaborates with j and zero otherwise. We assume that the links are undirected.
For the case of informal collaboration, this results from the idea that in the process of giving
feedback, a researcher also learns about the methods and results of someone else’s work. Ide-
ally, the value of gi j should be different, depending on whether j is a co-author or informal
collaborator. This would clearly distinguish the level of information spillover between the two
types of interactions. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the level of information
spillover is identical in both cases. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that informal collab-
oration is just as effective as formal collaboration in generating ideas for research. For example
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Colander (1989, p. 146) concludes his survey that "[m]uch if not most of the debate and discus-
sion about economic ideas take place at the pre-working paper, workshop and working paper
stages.", and Ductor et al. (2014, p. 937) argue in a study on productivity patterns among co-
authors that "a researcher who is close to more productive researchers may have early access to
new ideas". Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis below, we consider both the network of only
informal and a combined network of formal and informal collaboration.
For each i , let Ni denote the set of first-order neighbors. That is, the set of all agents who
directly collaborate with i . Let ni be the cardinality of Ni . To control for quality of each output,
let pi be the total number of projects i is involved in. Assuming that i allocates her effort equally
across the pi projects, effort exerted on each project is
ei
pi
.3 The total output Yi (G ,e) to i for
engaging in collaboration network G , given effort configuration e is then:4








gi j e j ei , (3.1)
where ti , the type of i , is individual productivity of i , which is determined by i ’s intrinsic
characteristics such technical skills and seniority in the field. The first two terms on the right
hand side of (3.1) capture the direct contribution of i and her set of collaborators. The third
term captures complementarity in efforts, where α is a parameter capturing the contributive
strength of such externalities. Following the above discussion, we see from (3.1) that the overall
productivity of i is ti +∑ j∈Ni gi j e j . The second term captures the notion that the effort of i ’s
collaborators positively influence her productivity. It is related to the idea of Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996) and is a kind of a congestion externality from collaboration: The larger the number
of project of i ’s coauthors, the less the effort they devote to i ’s projects.
Associated with effort level ei , is an opportunity cost ci (ei ). We let ci (ei ) assume a quadratic
form with parameter β identical for all agents for simplicity, i.e. ci (ei ) = 12βe2i . The utility
Ui (G ,e) that i derives from network G while exerting effort ei is then the net output Yi (G ,e)−
3This assumption simplifies our computations and comes at no loss of generality: a researcher will spend more
time on projects where she is a co-author, but this could be easily adjusted for by using a simple multiplicative
factor.
4Note that the first term of the right hand side of (3.1) results from summing eipi over all projects pi .
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ci (ei ). That is:








gi j e j ei − 1
2
βe2i . (3.2)
The model specification in (3.2) has similarities with those in the literature of network
games (e.g. Ballester et al. (2006), Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) and Bramoullé et al. (2014)).
The similarity is in the existence of externalities. The difference arises in the nature of the pro-
duction process we model, which involves group production as captured by the first two terms
of (3.2), and that we control for the quality of output. We characterize equilibrium properties of
the game, and in particular conditions for existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium
solution. We then use the resulting equilibrium efforts in an empirical study where we test for
the existence of complementarities and information spillover in collaboration. We achieve this
by assuming that equilibrium effort of a collaborator has a positive impact on the quality and
hence impact of a researcher’s output. We proxy the impact of research output by the citation
count it receives. In particular, we estimate models of the following kind:
Ci t ati oni = F (t,p,e∗,c), (3.3)
where we write F (a) to imply a function of a. The independent variables are t which is a
vector of types, p the vector of number of projects, e∗ which is equilibrium outcome and c, a
vector of control variables. We use citations of research output as a measure of its impact.
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3.3 Equilibrium Properties
Given (3.2), each researcher chooses an optimal level of effort e∗i , where the first order condition
is:





j for each i ∈ N . (3.4)
It is well known (e.g. Ballester et al. (2006)) that equilibrium levels of effort in a game set
up such as (3.2) depend on the Bonacich centrality of the underlying network of interactions,
defined as follows. Given a scalar λ≥ 0 and a network G , let a matrix M(G ,λ) be defined as




where I is the identity matrix. Let 1 be a column vector of ones. For an n×n-square matrix
G and a scalar λ such that M(G ,λ) is well defined, the vector of centralities of parameter λ in G
is:
b(G ,λ) = (I −λG)−1 1
The Bonacich centrality of node i is bi (G ,λ) = ∑nj=1 mi j (G ,λ), and counts the total num-
ber of paths in G starting from i . For a vector t of ti ’s, we define a corresponding vector of
centralities b(G ,λ,t) as
b(G ,λ,t) = (I −λG)−1 t
Proposition 1. Let µ1(G) be the maximum eigenvalue of G, The game with payoffs in (3.2) has
a unique interior equilibrium whenever β>αµ1(G). The respective equilibrium configuration is





where αβ = αβ .
Proof. See Appendix 3.A
Proposition 1 provides a characterization of equilibrium efforts. Equilibrium efforts are a
function of Bonacich centralities of the network, a property that is well known in the literature
of network games. Overall, scientists who collaborate with many other scientist will have a high
Bonacich centrality. Similarly, collaborating with scientists who are themselves highly central,
increases ones centrality even more. As a corollary, increasing the overall level of connectivity
in the network in turn increases the overall equilibrium effort (Ballester et al., 2006; Bramoullé
et al., 2014).
The component of the centrality measure in (3.5) that is specific to our model is its depen-
dence on the distribution of types of researchers. Researchers with higher individual productiv-
ity exert higher effort at equilibrium, as observable from (3.4). On an aggregate level, researcher
with higher productivity have a positive impact on aggregate effort. That is, since they tend
to exert a higher effort, other researcher who directly collaborate with them would also exert
higher effort due to effect of complementarities, and so will the collaborators of collaborators,











acts as a multiplier on the types. This effect is strongest if individuals with
the highest productivity are also the most central.
There are two main conclusions that follow from our stylized model of intellectual collab-
oration. First, high connectivity, and hence high intensity of collaboration among researchers
leads to higher aggregate equilibrium outcome. Second, for a given network of collaboration
and distribution of types, the optimal aggregate equilibrium outcome is obtained in a set up
where the most central individuals are also those with the highest individual productivity. In
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the following, we bring these results to the data and test them empirically.
3.4 Variable construction
3.4.1 Centrality in the Social Network of Informal Collaboration
To construct networks of informal collaboration, we use the data introduced in section 2.2:
Hand-collected acknowledgments from 6,401 articles published between 1997 and 2011 in six
scholarly journals in financial economics.
We connect two researchers whenever one acknowledged the other as a commenter on
a published research article in our dataset. Links between these researchers are directed but
always have a parallel link in the opposite direction. This is based on the notion that knowledge
spillover occurs in both directions: The author tells the commenter, sometimes in great detail,
about the article, which is valuable to the commenter. For example she can use the results to
build her own research on it before it is published. Spillovers from the commenter to the author
occurs in the form of feedback, which in turn not only improves the quality of the author’s cur-
rent work but may also provide ideas for future research. Links are weighted by the frequency
of interaction between collaborators.
For each year t we construct the network using the publications published in t , as well
as in the two previous years, t −1 and t −2. Formally, let At be the set of articles published in
years {t , t −1, t −2}. To each article a ∈ {At }, there is a non-empty set of authors κa and a not
necessarily non-empty set of commenters ιa . Every author i ∈ κa and every commenter k ∈ ιa
is part of the set of nodes that either authored or acknowledged in the set of articles At . The
resulting network G is weighted in such a way that for each pair i , j , gi j increases by 1/|κa | if
author i acknowledges commenter j on article a. If the commenter has been acknowledged
once on an article written by two authors, the weight of each of the two ties would be 1/2. If
one of the authors acknowledges this commenter on another solo-article, the tie increases to
3/2, reflecting a deeper relationship between the two. The adjacency matrix G is symmetric as
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acknowledgements are undirected, with the diagonal elements being equal to 0. This weighting
scheme also corrects for misreporting. That is, when a research article consists of many authors,
it is not clear which author spoke to which commenter. This is thus accounted for by the weights
of 1/|κa |.
In real world networks it is common that nodes are not connected, not even indirectly.
Formally, two nodes belong to the same network component l if there exists an alternating
sequence of nodes and ties, called a path, between them. There can be as many components as
there are nodes if all nodes are isolated. The size of a component is the number of nodes (i.e. the
number of academics) it contains. The component containing the most nodes is called the giant
component. For the regression, we compute and use the Bonacich centrality for all nodes in the
giant component and omit the other components because centralities across components are
not comparable: If a node i belongs to a small network component, all other nodes are fairly
close. In contrast, a node in a large network might have a potentially much smaller centrality
because many other nodes are far away.
We construct twelve networks for all t between 2000 and 2011. As the number of articles
increased over time, the network increase by size, too: The 2000 network is generated from 873
articles published in either 1998, 1999 or 2000 and consists of 3,286 distinct researchers. This
compares to the 2011 network, which connects 7,028 researchers that have collaborated on
1,889 articles. The giant component captures between 95% and 98% of the network, implying
that the error that we make from investigating the giant component only is relatively small.
In (3.5) of Proposition 1, we show that equilibrium efforts e∗, are equal to the Bonacich
centralities b(G ,α,t) of network G weighted by the vector t of individual productivities.5 That is




The parameter α is generally referred in the literature as attenuation factor. It discounts
the distance between agents that are not collaborating directly. The smaller α, the less impact
5Without loss of generality, we take β= 1 such that αβ =α, and e∗ = b(G ,α,t).
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distant agents have on an agent’s equilibrium effort. In our model, α captures the contribution
of complementarities in collaboration to ones research output. Proposition 1 provides equilib-
rium conditions; that isα< 1µ1(G) , whereµ1(G) is the leading eigenvalue of the weighted network
G . In the regression, we use α= 0.85
µ1(G)
. In section 3.6.1 we test different attenuation factors and
observe that coefficients peak in size and statistical significance for an attenuation factor of
around 0.80.
3.4.2 Author metrics
As before, we proxy individual productivity by the quantity and quality of their overall output
using the Euclidean index of citations (Perry and Reny, 2016). For every year, the Euclidean
index is the square root of the sum of the squared number of citations to each individual pub-
lished article (2.1). The alternative measures would be the total number of publications or the
total citation count normalized by the number of years of experience. The Euclidean index
however takes into account both measures making it a more accurate measure. We use data
obtained from Scopus to compute the Euclidean index, which is hence available for 11,718.
The number of projects each researcher is involved in each year is the number of publica-
tions in the current year and the next year. To account for shared work, each project is divided
by the number of co-authors. For example for someone that published one single authored ar-
ticle in 2005, and one co-authored article in 2006, the number of projects in 2003 would be 0, in
2004 1, in 2005 1.5, and in 2006 0.5.
3.4.3 Deceased authors
We strive to identify the effect of Bonacich centrality by comparing centralities computed in a
network in which deceased scientists are removed with a centralities computed in a counterfac-
tual network. Those two networks differ in that deceased authors were removed from the first. If
the difference in centrality scores between these two networks is positive then the commenter’s
network position increased.
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Our main source of deaths is the IDEAS database of Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)
repository hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.6 We augment this list with informa-
tion from the English-language version of Wikipedia, various university websites and acknowl-
edgements itself. We find 61 researchers that deceased within two years of their last recorded
activity in our yearly networks (i.e. provision of comment or publication). Table 3.B.1 in the
appendix lists them by date of death.
3.5 Identifying the Impact of Informal Collaboration on Publi-
cation Impact
The unit of observation is a published research article. The relevant social network from which
we compute centralities is always inferred the network of the previous year. Hence the author’s
own network status does not influence the positions of the commenters.7 We study all research
article published in a set of six major finance journals published between 1998 and 2011 that
have acknowledged at least one commenter who is in the giant component of the social network
of informal intellectual collaboration (N=1,415). These journals are The Journal of Finance, The
Review of Financial Studies, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Financial Inter-
mediation, the Journal of Money, Credit, & Banking, and the Journal of Banking and Finance.
To aggregate over all acknowledged commenters, we look at the most central commenter
in our main regression. That is, we ask what if the authors could only receive comments from
the most central commenter? To estimate robustness of the results, we also estimate our main
specification with the second-most central commenter in a sample of publications acknowl-
edging at least three commenters by name. To give an idea of the distribution of the most
Bonacich central commenter’s centrality scores, figure 3.1 depicts median, mean and maxi-
mum. The distribution ranges between 0 and 0.455, with a median of 0.006 and a mean of
0.024.
6The full list of author profiles with confirmed deaths is available at https://ideas.repec.org/i/erip.
html.
7A possible exception is when authors and commenters have collaborated in previous years.
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Notes: Graph shows distribution of Bonachich centrality (equation (3.6)) of the most central commenter of an
article, in the giant component of the network of informal collaboration in the year before publication without
deceased authors removed. Abcissa depicts minimum, median, mean and maximum.
Our regression estimation obtains as:
Ci t ati ons =α0+α1 · Ar ti cleC har acter i st i cs (3.7)
+α1D j our nal +α2Dyear
+β0 · AuthorC har acter i st i cs +β1 ·BestCommenterC har acter i st i cs
+β2 ·BestCommenterCentr al i t yC hang e
where ArticleCharacteristics is a vector of article-specific variables that contain the number
of authors, the number of pages, number of authors, number of acknowledged seminars and
number of acknowledged conferences. D j our nal is a vector of dummy variables that captures
journal fixed effects such as editor skills and preferences or management policies, while Dyear
represents publication year fixed effects. AuthorCharacteristics and BestCommenterCharacter-
istics are vectors controlling for characteristics of all authors and the best commenter. For au-
thors this includes the sum of the Euclidean indices of citations of all authors, the sum of other
author-normalized projects of all authors, the sum of experience of all authors and finally the
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sum of squared experience of all authors. Squared experience are intended to capture non-
monotonic age effects. Since we also control for the number of authors of a research article
we indeed estimate the mean effect of author characteristics. BestCommenterCharacteristics
include the number of projects. We do not include productivity measures because this is in-
cluded in the computation of the Bonacich centrality. All these variables were counted in the
year before publication.
Our main contribution is to introduce BestCommenterCentralityChange, the change in
centrality according to Bonacich centrality as defined in (3.6) in the social network of informal
intellectual collaboration of the most central commenter. These changes, while random, are
not correlated with centrality scores.
The dependent variable is the count of citations since publication. The distribution of
citations is skewed, discrete and non-negative. Therefore we estimate a negative binomial re-
gression model (Mullahy, 1986). Being a generalized linear model, the parameters are evaluated
at sample mean, i.e. holding all variables fixed at their mean values. To ease interpretation, we
compute and present marginal effects, i.e. the coefficients we present are the expected per-
centage increase in the outcome variable when the explanatory variable increases by 1 unit and
when all other variables are held constant at their mean and all dummy variables at 0.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for entire sample. In this sample, the average re-
search article has garnered 71.4 citations until August 2017, has been written by 2.2 authors
and consists of 26.9 pages. The authors’ combined Euclidean Index equals 184.9. They were
engaged in a total of 3.5 author-normalized projects (excluding the present project) and have
a joint experience of 18.6 years. Negative values in total author experience are due to the con-
struction of the variables, which are measured in the year before publication. If for example
an article is the first for all authors, they have a negative experience. This is the case for 291
publications. Correlation coefficients are presented in table 3.B.2 (in the appendix to this chap-
ter). We find a weak positive relationship between an article’s citation count and author ability
measured as sum of Euclidean indices. Correlation coefficients of total citations with the num-
ber of authors or the number of pages are equally weak. Most importantly, changes in the best
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commenter’s centrality changes are not correlated with their number of projects or even the
publication’s citation count.
Table 3.2 reports marginal effects for all variables. Column (1) serves as reference model
and excludes any commenter-related variables. All variables except the authors’ combined ex-
perience and the authors’ combined experience squared are statistically and economically sig-
nificant. For example, each additional solo-authored project of the authors is associated with
4.9% more citations for the average paper. These coefficients do not change significantly across
different specifications.
In column (2) we add characteristics of the most Bonacich central commenter: her total
number of ongoing author-normalized research projects. The coefficient is statistically signif-
icant, as predicted by our model. For each additional ongoing single-authored project of the
most central commenter from sample mean, citation count is expected to increase by 4.8%.
This coefficient is about 30% higher than that for authors’ combined author-normalized projects,
partly accounting for the fact that the mean is lower.
Column (3) finally adds variable Best. Com. Bonacich diff., which is the Bonacich central-
ity rank differential of the most Bonacich central commenter between the network of informal
intellectual collaboration without and with deceased author. The coefficient of 61.50 is statis-
tically significant with a p-value of 0.039. The coefficient is very high because of the very low
mean of 0.00003 at which the coefficient is evaluated. The interpretation is as follows: For each
increase in centrality by 1 from the mean, citations are expected to increase by 61.5 percent.
To put this into perspective, if the average most central commenter (mean Bonacich centrality
score: 0.0011) increases her centrality score by 1%, that is 0.01∗ 0.0011 = 0.000011, citations
are expected to increase by 0.00011∗ 61.6 ≈ 0.6% for the average article. This translates into
0.006∗71.4 ≈ 0.5 more citations.
In column (4) we additionally control for the number of acknowledged seminars and con-
ferences, as these might be correlated acknowledgment behavior. If no seminars or conferences
are explicitly acknowledged, we assume this number to be 0. The coefficient of interest de-
creases somewhat to 85.9, but the effect size remains virtually constant.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for all continuous variables.
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
Impact measure
Total citations 4015 71.4 36 111.88 0 2163
Article characteristics
# of pages 4015 26.9 27 10.42 3 128
# of authors 4015 2.2 2 0.84 1 6
Author characteristics
Auth. total Euclid 4015 184.9 61 378.77 0 7590
Auth. total projects 4015 3.5 3 2.64 0 31
Auth. total experience 4015 18.6 15 16.13 −3 100
Auth. total experience2 4015 604.9 225 956.83 0 10000
Best commenter characteristics
Best Com. projects 4015 2.2 2 1.97 0 18
Best Com. experience 4015 18.5 15 77.42 −8 2010
Best Com. experience2 4015 6335.0 225 155425.19 0 4040100
Network change
Best. Com. Bonacich diff. 4015 0.0000326 0.0000225 0.000489 −0.0262 0.00101
Notes: # of authors and # of pages is the simple count of authors and pages, respectively. Auth.
total Euclid is the author’s Euclidean index as defined in (2.1) in the year before publication,
summed over all authors. Auth. total projects is the number of other publications in the year
of publication and the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, summed over all
authors. Auth. total experience is the combined number of years between the year before publi-
cation and the publication year of each author’s first article. Auth. total experience2 is its square.
Best Com. projects is the number of publications in the year before the publication and the fol-
lowing year, divided by the number of co-authors, for the most central commenter. Best. Com.
experience is the number of years between the year before publication and the publication year
of the first article for the most central commenter. Best Com. experience2 is its square. Best.
Com. Bonacich diff. is the difference of Bonacich centrality (equation (3.6)) measured in the
giant component of the network of informal intellectual collaboration without and with deaths
of the most central commenter, in the year before publication.
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Table 3.2: Results of Negative Binomial regression for citation count.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of pages 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.0002
# of authors 0.073∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
p = 0.002 p = 0.002 p = 0.002 p = 0.0005
Auth. total Euclid 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Auth. total projects 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.00000
Auth. total experience −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001
p = 0.206 p = 0.333 p = 0.337 p = 0.798
Auth. total experience2 −0.0001 −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗∗
p = 0.123 p = 0.069 p = 0.068 p = 0.012
Best Com. projects 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.005
Best Com. experience −0.0003 −0.0004 0.003
p = 0.870 p = 0.807 p = 0.117
Best Com. experience2 0.00000 0.00000 −0.00000
p = 0.858 p = 0.795 p = 0.150
Best. Com. Bonacich diff. 61.500∗∗ 58.900∗∗
p = 0.039 p = 0.046
# of seminars 0.028∗∗∗
p = 0.000
# of conferences 0.029∗∗∗
p = 0.004
Constant 3.690∗∗∗ 3.610∗∗∗ 3.610∗∗∗ 3.320∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Publication year-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Journal-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
N 4,015 4,015 4,015 2,171
Log Likelihood -20,143.000 -20,124.000 -20,122.000 -11,120.000
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respec-
tively. Reported coefficients are marginal effects. # of authors and # of pages is the simple count
of authors and pages, respectively. Auth. total Euclid is the author’s Euclidean index (2.1) in
the year before publication, summed over all authors. Auth. total projects is the number of
other publications in the year of publication and the following year, divided by the number of
co-authors, summed over all authors. Auth. total experience is the combined number of years
between the year before publication and the publication year of each author’s first article. Auth.
total experience2 is its square. Best Com. projects is the number of publications in the year be-
fore the publication and the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, for the most
central commenter. Best. Com. experience is the number of years between the year before
publication and the publication year of the first article for the most central commenter. Best
Com. experience2 is its square. Best. Com. Bonacich diff. is the difference of Bonacich cen-
trality (equation (3.6)) measured in the giant component of the network of informal intellectual
collaboration without and with deaths of the most central commenter, in the year before pub-
lication.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
3.6.1 Different specifications of Bonacich centrality
To test the robustness of our results, we alter the attenuation factor of the Bonacich centrality.
We proceed to explore the importance of the attenuation factorα in equation (3.6). The attenu-
ation factor governs the importance of distant links/nodes in the computation of the centrality
of the focal node. Lower attenuation factor give less weights to distant nodes. When the at-
tenuation factor reaches 0, only immediate neighbors are taken into account for the centrality
computation.
In our main specification we have used an attenuation factor of attenuation factor of
0.85×1/µ1(Gt ), where µ1(Gt ) is the leading eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of network G for
year t (we scale with with eigenvalue to allow comparison between networks). In 3.3 we present
regression results with the same specification as presented above in model 3.7. In model (1) we
use an attenuation factor 0.99×1/µ1(Gt ), in model (2) an 0.90×1/µ1(Gt ), in model (3) the atten-
uation factor equals 0.80×1/µ1(Gt ), and in model (4) an attenuation factor of 0.70×1/µ1(Gt ).
Coefficients peak in magnitude at an attenuation factor of 0.8×1/µ1(Gt ) (model 3), while
statistical significance is highest for an attenuation factor of 0.9× 1/µ1(Gt ) (model 2). In our
model, the attenuation factor is an exogenous variable and is interpreted as the contributive
strength of complementarities in research efforts to individual utility. In equilibrium, it mea-
sures the decay in the contribution of equilibrium efforts of the first-order, second-order, third-
order collaborators/neighbors, and so on, to equilibrium effort of the respective scientist. The
smaller the attenuation factor the more the effort of first-order, second-order neighbors mat-
ter compared to that of distant neighbors. The value of the attenuation factor that gives the
maximum and most significant effect of Bonacich centrality on citations then best describes
the effects of complementarities on individual behavior. In our sample, this value is between
0.8×1/µ1(Gt ) and 0.9×1/µ1(Gt ).
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Table 3.3: Results of Negative Binomial regression for citation count with different Bonacich
centrality specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of pages 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
# of authors 0.071∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
p = 0.002 p = 0.002 p = 0.002 p = 0.002
Auth. total Euclid 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Auth. total projects 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Auth. total experience −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003
p = 0.407 p = 0.352 p = 0.339 p = 0.316
Auth. total experience2 −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗
p = 0.059 p = 0.067 p = 0.067 p = 0.079
Attenuation factor 0.99
Best Com. projects 0.046∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Best Com. experience −0.004∗∗
p = 0.028





Best Com. projects 0.046∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Best Com. experience −0.001
p = 0.465





Best Com. projects 0.046∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Best Com. experience −0.0004
p = 0.825





Best Com. projects 0.047∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Best Com. experience −0.001
p = 0.456




Best Com. projects 3.667∗∗∗ 3.626∗∗∗ 3.611∗∗∗ 3.628∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Publication year-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
Journal-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es
N 4,015 4,015 4,015 4,015
Log Likelihood -20,124.990 -20,124.000 -20,123.140 -20,123.020
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Reported coefficients are marginal effects.
# of authors and # of pages is the simple count of authors and pages, respectively. Auth. total Euclid is the author’s Euclidean index (2.1) in
the year before publication, summed over all authors. Auth. total projects is the number of other publications in the year of publication and
the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, summed over all authors. Auth. total experience is the combined number of years
between the year before publication and the publication year of each author’s first article. Auth. total experience2 is its square. Best Com.
projects is the number of publications in the year before the publication and the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, for the
most central commenter. Best. Com. experience is the number of years between the year before publication and the publication year of the first
article for the most central commenter. Best Com. experience2 is its square. Best. Com. Bonacich diff. is the difference of Bonacich centrality
(equation (3.6)) measured in the giant component of the network of informal intellectual collaboration without and with deaths of the most
central commenter, in the year before publication.
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3.6.2 Different network definition
Table 3.4 presents regression results similar to the baseline regression but with different cen-
trality and network definitions.
A centrality measure that is closely related to Katz-Bonacich centrality is Eigenvector cen-
trality. When the starting vector t is set to 0, so that there are no initial centralities, and the
attenuation factor is set equal to 1/µ1(A), an equivalence exists between Bonacich and Eigen-
vector centralities. Model 1 of table 3.4 presents results for our main specification with Eigen-
vector centrality instead of Bonacich centrality. The coefficient of 41.600 is much lower, while
the corresponding p value of 0.091 is nearly beyond conventional significance thresholds. We
interpret this result as implying that the significance of weighted Bonacich centrality b(A,α,t)
in our main results matter.
Our model predicts that spillovers depend on frequency of interaction and types of the
participating scholars. In column (2) of table 3.4 we compute Bonacich centrality in networks
without any link weights. The coefficient becomes turns statistically insignificant. We take this
as sign that accounting for the frequency of interactions among scientists and the types of the
participating scientists indeed matters in capturing strategic complementarities.
Our results show that connections in the network of informal intellectual collaboration
matter. In column (3) of table 3.4 we compute and compare Bonacich centrality in networks of
informal and formal collaboration. That is, two academics are connected not only when one
acknowledges the other but also when they have jointly published a paper. In this case the link
weight increases by one for each joint publication, and as before by 1/n for each acknowledge-
ment on a publication with n authors. The coefficient of comparable size as compared to main
results. This is due to the lower sample mean of the variable, at which the coefficient is eval-
uated in a negative binomial regression. The mean change in Bonacich centrality of the best
commenter in networks of formal and informal collaboration is 0.000023, which is about 30%
lower than the mean change of Bonacich centrality in the network of informal collaboration.
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Table 3.4: Results of Negative Binomial regression for citation count with different network def-
initions.
(1) (2) (3)
# of pages 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
# of authors 0.072∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
p = 0.002 p = 0.001 p = 0.002
Auth. total Euclid 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Auth. total projects 0.046∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Auth. total experience −0.002 −0.003 −0.002
p = 0.430 p = 0.187 p = 0.335
Auth. total experience2 −0.0001∗ −0.0001 −0.0001∗
p = 0.053 p = 0.157 p = 0.068
Eigenvector centrality
Best Com. projects 0.050∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Best Com. experience −0.004∗∗
p = 0.027





Best Com. projects 0.027∗∗∗
p = 0.0002
Best Com. experience −0.006∗∗∗
p = 0.0002




Network with formal collaboration
Best Com. projects 0.044∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Best Com. experience −0.0002
p = 0.907




Constant 3.660∗∗∗ 3.740∗∗∗ 3.610∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Publication year-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es
Journal-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es
N 4,015 4,015 4,015
Log Likelihood -20,123.000 -20,130.000 -20,123.000
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Reported
coefficients are marginal effects. # of authors and # of pages is the simple count of authors and pages, re-
spectively. Auth. total Euclid is the author’s Euclidean index (2.1) in the year before publication, summed
over all authors. Auth. total projects is the number of other publications in the year of publication and
the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, summed over all authors. Auth. total experience
is the combined number of years between the year before publication and the publication year of each
author’s first article. Auth. total experience2 is its square. Best Com. projects is the number of publications
in the year before the publication and the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, for the
most central commenter. Best. Com. experience is the number of years between the year before publica-
tion and the publication year of the first article for the most central commenter. Best Com. experience2
is its square. Best. Com. Bonacich diff. is the difference of Bonacich centrality (equation (3.6)) measured
in the giant component of the network of informal intellectual collaboration without and with deaths of
the most central commenter, in the year before publication.
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3.6.3 Betweenness centrality
The equilibrium behavior of our model shows that Bonacich centrality best captures individual
influence in an environment of intellectual collaboration with positive complementarities. The
existence of complementarities is necessary for Bonacich centrality to be an appropriate mea-
sure of influence in equilibrium. If the underlying process driving our empirical results were
pure information flow, then other centrality measures can equally capture a scientist’s level of
influence. In particular, the betweenness centrality (equation (2.5)) is so often used to mea-
sure the level of individual influence in relation to information flows within a network Freeman
(1978).
Although both measures captures an agent’s influence in terms of information possessed
in the process of information flow, Bonacich centrality is unique to the process of strategic in-
teractions with positive complementarities. Hence, if scientists’ betweenness centralities sig-
nificantly influence their research output, then our results above could also be a result of pure
information contagion and not existence of positive complementarities.
In Table 3.5 we test whether betweenness centrality of commenters is statistically signifi-
cantly associated with an article’s citation count.
The explanatory variable is the difference in betweenness centrality of the most between-
ness central commenter between the network of informal intellectual collaboration without
and with authors that deceased during the previous periods. Though the coefficient is high, it is
not statistically significant. This indicates that the positive and significant result we obtain for
Bonacich centrality is at the very least partially driven by strategic complementarities and not
just pure information spillovers.
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Table 3.5: Results of Negative Binomial regression for citation count with betweenness central-
ity.
(1)
# of pages 0.012∗∗∗
p = 0.000
# of authors 0.076∗∗∗
p = 0.001
Auth. total Euclid 0.001∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Auth. total projects 0.047∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Auth. total experience −0.002
p = 0.360
Auth. total experience2 −0.0001∗
p = 0.063
Best Com. projects 0.047∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Best Com. experience −0.003∗
p = 0.091
Best Com. experience2 0.00000∗
p = 0.082




Publication year-fixed effects Y es
Journal-fixed effects Y es
N 4,015
Log Likelihood -20,123.000
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Reported coefficients are marginal effects. # of authors and # of pages is the simple count of
authors and pages, respectively. Auth. total Euclid is the author’s Euclidean index (2.1) in the
year before publication, summed over all authors. Auth. total projects is the number of other
publications in the year of publication and the following year, divided by the number of co-
authors, summed over all authors. Auth. total experience is the combined number of years
between the year before publication and the publication year of each author’s first article. Auth.
total experience2 is its square. Best Com. projects is the number of publications in the year
before the publication and the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, for the most
betweenness central commenter. Best. Com. experience is the number of years between the year
before publication and the publication year of the first article for the most betweenness central
commenter. Best Com. experience2 is its square. Best. Com. betweenness diff. is the difference
of betweenness centrality (equation (2.5)) measured in the giant component of the network of
informal intellectual collaboration without and with deaths of the most betweenness central
commenter, in the year before publication.
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3.6.4 Do commenters cite the paper more?
An important concern is whether a higher number of acknowledged commenters increases ci-
tation count because of dissemination of the publication. That is, authors advertise the manuscript
while informally collaborating. Speaking to more researchers hence broadens the audience and
thus more informal collaboration translates into higher citation counts.
We assess the importance of this channel. For each article in our dataset, we look up
whether citing authors are also acknowledged on the article they cite (this information orginates
from Scopus). The total number of citations of the 4105 articles in our dataset equals 492,636.
1.8% of the citations are due to articles published by acknowledged commenters (the number is
slightly lower when including joint publications by acknowledged commenters and original au-
thor). Out of 4,105 articles, 2,905 are never cited by its commenters, 852 articles are cited once
by a commenter, 236 articles are cited twice by a commenter, 79 articles are cited thrice, and 33
articles are cited four or more times by its acknowledged commenters. Given that an article is
cited by its commenters, the average article is cited by 24% of its commenters (unconditional:
11%).
These commenters however do tend to cite the article shortly after the publication, as 3.2
reveals. Half of the citations from commenters’ publications occur after 4 years of the publi-
cation, while 50% of the citations from non-commenters’ publications occur after 8 years. The
weighted average time until a citation from a commenter occurs is 5.23 years, while that for
Others is 8.39.8
Only a small portion of acknowledged commenters cite the article they are acknowledged
on. Figure 3.3 shows on the y-axis that on average 11% of all acknowledged commenters on an
article eventually cite it (where the citing article must be without the original authors). As the
total number of acknowledged commenters varies, the x-axis gives an account of the absolute
number of acknowledged citing commenters. Its mean is 1.
8The measure corresponds to Macaulay duration used to characterize bonds. We define it as
∑n
t t ∗ct /
∑n
t ct for
n periods before and after publication year in which the publication received at least one citation. ct is the number
of citations in period t .
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Figure 3.2: Barplot showing when papers are cited by its acknowledged commenters, by number
of how many commenters cite it.





















Notes: Figure indicates the time lag before/since publication commenters cite the publication
they are acknowledged on, as compared to non-commenters that cite the article. Dashed lines
indicate the lag until which 50% of the citations from that group occur. The total number of
papers is 5320. A citation from "Commenters" means that at least one of the authors is ac-
knowledged commenter and none of the authors is authoring the cited publication. A citation
from "Others" includes self-citations.
Figure 3.3: Scatterplot showing the amount of commenters that cite the publication.
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Notes: Figure compares the number of acknowledged commenters that cite the article they are
acknowledged on (citing commenter), versus its share. Dashed lines indicate the means. To
count as citing commenter, the commenter must coauthor a publication where she is acknowl-
edged on as commenter, but without the original authors.
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Based on these numbers we conclude that the citations from acknowledged commenters
play a minor role, and that our measure of impact is not confounded by dissemination effects.
Additional channels, that we do not consider here, are dissemination through conferences and
seminars. This channel is likely to increase the share of citations from informal collaborators.
On the other hand, it is unclear whether informal collaborators would have cited the article
anyways had they not seen the article before.
3.7 Conclusion
Researchers that collaborate either formally or informally inevitably diffuse information for ex-
ample on new ideas, emerging trends and upcoming challenges. The extent to which indi-
viduals participate in the diffusion process depends on their position in the social network of
intellectual collaboration (Jackson, 2014). We show that research articles benefit more from a
commenter’s comments when the commenter is more Bonacich central, i.e. when she is closer
to the most connected clique in the network (Bonacich, 1987). An increase by 2% in Bonacich
centrality of the average most central commenter on a research article increases citation count
by ∼ 1 citations for the average article.
Overall, our stylized model and empirical analysis highlight the importance of intellectual
collaboration and network effects on the impact academic work can have. The importance
of intellectual collaboration adds new insights into the division of labor in academic teams.
There is a wide range of activities that are necessary for scientific innovation (Haeussler and
Sauermann, 2016). But not all of these need to be performed by co-authors only, i.e. authors
in economics can extend the team to outsource activities that do not justify co-authorship. For
example, authors test arguments and the scope of their article’s contribution while presenting,
or they rely on trusted assessors for relevant literature. It is precisely these larger groups that we
target at.
Appendix
3.A Proof of Proposition 1
Each scientist chooses a level of effort that maximizes (3.2). The respective first order condition
is





j for each i ∈ N . (3.8)
Writing e∗ for the row-vector of equilibrium efforts, and recalling that G is the weighted adja-
cency matrix, then (3.8) can be written in matrix form as
βe∗−αe∗G = e∗ (βI −αG)= t
Debreu and Herstein (1953, Theorems I I I∗ and I I I ) show that the matrix
(
βI −G) is well-
defined and non-negative, that is
(
βI −G)> 0, whenever β> µ1(G). They also show that under












is an interior equilibrium vector whenever β > αµ1(G). The proof of uniques, that is the non-
existence of corner solution, is identical to the proof of Theorem 1 Ballester et al. (2006).
3.B Additional tables and figures
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Table 3.B.1: List of deceased scholars used for identification in chapter 2.
Date of death Date of death
Aiyagari, S. Rao 1997, May 20 Fini, Riccardo 2007, January 20
Bailey, Martin J. 1997, June 26 McMillan, John 2007, March 13
Maddala, G. S. 1999, June 04 Sokoloff, Kenneth L. 2007, May 21
Marrinan, Jane 2000, January 02 Agell, Jonas 2007, July 01
Rosen, Sherwin 2001, March 17 Barclay, Michael J. 2007, August 16
West, Edwin G. 2001, October 06 Glyn, Andrew J. 2007, December 22
Tobin, James 2002, March 11 Benston, George J. 2008, February 01
Smith, Bruce D. 2002, July 09 Cass, David 2008, April 15
Dornbusch, Rüdiger 2002, July 25 Bartolini, Leonardo 2008, July 09
Gabriel, Stuart A. 2002, October 15 Terrell, Katherine 2009, January 01
Kindleberger, Charles P. 2003, July 07 Neftçi, Salih N. 2009, April 15
Flemming, John S. 2003, August 05 Granger, Clive W.J. 2009, May 27
Spulber, Nicolas 2004, January 02 Prati, Alessandro 2009, June 21
Lee, Winson 2004, March 01 Weston, J. Fred 2009, August 01
Laffont, Jean Jacques 2004, May 01 Mozumdar, Abon 2009, November 05
Freeman, Scott D. 2004, July 23 Samuelson, Paul A. 2009, December 13
Berkowitz, Michael K. 2004, August 08 Auernheimer, Leonardo 2010, January 01
Grossman, Herschel I. 2004, October 09 Ghosh, Dipak 2010, January 10
Battalio, Raymond C. 2004, December 01 Stockman, Alan C. 2010, January 14
Bergstrom, Albert Rex 2005, May 01 Dickhaut, John W. 2010, April 10
Hirshleifer, Jack 2005, July 26 Shastri, Kuldeep 2010, April 19
Xia, Yihong 2005, August 06 Hirschey, Mark John 2010, July 18
Geroski, Paul A. 2005, August 28 Zellner, Arnold 2010, August 11
Branson, William H. 2006, August 15 McKenzie, Lionel W. 2010, October 12
Billett, Matthew T. 2006, September 14 Kim, Bonghan 2011, January 01
Xue, Hui 2006, September 14 Urban, Dieter M. 2011, March 07
Fischer, Klaus P. 2006, October 06 Schneller, Meir I. 2011, April 10
Saxonhouse, Gary R. 2006, November 01 Howrey, E. Philip 2011, June 17
Friedman, Milton 2006, November 16 Warga, Arthur D. 2011, August 07
Goldberg, Lawrence G. 2007, January 01 Orbay, Hakan 2011, September 15
Kandel, Shmuel 2007, January 01














































Table 3.B.2: Spearman and Pearson correlations for all continuous variables.
Impact measure
Total citations 1.00 0.36 0.20 0.08 1.00 0.07 0.56 0.16
Article characteristics
# of pages 0.24 0.13 0.12 −0.05 0.05 −0.02 0.47 0.56
# of authors 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.62 1.00
Author characteristics
Auth. total Euclid 0.16 0.10 0.28 0.36 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.51
Auth. total projects 0.07 −0.01 0.39 0.36 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.82
Auth. total experience 0.03 0.02 0.60 0.52 0.41 1.00 0.09 0.04
Commenter characteristics
Best Com. projects 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.08 −0.01 0.20 0.07
Best Com. experience −0.01 −0.02 0.04 0.00 −0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.14
Network measure
Best. Com. Bonacich diff. 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00
Notes: Upper triangular shows Spearman (rank) correlation coefficients, while lower triangular shows Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients. # of authors and # of pages is the simple count of authors and pages, respectively. Auth. total Euclid is the author’s Euclidean
index (2.1) in the year before publication, summed over all authors. Auth. total projects is the number of other publications in the
year of publication and the following year, divided by the number of co-authors, summed over all authors. Auth. total experience
is the combined number of years between the year before publication and the publication year of each author’s first article. Auth.
total experience2 is its square. Best Com. projects is the number of publications in the year before the publication and the following
year, divided by the number of co-authors, for the most central commenter. Best. Com. experience is the number of years between
the year before publication and the publication year of the first article for the most central commenter. Best Com. experience2 is
its square. Best. Com. Bonacich diff. is the difference of Bonacich centrality (equation (3.6)) measured in the giant component
of the network of informal intellectual collaboration without and with deaths of the most central commenter, in the year before
publication.
Chapter 4
Informal Contacts in Hiring: The
Economics Job Market
4.1 Introduction
The Economics labor market is organized annually by the American Economic Association with
graduate students, their advisers and hiring institutions as market participants (Coles et al.,
2010). Matching students to universities remains imperfect due to, inter alia, asymmetric infor-
mation about the quality of the applicant. Reference letters and phone calls from the adviser(s)
reduce these asymmetries (Athey et al., 2016; Colander, 1997).1 Since an adviser can reduce the
information asymmetry about the quality of her students in her academic network2, we expect
that better ‘connected’ advisers are able to reduce this information asymmetry more than less
connected advisers. We test the hypothesis that PhD students of well connected advisers ob-
tain better first placements than those of less connected advisers in the academic market for
Economics graduates. We define adviser connectedness as the Eigenvector centrality rank of
1For example, Colander (1997) writes that "Recommendations from important people are extremely important"
and "Informal contacts - and phone calls by your advisers and friends - are important".
2One other example of using social networks to reduce information asymmetry is given by Baruffaldi et al.
(2016), who show that PhD students who obtained their Master’s degree at an affiliation of their adviser’s co-author
are more productive than PhD students coming from a university to which their adviser has no links.
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the adviser in the collaboration frequency weighted network of co-authors in the field of Eco-
nomics, and we create our own ranking based on the methodology of the Tilburg University
Economics ranking to judge the quality of a student’s placement university. Eigenvector cen-
trality measures not just ‘connectedness’ in terms of direct connections (number of co-authors),
but also allows for indirect connections to influence connectedness. For example, if an adviser’s
co-author becomes more connected then this adds to the connectedness of the adviser as well,
and this could potentially influence the placement of her students.3
The contribution of this chapter can be separated into three parts. Oyer (2006) points out
that the first placement of graduate students has a significant impact on their careers. Thus,
first and foremost, our research is important for graduate students since it demonstrates an-
other channel through which an adviser can influence student placement. The role of the ad-
viser has also been explored by Krueger and Wu (2000), who report a correlation between the
subjective prominence of the letter writer and student placement. We are also able to confirm
that ‘prominence’ (which we in contrast equate with the Euclidean index4 of citations) matters,
but it does not account completely for the impact of adviser connectedness. We show that even
after controlling for prominence, the connectedness of the adviser matters for her students’
placement.
Secondly, though our results are for a unique job market, we are confident that our results
offer two relevant insights for the general labor market as well. One, owing to our unique data
set we are able to demonstrate the importance of even indirect connections in job search. For
example, though an adviser may not have a co-author at a given University, she may still be able
to put in a good word for her student there if her coauthor has a co-author in that university.
This distinguishes our chapter from those in the literature on referrals who only look at direct
3Eigenvector centrality is the weighted sum of the Eigenvector centralities of the immediate neighbors, where
the weights correspond to the neighbors’ Eigenvector centralities. The idea behind this measure is that people
connected to more connected individuals are themselves more connected. This has been shown to be informative
in various settings. Cruz et al. (2017) recently show that politicians who are more Eigenvector central in a net-
work of families receive higher voter turnout. Similarly, Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) show that equilibrium efforts
in networks are proportional to a variant of the Eigenvector centrality, and Banerjee et al. (2013) show that the
Eigenvector centrality of the first-informed individual predicts how fast information spreads in a social network. A
further discussion of this measure is in section 4.3.3.
4The Euclidean index of citations is the Euclidean sum of publications represented by their citation stock for
any given year, as proposed by Perry and Reny (2016).
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links (Kramarz and Skans, 2014; Burks et al., 2017) - current employees referring a worker in
their current workplace. While these papers establish the value of direct connections, they do
not speak about which workers are more ‘connected’ than others, and whether this matters for
job seekers. For example, a link with a worker who has worked in several firms may be more
valuable to a job seeker than a link with a worker who has worked at only one firm because
the former has connections with more employers5. It is important to understand how con-
nectedness impacts job outcomes because this could have repercussions on the distribution of
income. People close to more connected workers may have higher incomes than people with
fewer connections, and this could perpetuate. Two, by focusing on the Economics job market
where there is little information asymmetry about new job openings (thanks to Job Openings
for Economists and other web pages), we provide some supportive evidence to show that net-
work connections can be used to reduce information asymmetry about the quality of the job
candidate, and this helps applicants get better jobs. This is an important distinction from the
literature on job search (Granovetter, 1973; Bayer et al., 2008), which is usually unable to distin-
guish between two channels via which social networks usually affect labor market outcomes:
learning about new job openings versus reducing information asymmetry about the job candi-
date.6
A final contribution of this chapter is the novel data set we create for our analysis, which
was collected from various first and second hand sources. Our sample consists of 3,182 Eco-
nomics students who obtained their PhD from 137 different North American universities during
the academic years 2000/2001, 2001/2002, 2002/2003 and 2003/2004. Our data originates from
the Journal of Economic Literature, which in its December issues publishes a list of new Eco-
nomics graduates of North American universities. For each student, we find the adviser and the
5Assuming of course that the worker left his past employers on good terms! Also, while we realize that the
general labor market does not have an ‘adviser’ who places workers, at its heart, this chapter is about pointing out
that more connected people may be more valuable in a job search. This message will be true for any labor market
with information frictions.
6There are, however, theoretical arguments highlighting the result that referrals by current employees can di-
minish information problems arising from the fact that employers do not know worker quality perfectly (Mont-
gomery, 1991; Burks et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2016; Hensvik and Skans, 2016). Furthermore, while economics
graduates know about most of the job openings, they may not have other relevant information regarding these
openings such as the work environment at the prospective department. An adviser can help reduce these infor-
mation asymmetries as well. Thus, our focus on channel side is a reduction in information asymmetry - this could
be regarding student quality or about other variables which can affect the match quality.
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first placement from various sources including department websites, direct emails to depart-
ments, students’ CVs, the genealogy project of the RePEc database and The Academic Family
Tree project. The social network of coauthors is constructed using 114,409 publications in 408
journals.
We show that advisers who are more connected (have a better eigenvector centrality rank
in the network of coauthors) place their students at better ranked universities compared to
those who are not as well connected. Obviously, the connectedness of the adviser in the net-
work of co-authors is endogenous. We identify the impact of adviser connectedness by using
the changes in the connectedness of the adviser’s co-authors in the year of student placement
(in a model with adviser-fixed effects) as an instrument. The adviser’s co-authors’ connected-
ness is computed in the co-author network which excludes the adviser. This is to avoid changes
in the adviser’s own connectedness changing the connectedness of her coauthors. The iden-
tifying condition here rests on the following ideas. One, we control for time-invariant unob-
served adviser characteristics via adviser-fixed effects. Two, changes in the connectedness of
the adviser’s co-authors in the year of a student’s placement would be difficult to anticipate (and
therefore use strategically) for both the student and the adviser. Therefore, it can be thought of
as an exogenous variable which changes adviser connectedness in the year of placement, and
affects student placement only via this channel. A deeper discussion of the critical empirical
challenges and our identification strategy is presented in section 4.4.
In section 4.5.2, we provide additional evidence to support our hypothesis that an ad-
viser’s connectedness matters for her student’s placement. We use the death of economists as
an exogenous shock which affects the ‘social distance’7 between an adviser and a department,
and we show that an increase in this social distance negatively affects the probability of the
adviser placing her student at that department. Finally, in section 4.6, we provide supportive
evidence to argue that the channel through which an adviser’s connectedness affects her stu-
dent’s placement is that it helps the hiring university screen better by reducing information
asymmetry regarding the student’s quality.
7The shortest path between the adviser and the department in the co-author network.
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4.2 Literature
Social networks and informal connections help a worker in finding a job in two main ways. One,
by giving the worker information about new job postings (Granovetter, 1973; Boorman, 1975;
Calvó-Armengol, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005). Two, by reducing the information
asymmetry between the worker and the employer about the worker’s ability8 (Montgomery,
1991; Burks et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2016). However, studies which look at the former
channel - like those which study the impact of neighborhoods and other ‘local’ networks on
job search, often cannot distinguish between these two effects. For example, Bayer et al. (2008)
find that individuals residing on the same block are more likely to work together. However, it is
not clear if this is simply because neighbors learn from each other about new job openings, or
if they actually recommended them. In contrast, we study the Economic job market where the
job seekers have almost full information about all the job openings. This is because most job
openings are posted on one web page - Job Openings for Economists (JOE). Thus, the setting
in this chapter is particularly conducive to studying how much social connections can help by
reducing information asymmetry about the quality of the job candidate.
The literature on referrals studies how firms can screen better when they use referrals
from their current workers to hire new employees. Montgomery (1991) establishes that there
are gains from referral hiring as employers can utilize recommendations from their produc-
tive workers to identify other productive potential workers. Hensvik and Skans (2016) directly
test this empirically. Building on learning models, Dustmann et al. (2016) hypothesize that job
search networks help reduce information deficiencies in the market and consequently referral-
based job searches lead to better matches. The authors proceed to test the prediction empir-
ically and show that referred workers initially earn higher wages. Few other studies have ad-
dressed this issue empirically. Burks et al. (2017) for example, show that referred workers are
less likely to quit even though their productivity does not differ from that of non-referred hir-
ings.
The literature on referrals makes clear that knowing a currently employed worker can in-
8Nepotism and reciprocity are other possible channels.
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crease the probability of landing a job at their current firm for a job seeker. However, the papers
in the literature do not quantify the value of any given connection as compared to another. For
example, if a job seeker has a link with two workers, which one is more valuable to the worker?
Do they have the same value if the two workers work in similar firms in similar positions? The
chapter contributes to the literature on job search by using a unique data set to map the net-
work of connections to show a causal relationship between nodes which are more connected (as
per network theory measures of connectedness) and job market outcomes of job seekers who
have a link with these nodes. Furthermore, since we study the entire network of social con-
nections, we are able to take into account the impact of indirect connections as well as those
of direct links. For example, Kramarz and Skans (2014) look at the direct link between parent
and children and establish that this connection is important for the job market outcome of the
children. Burks et al. (2017), Hensvik and Skans (2016) show that workers recommended by the
current employees are often a better match for the firm. However, if a worker knows about a job
opening at her previous employer or if a worker knows a friend who is employed in a different
firm, then these papers will not be able to capture how the worker can use this information to
help a job seeker get the job. For this, one would have to know the entire network of work-links
amongst all workers. Some studies do try to infer networks from available data. For example,
Dustmann et al. (2016) proxy a referral hire by the share of workers in the firm with the same
ethnicity as the applicant. However, these inferences are imprecise. In contrast, our data allows
us to precisely link economists whenever they have published a research article.
The literature on the Economics job market is relatively small. We know of no other pa-
pers which study the importance of the connectedness of the adviser for the placement of the
student. In addition, most papers establish interesting correlations without showing causality.
For example, Athey et al. (2016) look at graduates from the top PhD programs in the USA to
show that first year (graduate school) grades in core courses of Microeconomics and Macroe-
conomics are significantly related to better job placement. They also report that the quality of
the undergraduate institution of the student also affects the quality of first job. Krueger and
Wu (2000) show that the ‘prominence’ (measured in an admittedly subjective manner) of the
recommendation letter writer helps student placement. Smeets et al. (2006) show that market
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does not rely completely on the reputation of the PhD granting university since they find that
often the top graduates of very good (but not elite) programs outperform average graduates of
elite programs in terms of initial placement. Gallet et al. (2005) test a multi-market strategy in
the Economics Job Market and confirm its predictions regarding cyclicity: “in the bust market,
graduates of elite schools shifted their search strategies to include weaker academic institu-
tions, while graduates of lower-ranked schools shifted their applications away from academia
and toward the business sector." To avoid this kind of selection bias was one of the reasons why
we chose to work with data from the years before the financial crisis for our study. Baruffaldi
et al. (2016) study the use of academic networks (science and engineering students only) in the
hiring of PhD students and its impact on student productivity. They show (without claiming
causality) that PhD students hired from masters programs at affiliations from which the adviser
of the PhD student draws co-authors have, on average, a higher productivity compared to stu-
dents hired from universities to which their adviser has no links. Unlike our study though, this
study is unable to indicate the importance of the centrality of the student’s masters professors
on their PhD program placement.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Doctoral Dissertations in Economics
Lists of doctoral students receiving their PhD from an Economics-related faculty in the US
and Canada are published annually in the December issue by The Journal of Economic Lit-
erature (JEL). These dissertations are, with few corrections and additions as well as different
information, also available from EconLit. We focus on four academic years, namely 2000/2001,
2001/2002, 2002/2003, and 2003/2004. The information from both the JEL lists and EconList
include the JEL field of their dissertation along with the year in which they were awarded the
PhD and the name of the PhD school.
We have information on 3,482 students from 137 different schools. To obtain a more ho-
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mogeneous set, we remove 300 students that belong to JEL general category "Q" (Agricultural
and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics) because the labor
market for agricultural Economists is different from the rest of Economics. After this process we
are left with 3,182 students, whose distribution of year and JEL code is summarized in table 4.1.
The largest field is O (Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth)
with 420 students. Four fields have more than 300 students: F (International Economics), G (Fi-
nancial Economics), D (Microeconomics) and E (Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics).
Table 4.1: Crosstable by year and JEL code for all PhD students.
JEL A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P R Z All
Year
2000 0 1 20 34 40 49 34 16 30 39 2 33 5 5 71 9 12 0 400
2001 0 2 50 76 82 99 95 38 55 78 7 67 11 11 94 18 18 0 801
2002 0 3 39 82 79 88 96 22 53 71 4 63 11 10 112 13 22 0 768
2003 1 3 39 93 89 85 79 34 68 63 6 54 9 11 95 13 17 1 760
2004 1 1 31 53 39 64 56 15 37 35 7 33 9 4 48 14 5 1 453
All 2 10 179 338 329 385 360 125 243 286 26 250 45 41 420 67 74 2 3182
Notes: Table lists numbers of graduated PhD students from North American universities for
the academic years 2000/2001, 2001/2002, 2002/2003, and 2003/2004 by Journal of Economic
Literature general category. Students from JEL general category Q ("Agriculture") are excluded.
We obtain information about the student’s advisers from four sources. First, we use the
genealogy database of the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) project.9 Second, we obtain
adviser information from academic departments, either through public sources in the form of
websites, or privately through direct emails.10 Third, we collect CVs of the students themselves.
The fourth source includes various online sources such as academic tree or Mathematics Ge-
nealogy Project. Using the Scopus database we compute the Euclidean index of citations for
each year for each adviser as a measure of adviser productivity. Perry and Reny (2016) show
that, unlike other indices (such as the h-index), this index has desirable properties if one is
interested in combining citation stock and publication count.
Table 4.A.1 in the appendix ranks advisers by number of graduating students in 2000-
9See https://genealogy.repec.org/ Information on advisers requires the existence of a RePEc account of the stu-
dent.
10Of 131 contacted departments, 29 sent information, 17 declined to share these information and 10 do not have
records from the period 1999-2004.
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2004 period. The ranking is lead by Daron Acemoglu having a total of 23 PhD students (which
includes co-supervised students). He is followed by Andrej Shleifer (20 students) and Roger Be-
tancourt (18 students). A data issue we face is that a fraction of the advisers in our sample had
only one of their students graduate in the 2000/2001-2003/2004 period. Figure 4.A.1 in the ap-
pendix shows that out of 1,384 advisers, more than 650 advisers had only 1 student graduate in
our time period, about 300 advisers had 2 students, and less than 180 advisers had 3 students
graduating in this period. This implies that an analysis with adviser-fixed effects would have to
use data from a subsample of students only. This will create a sample selection bias. Since we
lose more students from lower ranked universities to this selection, and the impact of adviser
connectedness should be higher for lower ranked universities,11 we advise that our estimated
impact of adviser connectedness on student placement be thought of as a conservative esti-
mate. To use more data, we also report results from regressions without adviser-fixed effects.
However, the identification condition needed in this regression is much stronger.
Finally, we estimate the gender of students and advisers based on their first name using
the genderize.io database.12 Out of the 1,384 advisers, we estimate 159 to be female, which
corresponds to a share of roughly 10%. The share of female PhD students is higher, with 1,212
out of 3,182 (28%).
4.3.2 Economics Job Market
Information on initial placements is available either through the student’s CV or from their for-
mer departments directly.13 Figure 4.A.3 in the appendix visualizes the hiring network for the
students in our network. To measure the quality of the initial placement we convert the ini-
tial placement into placement ranks. We use the method of the Tilburg Economics University
Ranking to rank universities according to their research output. The Tilburg Economics Uni-
11This is because students from better ranked universities usually reduce information asymmetry about their
quality via publications before the job market, and presenting their work at top conferences (this also gives them
a chance to network).
12See https://genderize.io/.
13Not all universities give an account of their student’s initial placement. We contacted all departments to share
information. 31 sent placement information, 17 declined to share these information and 14 do not have records of
that time. The remainder did not answer.
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versity Ranking uses a weighted publication output in 74 predefined journals to assign points
to the authors’ main affiliation, and ranks universities according to these points14. Using data
from Scopus and not the Web of Science, our version of the ranking covers more universities
and colleges and thus allows a greater sample size. We use the Scimago Journal Impact Factor,
rather than the Web of Science Journal Citation reports, in the year of the publication as jour-
nal weight because it was computed using data from Scopus and thus complements our data
source.15 Using data from Scopus allows us to include rank affiliations by organization type.
In the main version of our ranking, we rank all affiliations which are classified as university or
college. We use the affiliation rank in the year of the placement. Figure 4.A.2 (in the appendix)
gives an account of the distribution of ranks of the initial placements in the final sample.16
Our analysis focuses on academic placements only. Out of the 3,182 students in our sam-
ple, 1,372 (roughly 43%) initially went to a ranked university or college during the four academic
years under consideration. Students interested in a research career may not only go to univer-
sities, but to the private, governmental and non-governmental sector. For example, 31 students
were hired by research institutes, 7 to policy institutes and 5 to military organisations (US Air
Force Academy, US Naval Academy, etc.). Other big players in the market are research-active fi-
nancial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (75 PhD students), the World Bank
(44 PhD students), the Bank for International Settlements (4 PhD students) and various central
banks (87 PhD students). We also note that the academic career is not the only possible career
fresh Economics graduates want to pursue (Stephan, 2012; Conti and Visentin, 2015). Research
intensive private companies (Cornerstone Research etc.) hired 25 students, while consulting
firms hired another 22 students.
We augment our data with information about the ‘tightness’ of yearly job markets. We
use yearly "Reports of the Director Job Openings for Economists" published in The American
Economic Review,17 which give an account of the number of openings per field (as defined by
14For details see https://econtop.uvt.nl/methodology.php.
15For the original ranking use for various years https://econtop.uvt.nl/. Spearman correlation between our
version and the original for 2004 is 0.89.
16Estimations using the unweighted count of publications in these 70 journals do not alter the qualitative results.
The likely reason is that the 70 Economics journals used to measure the weighted publication output are all very
good journals.
17In particular, we use the reports by Hinshaw (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) and Hinshaw (2004).
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the JEL code). To measure tightness in a given year for a given field, we divide the supply of





where z is the academic year starting in the second half of year t and f is the JEL code-defined
field. That is, students finishing in the first half of a year are accounted to the previous year’s
job market. Clearly, a higher tightness (T i g htnesst f ) would indicate that the market is more
‘difficult’ for students in field f in year t (higher supply of students in that field compared to
demand). In our analysis, we show that adviser connectedness matters more for her student’s
placement in years with higher tightness as compared to years with lower tightness.
4.3.3 Networks of Collaboration
Our variable of interest is adviser connectedness in the Economics co-author network. In a
co-author network, nodes represent researchers, and a link exists between two nodes if the re-
searchers have jointly published a full research article. Co-author networks have sparked great
interest among Economists, starting with Eagly (1975) who describes "Economics Journals as
Communications Network". More recently Goyal et al. (2006) have shown that Economics co-
author networks since the 1990s have small-world properties, implying that communication is
greatly facilitated by a few highly interlinked stars. Ductor et al. (2014) show that one’s current
local network has predictive value for one’s future productivity.
To construct the co-author networks we consider 114,409 publications indexed in Else-
vier’s Scopus database published in 408 journals between 1997 and 2005. Since our analysis
covers the period up until 2004, we include co-author ties visible one year later (as the research
project must have begun earlier). The set of journals from which we draw our co-author net-
work is defined according to field-wise rankings in Combes and Linnemer (2010). We include
every title that is ranked at least C in any field-wise ranking. In this network two researchers
are connected when they have jointly published a paper, where the link weight corresponds to
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the number of joint publications. The idea behind the weight is that if a pair of researchers has
published several papers as co-authors then they have a stronger connection compared to if
they had worked together only once.
For each year t (∈ {2000,2001,2002,2003,2004}) we construct the network using the publi-
cations published in all years 1996,1997, · · · , t , t +1. We chose the network definition such that
network variations comes from new connections and old connections are not disregarded. As
the number of articles increased over time, the network grew too. In the earliest of our networks,
the one for the year 2000, there are 30,617 distinct researchers. The network for 2004 consists
of 52,942 distinct researchers. These networks are represented by symmetric matrices G whose
entries gmn indicate the strength of a link between m and n. The diagonal is set to 0.
For technical reasons we only consider the network’s giant component. This is the net-
work’s largest component where each node is accessible from any other node by an uninter-
rupted series of links. Two nodes are said to be in two different components when there is no
such path of links. While it is theoretically possible to compute centralities for each component,
they are not comparable, as the computation takes into account the size of each component.
The respective giant component for our analysis covers about one third of the overall network
size.
Eigenvector centrality is a measure of influence and defined as the weighted sum of the
Eigenvector centralities of the network neighbors, where the weight corresponds to the neigh-
bor’s own Eigenvector centrality. The idea is that if one is connected to nodes that are them-
selves more connected then one is more connected. The centrality score is obtained as a fixed
point that satisfies, for scalar λ and any non-zero vector E:
EG =λE. (4.2)
By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, if equation (4.2) holds then λ is the leading eigenvalue of
G , called µ1(G), and vector E the assocciated eigenvector. The elements of E are hence the
eigenvector centralities of all members in G .
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A crucial element in the calculation of author centralities is that we remove the adviser
from the network before we compute the adviser’s coauthors’ Eigenvector centrality. The reason
is that our identification strategy exploits exogenous changes to the adviser’s centrality coming
from changes in the centrality of her co-authors. Clearly, we would not want these changes to
result from changes in the centrality of the adviser herself. Formally, we refer to the network as






where Nm is the set of co-authors of m.
Finally, since the centrality scores only indicate the relative importance of different nodes,
we convert the scores into ranks for nodes. This also helps because ranks make centrality posi-
tions more comparable across networks for different years. Our variable of interest is hence the
average Eigenvector centrality rank of the coauthors Nai of adviser a of student i in t :








In the second part of our analysis we are interested in the connectedness of advisers with
universities, rather than with other economists. We use the Hasselback Faculty Directories for
Economics, Management and Finance to obtain information on faculty membership18. Faculty
rosters for Economics exists for 2001/2002 and 2003/2004 academic years, for Management for
the 2001/2002 academic year, and for Finance for the academic years 2000/2001, 2002/2003
and 2004/2005. The rosters include 14105 distinct faculty members which we could identify on
Scopus (a pre-requirement to be in the co-author network). 6040 of the faculty members are
also nodes in the co-author network.
18See http://www.jrhasselback.com/FacDir.html. The lists are sometimes called Prentice Hall Guide to
Economics Faculty resp. Prentice Hall Guide to Finance Faculty individually.
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4.4 Empirical Issues and Identification Strategy
Our objective is to identify the effect of adviser connectedness on student placement. Addi-
tionally, we would like to provide supportive evidence to show that the channel through which
adviser connectedness helps students on the job market is by reducing information asymme-
try about the student’s quality (via informal phone calls/emails). There are several endogeneity
issues we need to contend with.
Consider the problem of identifying the impact of the adviser’s connectedness on stu-
dent placement (we discuss issues with identifying the channel through which connectedness
affects placement in section 4.6). An adviser’s connectedness in the network of co-authors is
not exogenous: advisers who are more productive, are more experience or affiliated with better
universities are more likely to be better connected. Therefore, a simple regression of student
placement on adviser connectedness may pick up the impact of these variables rather than
that of connectedness. Furthermore, while we can mitigate the above effects by controlling for
the adviser’s publication record, university and seniority (which we do), there might be unob-
served variables which affect both adviser connectedness and student placement. Ideally, we
would like a variable which exogenously shifts adviser connectedness but does not affect stu-
dent placement through any other channel.
Our strategy is to exploit the longitudinal nature of our placement data and identify the
impact of adviser connectedness on student placement via changes in the connectedness of the
adviser’s co authors in a model with adviser fixed effects. The connectedness of an adviser’s co-
authors’ can change when her co-authors start new projects with new co-authors. This affects
the centrality score of the adviser as well. To avoid having changes in the adviser’s own central-
ity causing the change in her co-authors’ centrality, we compute the centralities of the adviser’s
co-authors’ in the network of co-authors which excludes the adviser herself. While the central-
ity level of an adviser’s co-authors is endogenously determined, our identifying assumption is
that the change in the connectedness of an adviser’s co-authors in the year of placement of the
student is not anticipated, and is therefore not strategically used by either the adviser or her
students for better placement. Thus, this variable does not directly affect the placement of the
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adviser’s students except to the extent that it changes the adviser’s connectedness in the year
in which the student is on the job market. We include adviser-fixed effects in our regressions
to make sure that there are no unobserved time-invariant adviser characteristics biasing our
coefficients. This strategy works as an IV for all advisers who place graduate students in more
than one year in our data set. Hence, for this sample we exclude students whose advisers did
not place another student in another year. We run the regressions using the mean centrality
rank of the adviser’s co-authors as the main explanatory variable.
Additionally, we show results without adviser-fixed effects, since this allows us to use more
data. The identification assumption is stronger in this case though. The underlying identifying
assumption in the model without adviser fixed effects is that after controlling for the adviser’s
publication record, experience, gender and affiliation, the only channel through which the level
of connectedness19 of an adviser’s co-authors’ affects student placement is by affecting the con-
nectedness of the adviser.
Now, we discuss more deeply the specific channels which could bias our results, and how
our identification strategy assuages these concerns. First, there are many unobserved charac-
teristics of the adviser which could be correlated with both adviser connectedness (even with
changes in adviser connectedness) and student placement. For example, one may argue that
better/smarter advisors are more likely to increase their network in any given year via new col-
laborations. Or, a different channel could be that more ‘helpful’ advisers are more likely to
write papers with their students, and younger economists are likely to engage in more collabo-
rative projects. Thus, being helpful may affect the change in connectedness of any adviser (via
changes in the centrality of their ex student-coauthors), and also affect their student’s place-
ment in any given year. We address all such concerns about unobserved adviser characteris-
tics biasing our coefficients by including adviser fixed effects in our models. Additionally, we
include controls for several observed adviser characteristics like publication quality and expe-
rience which are not time invariant, and could influence student placement.
Next, we discuss if unobserved student quality and assortative matching could bias our
19Note that this considers only the level of connectedness (in the model without adviser fixed effects) of the
adviser’s co-authors, not the change in the level of connectedness since we don’t have adviser fixed effects.
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results. We don’t have sufficient controls for an important variable which affects student place-
ment - student quality. This could bias our estimates if good students are more likely to match
with more connected advisers. If this were the case then good placements will be because of
high student quality and not because of the connectedness of the adviser. For this issue, we
have the following argument. Our identification strategy breaks down only if there is an un-
observed variable which affects student-adviser matches and is simultaneously correlated with
the change in the centrality of the adviser’s co-authors in the year in which the student gets
placed. However, we believe that it is hard for students (and advisers) to anticipate the change
in connectedness20 of their adviser’s co-authors’ in the year of their placement. Thus, we argue
that the change in the centrality of the adviser’s co-authors affects student placement only via
(exogenously) changing the adviser’s connectedness.
Another counter argument could be that of clustering. The concern with clustering is that
helpful advisers have helpful co-authors and helpful co-authors are more likely to have changes
in connectedness (because more people are willing to work with them). However, the impact of
clustering must die down with distance from the adviser. That is, the probability of sharing a
quality reduces with distance. As a robustness check we look at the co-authors of an adviser’s
co-authors (i.e. the second neighbors of the adviser) and then take their connectedness as our
IV for adviser connectedness in a model with adviser-fixed effects.
Before we move on to describe a data issue we face, we would like to point out that despite
our best efforts there are some remaining channels which may bias our results. We leave it to
the judgment of the reader to determine how big these effects may be. One example of such a
channel would be if a subfield suddenly became popular. If both the adviser and her student
work in this subfield, then this will affect both the change in the connectedness of the adviser
(more papers will be written in this subfield which will mean more collaborations), and the
ranking of the student’s placement (more universities may be interested in hiring in the newly
popular subfield). We wish to make two points regarding this channel. One, we control for
field fixed effects so the above channel can only work for smaller subfields. Two, for the above
20Students may know the approximate level of their adviser’s connectedness in the year in which they choose
their adviser but it would be quite difficult to anticipate the precise change in connectedness of their adviser’s
co-authors in their expected future graduation year.
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argument to bias our coefficients, the subfield would have to suddenly become popular within
the short time period of our data set (1999-2004).
A significant data issue we face is that of sample selection. Due to data limitations and
our identifying restrictions, we lose data points from the initial sample size of 3,182 graduates.
The main restrictions are - a) we can only consider students who were placed in Tilburg ranked
departments, b) we can only consider those students whose adviser placed students at Tilburg
ranked departments in multiple years between 2000 and 2004 (to employ adviser fixed effects),
and c) we study only those students for whom we have both placement and adviser informa-
tion. The final sample size is 366 students (about 11.5 percent of the original sample). Losing
a large fraction of our student data set can lead to selection bias in our estimated coefficients.
While we have no strong arguments to negate the effect of this data issue, we would like to
make the following observation about the probable direction of bias. Table 4.2 shows that the
final sample size is biased towards higher-ranked institutions: about 47% of all students in the
initial dataset (of 3,182 students) received their PhD from a university ranked 30 or better in
the year of their graduation. This share increases to about 70% in the final sample size we use
for our regressions. We expect that adviser connectedness matters more for students who are
not from top schools. This is because students from better ranked universities usually reduce
information asymmetry about their quality via publications before the job market, and by pre-
senting their work at top conferences (this also gives them a chance to network). Therefore, it
is possible that our estimate of the impact of adviser connectedness on student placement is a
conservative one.
Finally, we also show that co-author networks matter for student placement in a simpler
way. Suppose the distance between a department and an adviser is defined as the shortest
path in the co-author network between the adviser and any faculty member at the department.
We use the death of economists (anywhere in the co-author network) as an exogenous shock
which affects the social distance between an adviser and different departments negatively.21
We then ask whether an increase in the social distance due the death of economists affects the
21The death of an economist could increase the distance between an adviser and a department by breaking the
shortest co-author path the adviser had to that department.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of initial and final dataset.
Initial Final
Number Share (in %) Number Share (in %)
Ranks 1-30 1458 45.82 257 70.22
Ranks 31-100 799 25.11 88 24.04
Ranks 101-300 718 22.56 17 4.64
Other 207 6.51 4 1.09
Notes: Table lists number of students and share of total by PhD school group for the initial and
the final dataset. PhD schools are grouped according to the rank in the student’s year of grad-
uation. Students of 6 PhD schools without rank in the year of the graduation were categorized
together with "Other".
probability of the adviser’s student getting placed in the department. Examining the effect of
deceased individuals on their local network is a popular identification strategy in the study of
social networks.(Azoulay et al., 2010; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Oettl, 2012; Azoulay et al., 2015)
There are 30 researchers who passed away during the 1999-2004 period.22 Table 4.A.3 in the
appendix gives an account of these researchers along with their date of death.
4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Centrality rank and placement rank
We look at all those students in our sample for which the following three requirements hold: (1)
the student was placed at a ranked institution, (2) the student’s adviser is a member of the co-
author network’s giant component, (3) conditions (1) and (2) hold for at least one other student
of the same adviser who graduated in a different placement year. Condition (3) is crucial for
our identification strategy since want to use a model with adviser-fixed effects to obtain iden-
tification via changes in the centrality of the adviser’s co-authors. Our final sample is called the
‘adviser coauthor centrality sample’, and it consists of 366 students.
22We let the period start one year earlier than our student sample because vacancies from researchers that passed
away in the year are likely to not be filled up so soon.
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For this sample, the summary statistics are presented in table 4.3, while table 4.A.2 (in the
appendix) reports the relevant correlation coefficients. The mean placement in the year of the
placement has rank 256.7, which for 2002 refers to the Economics departments of the Univer-
sities of Valencia, Complutense de Madrid, Adelaide, Trinity College Dublin, Syddansk Univer-
sitet, Binghamton, West Virginia, Eindhoven (TU), Vilnius and Lausanne, as well as American
University, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, and Queen’s University Belfast.
It ranges from rank 1 (Harvard University, in 2004) to rank 1,416. Figure 4.A.2 in the appendix
presents the distribution graphically. Our variable of interest is the adviser’s Eigenvector cen-
trality rank and this has a mean of 6149.9, ranging from 240 to 27,629.23 The instrument for this
variable is the adiser’s coauthors’ mean Eigenvector centrality rank, which is computed in the
network without the adviser. Its means is 7638.9. The average Euclidean Index of citations for
the adviser is 245.624 and ranges from 1 to 2530. Adviser experience is measured by the number
of years since the first indexed publication. This is 18.8 years on average, ranging from 3 to 45
years.
For our analysis, we estimate the following regression equation in an ordered logistic re-
gression model25:
PlacementRanki t =β0 +β1AdvisersCoauthorsMeanEigenvectorRanki t+
β2Genderi +β3PhDSchoolRanki t +β4AdviserControlsi t+
γ1Adviseri +γ3YearOfCompletioni +γ4Fieldi +εi t (4.5)
The outcome variable is the placement rank of student i in year t , where the rank is
computed following the methodology of the Tilburg University Economics ranking but using
data from Scopus. AdvisersCoauthorsMeanEigenvectorRanki t is the mean Eigenvector central-
ity rank over i ’s adviser’s coauthors in the weighted coauthor network for year t , computed in
a network without the adviser (equation (4.4)). We are interested in β1. Note that since lower
23The minimum rank equals 240 and not 1 as one might expect for two reasons. First, it’s the average over all
neighbor’s centrality ranks, and secondly our ranks are relative to the entire population that makes up the network.
24A possible paper/citation trajectory would be 74, 43, 10 and 230.
25Results of an ordered probit regression are qualitatively the same.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics in the adviser coauthor centrality sample.
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
Placement Rank 363 256.7 97 355.00 1 1416
Adv. Eigenvector rank 567 6149.9 4964 4384.66 240 27629
Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvector rank 567 7638.9 7261 3761.34 269 24390
Tightness 573 0.304 0.282 0.167 0.08 1.048
School Rank 574 33.5 14 56.56 1 521
Adv. Euclidean Index 574 245.6 116 386.26 2 2530
Adv. Experience 574 18.8 18 7.62 3 45
Notes: Placement Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics
ranking of a student’s placement in the year of the placement. Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvec-
tor rank is the mean Eigenvector centrality rank of all coauthors of an adviser in the weighted
coauthor network corresponding to the year of the placement. Market tightness for a field in a
given year is the number of students graduating in that year in that field, divided by the num-
ber of AEA-reported job openings in that field in that year, where field is measured by JEL code
(equation (4.1)). PhD School Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University
Economics ranking of the PhD-awarding university in the year the student finished. Euclidean
Index is the adviser’s Euclidean index of citations in the year the student graduated. Experience
is the number of years between an adviser’s first publication and the year in which the student
graduated.
numbers indicate better ranks26, we expect β1 to be positive as this would indicate a positive
relationship between adviser centrality and better placement. Gender i is a binary variable in-
dicating a female student. We also have another gender control (samesex) which is a binary vari-
able indicating that student and adviser have the same sex. AdviserControlsi t include the ad-
viser’s Euclidean index of citations in t , her experience and experience squared, because these
values are time-variant. PhDSchoolRanki t is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg
University Economics ranking of the PhD granting school of student i in year t . In a variation
of the model we replace PhDSchoolRanki t with university-fixed effects. In all specifications
we cluster standard errors at the PhD granting University level to allow for unobserved hetero-
geneity as well as different group sizes.27 Fixed-effects for the year of completion captures year-
specific information. We also include fixed-effects for the student’s field. Adviser-fixed effects
26Both the dependent variable PlacementRanki t and the main explanatory variable AdviserCoauthorMeanEigen-
vectorRanki t are ranks.
27Abadie et al. (2017) argue that standard errors must be clustered around a variable when there is selection bias
in the sample on that variable. We definitely get more students from better ranked universities in our final sample
(see Table 4.2).
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control for unobserved adviser characteristics which could influence student i ’s placement.
Table 4.4 presents results from an ordered logit regression model (regression equation
(4.5)). In column (1), the adviser’s neighbor’s mean Eigenvector centrality rank is statistically
insignificant with a p-value of 0.121 but has the expected sign. In column (2) we use the take
the mean of the three most-connected co-authors of an adviser. The coefficient is statistically
significant with a p-value equal to 0.029. Column (3) follows the specification of column (1),
except that we include PhD School-fixed effects instead of adviser-fixed effects. The coefficient
is statistically significant with a p-value equal to 0.055.
To given an idea of the effect size, we take the coefficient of model (2). An improvement in
the adviser’s three most connected co-authors’ average Eigenvector centrality rank by 1 results
in a e0.0000697 −1 ≈ 0.007% better placement outcome, where ‘better’ refers to a better ranked
department according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking. A 0.007%
improvement translates into 0.00007∗1416 ≈ 0.1 placement ranks. To put this into perspective,
there are between 26,000 and 40,000 nodes in the yearly varying co-author networks, as nearly
every researcher has a unique rank. Hence, the scope for rank change among an adviser’s coau-
thors’ is considerably large. An improvement in 10 ranks in the mean rank of an adviser’s three
most connected coauthors would result in a placement rank improvement of the adviser’s stu-
dent by approximately 1.
The coefficient for adviser-student relationships of same sex is positive but statistically
insignificant, whereas the coefficient for female students is positive and weakly statistically sig-
nificant. Female students tend to be placed worse, and the effect is partly offset in magnitude
if their adviser is female, too. However, within a PhD school this effect disappears (column (3)).
This is interesting in light of recent studies investigating same sex-relationships in PhD student
advising (Gaulé and Piacentini, 2017; Mansour et al., 2018).
We hypothesize that if informal contacts do matter for placements, then their value should
increase with tighter market conditions. That is, the adviser’s connectedness should play a
stronger role in student placement in the years in which there is more competition for place-
ment. To test this hypothesis we interact our variable of interest, the adviser’s coauthors’ Eigen-
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vector centrality rank with market tightness. Table 4.5 presents regression results in a model
where are our variable of interest is interacted with market tightness as defined in equation
(4.1). As before, we include adviser-fixed effects, field-fixed effects and cluster standard errors
around the PhD school. Unlike before, we do not control for placement year. This is because if
we include year fixed effects then field and year-fixed effects would completely absorb any mar-
ket tightness variation. In column (2) we replace school rank with school-fixed effects, and in
column (3) we drop adviser-fixed effects to gain more observations. In the first two models, the
interaction of Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvector rank and Market Tightness is statistically signifi-
cant and has a negative sign. Thus, we confirm our hypothesis that an adviser’s connectedness
matters more when market conditions are tight.
A possible concern with our centrality regression is that of ‘clustering’. We use changes in
the centrality of the adviser’s co-authors to identify the impact of the adviser’s centrality on the
placement of her students. However, this relies on the assumption that changes in the central-
ity of the adviser’s coauthors only influence the placement of the adviser’s students by changing
the centrality of the adviser. This will not be true if the aforementioned variable is correlated
with an unobserved adviser characteristic which also affects placement. Consider for example a
helpful adviser’s who could have helpful co-authors who are more likely to have changes to their
connectedness because many people want to work with them. As a robustness check against
this kind of argument, in table 4.6, we report regression results repeating the above analysis but
using the average centrality rank of the adviser’s second (or indirect) neighbors. The idea is that
the clustering of unobserved characteristics must die with distance. An adviser’s second neigh-
bors are less likely to share the adviser’s unobserved characteristic. We show that the placement
of the adviser’s students is still significantly affected by the centrality of the adviser’s second
neighbors. This also strengthens our argument for the importance of even indirect connections
in job placement. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) include adviser-fixed effects, while columns (5)
and (6) replace adviser-fixed effects PhD school-fixed effects. Columns (3), (4) and (6) interact
our variable of interest with market tightness and thus exclude year-fixed effects.
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Adv. neigh. mean 0.0000584 0.0000461∗
Eigenvector rank p = 0.121 p = 0.055
Adv. top 3 neigh. mean 0.0000697∗∗
Eigenvector rank p = 0.029
Same sex 0.579 0.613 −0.227
p = 0.209 p = 0.233 p = 0.524
Female student 0.845∗ 0.876∗ −0.0820
p = 0.057 p = 0.076 p = 0.825
PhD School Rank 0.00982∗∗∗ 0.00910∗∗∗
p = 0.002 p = 0.006
Euclidean Index −0.000753 −0.000742 −0.0000772
p = 0.242 p = 0.208 p = 0.881
Experience −0.0534 −0.0606 −0.0332
p = 0.468 p = 0.402 p = 0.404
Experience2 0.00148 0.00168 0.00137
p = 0.329 p = 0.264 p = 0.157
Euclidean Index (2014) −0.000139
p = 0.158
Adviser fixed effects Y es Y es No
PhD School fixed effects No No Y es
Field fixed effects Y es Y es Y es
Year Fixed effects Y es Y es Y es
Clustered SE PhD School PhD School PhD School
N 357 353 692
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Placement Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics rank-
ing of the student’s placement in the year of the placement. Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvector rank
is the mean Eigenvector centrality rank of all coauthors of a student’s adviser in the weighted
coauthor network in the year of the student’s placement, computed without the adviser (equa-
tion (4.4)). Similarly, Adv. top 3 neigh. mean Eigenvector rank is the mean Eigenvector centrality
rank of an adviser’s three most connected coauthors. Same sex equals 1 if both the student and
the adviser are estimated to be of the same sex. Female student equals 1 if the student’s first
name is estimated to be a female first name. PhD School Rank is the rank according to our ver-
sion of the Tilburg University Economics ranking of the PhD-awarding university in the year
the student finished. Euclidean Index is the adviser’s Euclidean index of citations in the year the
student graduated. Experience is the number of years between an adviser’s first publication and
the year in which the student graduated. Experience2 is its square. Euclidean Index (2014) is the
adviser’s Euclidean index not in the year of student placement, but in 2014.
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Table 4.5: Results of an Ordered Logistic regression for rank of initial placement interacted with
market tightness, adviser coauthor centrality sample.
Placement Rank
(1) (2) (3)
Adv. neigh. mean −0.0000408 −0.0000345
Eigenvector rank 0.573 0.532
Market Tightness −4.783∗∗ −3.091∗∗ −2.956
0.049 0.035 0.218
Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvector rank × 0.000371∗ 0.000327∗
Market Tightness 0.100 0.074
Same sex 0.433 0.404 −0.228
0.390 0.486 0.520
Female student 0.736 0.742 −0.0858
0.106 0.166 0.814
PhD School Rank 0.00971∗∗∗ 0.00913∗∗
0.004 0.013
Euclidean Index −0.000691 −0.000624 0.000194
0.280 0.275 0.713
Experience −0.0339 −0.0275 −0.0340
0.627 0.679 0.398
Experience square 0.000960 0.000864 0.00125
0.490 0.519 0.189
Adv. top 3 neigh. mean −0.0000433
Eigenvector rank 0.332
Adv. top 3 neigh. mean Eigenvector 0.000379∗∗∗
rank× Market Tightness 0.007
Euclidean Index (2014) −0.000197∗
0.062
Adviser-fixed effects Y es Y es No
PhD School-fixed effects No No Y es
Field-fixed effects Y es Y es Y es
Clustered SE PhD School PhD School PhD School
N 357 353 684
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Placement Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics rank-
ing of the student’s placement in the year of the placement. Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvector rank
is the mean Eigenvector centrality rank of all coauthors of the student’s adviser in the weighted
coauthor network in the year of the student’s placement, computed in a network without the
adviser (equation (4.4)). Female student equals 1 if the student’s first name is estimated to be a
female first name. Same sex equals 1 if both the student and the adviser are estimated to be of
the same sex. Market tightness for a field in a given year is the number of students graduating in
that year in that field, divided by the number of AEA-reported job openings in that field in that
year, where field is measured by JEL code (equation (4.1)). PhD School Rank is the rank accord-
ing to our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking of the student’s PhD granting
institution in the year of the student’s graduation. Euclidean Index is the adviser’s Euclidean in-
dex of citations in the year the student graduated. Experience is the number of years between an
adviser’s first publication and the year in which the student graduated. Experience2 is its square.
Adv. top 3 neigh. mean Eigenvector rank is the mean Eigenvector centrality rank of an adviser’s
three most connected coauthors. Euclidean Index (2014) is the adviser’s Euclidean index not in
















































Table 4.6: Results of an Ordered logistic regression for rank of initial placement for second neighbor centrality ranks, adviser coau-
thor centrality sample.
Placement Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adv. 2nd neigh. mean 0.0000663∗ −0.0000192 0.0000571∗ −0.0000234
Eigenvector rank p = 0.070 p = 0.790 p = 0.059 p = 0.661
Adv. top 3 2nd neigh. mean 0.0000745∗∗ −0.0000767
Eigenvector rank p = 0.043 p = 0.113
Same sex 0.567 0.580 0.349 0.286 −0.215 −0.222
p = 0.230 p = 0.238 p = 0.515 p = 0.639 p = 0.544 p = 0.539
Female student 0.844∗ 0.831∗ 0.686 0.620 −0.0747 −0.0797
p = 0.059 p = 0.071 p = 0.151 p = 0.266 p = 0.839 p = 0.829
PhD School Rank 0.00977∗∗∗ 0.00960∗∗∗ 0.00973∗∗∗ 0.00997∗∗∗
p = 0.002 p = 0.003 p = 0.003 p = 0.007
Euclidean Index −0.000810 −0.000724 −0.000749 −0.000647 −0.000151 0.000103
p = 0.202 p = 0.272 p = 0.236 p = 0.268 p = 0.770 p = 0.842
Experience −0.0477 −0.0528 −0.0239 −0.0184 −0.0297 −0.0290
p = 0.505 p = 0.443 p = 0.722 p = 0.767 p = 0.467 p = 0.474
Experience square 0.00142 0.00151 0.000845 0.000648 0.00131 0.00116
p = 0.337 p = 0.286 p = 0.531 p = 0.605 p = 0.192 p = 0.238
Market Tightness −4.361∗ −2.142 −3.034
p = 0.071 p = 0.123 p = 0.210
Adv. 2nd neigh. mean Eigenvector 0.000335 0.000332∗
rank × Market Tightness p = 0.134 p = 0.064
Adv. top 3 2nd neigh. mean Eigenvector 0.000482∗∗∗
rank × Market Tightness p = 0.001
Adviser fixed effect Y es Y es Y es Y es No No
PhD School fixed effects No No No No Y es Y es
Field fixed effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Year fixed effects Y es Y es No No Y es No
N 357 357 357 357 692 691
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Placement Rank is the rank according to our version of the
Tilburg University Economics ranking of the student’s placement in the year of the placement. Adv. 2nd neigh. mean Eigenvector rank is the mean Eigenvector
centrality rank of all indirect coauthors of the student’s adviser in the weighted coauthor network in the year of the student’s placement, computed in a network
without the adviser. Same sex equals 1 if both the student and the adviser are estimated to be of the same sex. Female student equals 1 if the student’s first
name is estimated to be a female first name. PhD School Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking of the student’s
PhD granting institution in the year of the student’s graduation. Market tightness for a field in a given year is the number of students graduating in that year in
that field, divided by the number of AEA-reported job openings in that field in that year, where field is measured by JEL code (equation (4.1)). Euclidean Index
is the adviser’s Euclidean index of citations in the year the student graduated. Experience is the number of years between an adviser’s first publication and the
year in which the student graduated. Experience2 is its square.
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4.5.2 Social Distance and Placement probability
In this subsection, we present additional evidence that an adviser’s connections in the aca-
demic network matter for her student’s placement. We show that the social distance between
an adviser and a department affects the probability of the adviser placing her student at that
department.
Hitherto, we have focused on identifying the impact of adviser centrality on the rank of her
student’s placement. In the data sample for this subsection, which we term "adviser distance
sample", the unit of observation is the connection between advisers and placement university’s
faculty members. We look at all possible paths between every adviser and every possible uni-
versity that satisfies three conditions: a) there is a department rank available for the university
or college, b) we know the faculty members from the Hasselback rosters and c) at least one fac-
ulty member is in the co-author network. We then count the number of steps one has to take
to go from an adviser a to the closest member of university k (where each step is a co-author
link). Thus, we define the distance between an adviser a and a university k by the length of the
shortest path. In order to identify the impact of this ‘social distance’ between an adviser and a
prospective placement university on the placement of the adviser’s student, we construct a vari-
able that measures the increase in social distance caused by the death of authors somewhere in
the network. The dependent variable is whether one of a’s students were placed at university k
in t .
We estimate the following regression equation in a logistic regression model28:
Pl acementakt =β0 +β1IncreaseInSocialDistanceAfterDeathakt +β2SocialDistanceBeforeDeathakt
+γ1PlacementRankkt +a +PhDSchool j + t +ε j kt (4.6)
We are interested in coefficients β1 and β2. Since the social distance increases due to the
removal of deceased authors, we expectβ1 to be negative, as this indicates a lower probability of
student placement at k. The variable SocialDistanceBeforeDeathakt indicates the length of the
28Results of a probit model are qualitatively the same.
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shortest path between adviser a to the nearest faculty member of k in the co-author network in
year t , given that the path exists (before accounting for the change in distance due to death of
authors). We expect this coefficient to be negative (though not identified) since a shorter dis-
tance to another faculty should result in a higher placement probability if social connections do
play a role in placement. PlacementRankkt is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg
University Economics ranking of university k in year t . Fixed effects for adviser a and the stu-
dent’s Phd granting school PhDSchool j capture unobserved characteristics, while fixed effects
for year of placement capture market characteristics for that year. In a variant of the model
we remove adviser-fixed effects to gain more observations, and instead we control for adviser
characteristics such as her Euclidean Index of citations, her experience and the squared expe-
rience. In all variants of the model we cluster standard errors around PhDSchool to account for
unobserved heterogeneity and different group sizes.
Table 4.7: Summary statistics for adviser distance sample.
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
Student placement 1027 1.00 1 0.00 1 1
Increase in social dist. after death 46910 1.50 1 0.86 1 11
Social dist. before death 973294 8.72 8 2.74 2 32
Placement Rank 973294 187.82 98 293.89 0 2554
Euclidean Index 973294 18.84 18 8.41 0 52
Experience 973294 263.87 215 214.55 1 845
Male adv. 973294 0.91 1 0.29 0 1
Notes: All variables refer to time-variant dyads between adviser a and placement k in year t ,
given that k appears in our ranking and a list of faculty members is available. Student Place-
ment equals 1 if a student of adviser a was placed at university k in year t . Increase in social
dist. after death is the increase in social distance in the co-author network between a and the
nearest faculty member of k after scientist died in year t−1. Social dist. before death is the social
distance in the co-author network between a and the nearest faculty member of k before the
distance changed induced by the removal of deceased scientists. Placement Rank is the rank
according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking of university k in year t .
Euclidean Index is the adviser’s Euclidean index of citations in year t . Experience is the number
of years between an adviser’s first publication and year t . Male adv. equals 1 if the adviser is
estimated to not be female. Only paths between known advisers of students graduating from
North-American universities and identified faculty members of departments listed in our ver-
sion of the Tilburg University Economics ranking and listing in the Hasselback faculty roosters
considered.
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Table 4.7 presents summary statistics for the adviser distance sample. The total number of
dyads (adviser-university pairs) is 2,706,900, of which 973,294 include existing paths between
adviser a and the closest faculty member of k in year t . For 46,910 of these, the social distance
increased due to the exogenous shock of author deaths, sometimes up to 11 steps. Correspond-
ing correlation coefficients are given in table 4.A.4 (in the appendix).
Table 4.8 presents results of a logistic regression for model 4.6 with standard errors clus-
tered around PhD School. As expected, the coefficient of social distance in the co-author net-
work before death is negative, indicating that students are more likely to be placed at faculties
to which their adviser has a shorter distance. A one unit increase in the distance to university k
decreases the odds of being placed at k by e−0.363 −1 ≈ −30% (at the mean co-author distance
before death (1.5) and holding all other variables fixed at the mean). The coefficients change
marginally in column (2), where we control for the PhD School rather than the adviser. The
p values for both models fluctuate around a value of 0.06, indicating robust statistical signifi-
cance.
4.6 Channel
We want to argue that an adviser’s connectedness in the co-author network matters for her
student’s placement because it reduces information asymmetry regarding the match quality
of a student with a university. Other theoretically possible channels include reciprocity and
favoritism. We will provide supporting empirical analysis (without showing any causality) to
argue that the latter channels are not very important.
Reciprocity refers to a direct exchange of students in the same or subsequent years be-
tween two universities (‘I hire your students, you hire mine’). More connected advisers may
have more of these reciprocal relationships which would affect student placement. To assess
the importance of this channel we construct a network of PhD granting schools connected via
directed links whenever one school places a PhD student in the other. There are 437 non-zero
links between universities in our sample (i.e. those that produce PhD students) of which only
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5.1% of all ties are bi-directional i.e. both universities hired a student from the other (indicating
an exchange of students). Being very rare, bidirectional links tend to occur more often with top
schools, i.a. a student moving from Harvard to MIT and vice verse. Based on the low number,
we rule out reciprocity as an important channel through which adviser connectedness affects
student placement.
We defined favoritism vis-a-vis the student’s adviser as hiring of her student by her coau-
thors’ university, i.e. the student is placed in the adviser’s coauthors’ department. Bian et al.
(2016) study the extent of favoritism with senior hiring in the German academic market. They
define favoritism as hirings of senior researchers that were colleagues with individuals working
in the hiring department. We assess the importance of this channel by an estimation of the
minimum social distance between an adviser and faculty members of the university where her
student got placed. Social distance is defined as number of intermediate nodes between any
two nodes in the network, given that a path exists between them. For example, if the student
is placed in the adviser’s coauthors’ department, the corresponding social distance would be 1.
On the other hand if a student is placed at a department where her adviser has no co-authors
but one of her adviser’s co-authors has a co-author, the social distance is 2. Figure 4.1 indicates
that out of the 519 advisers for whom we can connect adviser and student’s placement faculty
members (through some path of co-authors), only 11 times did the student go to her adviser’s
coauthor’s university. This further strengthens our assertion that indirect connections matter
a lot for job placement (over and above direct connections). In a further 21 cases, the mini-
mum social distance between the adviser and the nearest placement faculty member is 2. The
mean social distance between an adviser and her student’s placement is about 7. That is, on
average there are 6 researchers between the adviser and her student’s placement faculty. The
number is exactly the same when including the social distances of committee members (which
we know for 109 PhD students). Given the high average social distance between the adviser and
the student’s placement, we conclude that there is little scope for favoritism.29
29The finding of a relatively high social distance is also interesting in light of the findings of Baruffaldi et al. (2016).
The authors relate a PhD student’s productivity to where she obtained the previous academic degree. They find
PhD students trained at the affiliations of the new supervisor’s coauthors are most productive, i.e. where the social
distance is non-zero, but small.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of minimum social distance to placement faculty.
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Adviser; N = 529
Committee; N = 110
Notes: Histogram shows social distance between a student’s adviser and the nearest member of
the placement faculty. Social distance is the number of nodes on a path between nodes and is
measured in the coauthor network of the year of placement.
It could be argued that adviser connectedness helps student placement if some depart-
ments are afraid of refusing students of advisers who are influential in their field. However,
we believe that by including controls for adviser’s productivity, age, gender and affiliation, we
control for this effect.
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Table 4.8: Results of a logistic regression for placement probability in adviser distance sample.
Student placement
(1) (2)
Increase in dist after death −0.363∗ −0.361∗
p = 0.061 p = 0.067
Co-author distance before death −0.224∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Euclidean Index 0.000639∗∗∗ 0.000535∗∗∗
p = 0.006 p = 0.000
Experience 0.0152 0.0354
p = 0.656 p = 0.265
Experience square −0.000427 −0.000922
p = 0.603 p = 0.254
Placement Rank −0.00499∗∗∗ −0.00517∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Constant −4.480∗∗∗ −5.053∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Adviser fixed effect Y es No
Year fixed effect Y es Y es
PhD School fixed effect No Y es
N 992,079 964,309
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance to the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
All variables refer to dyads between adviser a and placement k in year t , given that k is listed
in our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking and a list of faculty members is
available. Student Placement equals 1 if a student of adviser a was placed at university k in year
t . Increase in social dist. after death is the increase in social distance in the co-author network
between a and the nearest faculty member of k after a scientist died in year t −1. Social dist.
before death is the social distance in the co-author network between a and the nearest faculty
member of k before the exogenous removal of deceased authors. Placement Rank is the rank
according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking of university k in year t .
Euclidean Index is the adviser’s Euclidean index of citations in year t . Experience is the number
of years between an adviser’s first publication and year t . Experience2 is its square. Male adv.
equals 1 if the adviser is estimated to not be female. Only paths between known advisers of
students graduating from North-American universities and faculty members of departments
from the Hasselback faculty roosters considered.
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
We show that students receive better placement outcomes when their adviser is better con-
nected in the Economics co-author network. We provide supportive evidence to argue that
this could be because more central advisers are better positioned to disseminate information
in the network, which ultimately decreases information asymmetry regarding the match qual-
ity of her student with a prospective university. Our research is relevant for understanding the
placement of graduate students. Since initial placement matters a lot for an Economist’s career
(Oyer, 2006), the effort dedicated to understanding it, can hardly be overstated.
Furthermore, our result that the connectedness of the adviser matters for the placement
of Economics graduates has insights into possible results in the general labor market. Hitherto,
several papers have documented that referrals and job opening information from currently em-
ployed workers matters for job seeking individuals. However, we demonstrate that not all con-
nections are equal - more connected workers30 could be more important for job seekers. We
also demonstrate through our study that indirect connections could be an important determi-
nant of job market outcome. Finally, due to the special characteristics of the Economics Job
Market, one of which is that there is no information asymmetry regarding job openings, we are
able to provide some evidence to argue that social networks serve as a conduit of information
regarding an applicant’s quality.
Further avenues for research include the quality of a job match. Ultimately, the Eco-
nomics job market is not necessarily about matching the student with the highest ranked de-
partment, but to improve the match between the student and the department (Smeets et al.,
2006). It would be interesting to see how students matched after recommendations/calls from
the adviser fare in the academic world. A good measure of match quality would be if the student
gets tenure at the university which first hires the student. Another extension of our work would
be to study how adviser connections in industry could affect non-academic placements.
30This could be in the network of all jobs held (where two workers are connected if they have ever worked in the
same firm at the same time), or in the networks of colleagues, friends and acquaintances.
Appendix
4.A Additional tables and figures
Table 4.A.1: Advisers with most PhD students, 2000-2004.
Name Students University Citations Euclid Seniority
1 Daron Acemoglu 23 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1258.0 138.40 10
2 Andrei Shleifer 20 Harvard University 11257.0 715.10 17
3 Roger R. Betancourt 19 University of Maryland 430.0 30.84 32
4 Peter C.B. Phillips 18 Yale University 21933.0 1675.89 30
5 John Y. Campbell 17 Harvard University 5457.0 312.60 17
5 Lawrence F. Katz 17 Harvard University 6287.0 606.40 22
7 Arnold C. Harberger 14 University of California, Los Angeles 271.0 33.02 47
7 Olivier Jean Blanchard 14 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 7003.0 578.85 24
7 Ronald Andrew Ratti 14 University of Missouri 103.0 9.70 26
10 Abhijit V. Banerjee 13 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2248.0 320.74 12
11 Dominick Salvatore 12 Fordham University 612.0 41.04 31
11 John C. Haltiwanger 12 University of Maryland 1125.0 80.04 21
11 Ricardo J. Caballero 12 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1535.0 146.14 14
14 George W. Evans 11 University of Oregon 1327.0 85.59 19
15 Barry J. Eichengreen 10 University of California, Berkeley 2734.0 128.16 22
15 Gary S. Becker 10 University of Chicago 3478.0 295.30 18
15 James M. Poterba 10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 5862.0 481.83 20
15 Joshua D. Angrist 10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1533.0 231.20 13
15 Larry A. Sjaastad 10 Texas A&M University & University of Chicago 152.0 18.71 43
15 Mohsen Bahmani-
Oskooee
10 University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee 1465.0 85.34 19
15 Robert A. Moffitt 10 Johns Hopkins University 2121.0 128.23 26
15 Stephen J. Turnovsky 10 University of Washington 4345.0 143.95 35
15 Thomas D. Willett 10 Claremont Graduate University 1642.0 73.44 35
15 Thomas J. Holmes 10 University of Minnesota 95.0 21.84 13
Notes: Table lists PhD advisers by number of PhD students that graduated at North Amer-
ican Economics departments in the academic years 2000/2001, 2001/2002, 2002/2003 and
2003/2004. Students is the number of students that graduated with this adviser and that have a
Scopus profile. Citations is the number of citations to that author. Publications is the number
of publications of that author. Seniority is the number of years since the first publication. All in-
formation originate from Scopus and were obtained in March 2017. Only advisers with Scopus
profile considered. Co-advised students count as full supervised students.
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Figure 4.A.1: Histogram showing the number of students per adviser (academic years 2000/01-
2003/04).
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Notes: Histogram shows the number of advisers (y axis) with a given number of students (x
axis). Only students with known adviser from North-American universities that graduated in
the academic years 2000/2001, 2001/2002, 2002/2003, and 2003/2004 considered.
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Notes: Graph shows the distribution of the initial placement of students in our dataset. Only
students with known adviser from North-American universities that graduated in the academic
years 2000/2001, 2001/2002, 2002/2003, and 2003/2004 considered, whose initial placement is
ranked in the our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking.
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Table 4.A.2: Summary statistics for all continuous variables in the adviser coauthor centrality
sample.
Placement Rank 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.52 −0.41 −0.04
Adv. Eigenvector rank 0.23 0.70 0.07 0.19 −0.12 −0.02
Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvector rank 0.18 0.77 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.13
Tightness 0.08 0.06 0.07 −0.09 0.01 −0.01
School Rank 0.28 0.15 0.12 −0.03 −0.51 0.02
Adv. Euclidean Index −0.20 −0.13 −0.02 −0.14 −0.18 0.34
Adv. Experience −0.05 −0.03 0.12 −0.01 0.07 0.22
Notes: Upper triangular depicts Spearman correlation coefficients while lower correlation reports Pear-
son correlation coefficients. Placement Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University
Economics ranking of a student’s placement in the year of the placement. Adv. neigh. mean Eigenvec-
tor rank is the mean Eigenvector centrality rank of all coauthors of an adviser in the weighted coauthor
network corresponding to the year of the placement. Market tightness is the field-specific number of
students who graduated in a year divided by the in this field number of AEA-reported job openings for
that year (equation (4.1)). School Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University
Economics ranking of the PhD-awarding university in the year the student finished. Euclidean Index is
the adviser’s Euclidean index of citations in the year the student graduated. Experience is the number
of years between an adviser’s first publication and the year in which the student graduated. Experience2
is its square. Only students considered that were placed at a ranked institution, whose adviser is in the
network’s giant component, and whose adviser has students in different years for which above two con-
ditions hold.
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Table 4.A.3: List of deceased faculty members in the dataset.
Name Date of death Name Date of death
Dalton, George 1999, Aug 23 Vilasuso, Jon R. 2002, Apr 27
Liu, Jung-Chao 1999, Aug 31 Bowman, Mary Jean 2002, Jun 04
Griliches, Zvi 1999, Nov 04 Smith, Bruce D. 2002, Jul 09
Gapinski, James H. 2000, Jan 01 Ansoff, H. Igor 2002, Jul 14
Johnson, Byron L. 2000, Jan 06 Dornbusch, Rüdiger 2002, Jul 25
Heyne, Paul 2000, Mar 09 Ando, Albert 2002, Sep 19
Miller, Merton H. 2000, Jun 03 Gabriel, Stuart A. 2002, Oct 15
Lillard, Lee A. 2000, Dec 02 Sertel, Murat R. 2003, Jan 25
Elliott, John E. 2001, Jan 01 Johnson, D. Gale 2003, Apr 13
Cameron, Rondo 2001, Jan 01 Berger, Mark C. 2003, Apr 30
Cookingham, Mary E. 2001, Mar 12 Kain, John F. 2003, Aug 03
Rosen, Sherwin 2001, Mar 17 Modigliani, Franco 2003, Sep 25
Moses, Ronald 2001, Jun 20 Hsu, Robert 2004, Jan 18
Straub, LaVonne 2002, Jan 24 Lee, Winson 2004, Mar 01
Rosenthal, Robert W. 2002, Feb 07 Laffont, Jean Jacques 2004, May 01
Notes: Table lists 30 authors who passed away between summer 1999 and summer 2004 while
serving on the faculty of universities as listed in the Hasselback lists.
Table 4.A.4: Correlations for placement probability in the adviser distance sample.
Student placement 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Increase in social dist. after death 0.00 −0.03 0.00 1.00 0.00
Social dist. before death −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01 −0.03
Placement Rank 0.01 −0.01 −0.14 −0.02 −0.01
Euclidean Index 0.00 0.00 −0.05 0.28 1.00
Experience −0.03 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.02
Notes: Upper triangular depicts Spearman correlation coefficients while lower correlation re-
ports Pearson correlation coefficients. All variables refer to time-variant dyads between adviser
a and placement k in year t , given that k appears in the our ranking and a list of faculty mem-
bers is available. Student Placement equals 1 if a student of adviser a was placed at university
k in year t . Increase in social dist. after death is the increase in social distance in the co-author
network between a and the nearest faculty member of k after scientist died in year t −1. Social
dist. before death is the social distance in the co-author network between a and the nearest
faculty member of k before the distance changed induced by the removal of deceased scien-
tists. Placement Rank is the rank according to our version of the Tilburg University Economics
ranking of university k in year t . Euclidean Index is the adviser’s Euclidean index of citations
in year t . Experience is the number of years between an adviser’s first publication and year t .
Male adv. equals 1 if the adviser is estimated to not be female. Only paths between known ad-
visers of students graduating from North-American universities and identified faculty members
of departments listed in our version of the Tilburg University Economics ranking and available
Hasselback faculty roosters considered.
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Figure 4.A.3: Hiring network of North American universities 2000/2001-2003/2004.
Notes: Map shows hiring network for North American universities for the academic years 2000-
2001, 2001-2002, and 2002-2003. Every node represents a university from which at least one
student graduated that was subsequently hired by another university on the map, which is in-
dicated by the links (Nodes representing Hawaiian universities are omitted). Nodes are sized
according to how many students graduated from that university. Network is calculated from
the placement of 451 students going from/to 132 universities.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
As probably all dissertations in Economics, this thesis’ title page was followed by acknowl-
edgements. I am not alone doing so. Acknowledgements are customary and widespread in
Economics and beyond. In it, the reader finds names of other scientists, of research assis-
tants, of industry professionals, of sources of funding, of universities where seminars have been
given and of conferences the current research has been presented. Scientists use acknowledge-
ments to express gratitude for intellectual and other help during various stages of their research
projects, without transferring intellectual property rights, which remain solely with the au-
thor(s) (Cronin, 1995; Laband and Tollison, 2000). This thesis uses these acknowledgements
as primary source of data to create a social network connecting collaborators, which allows us
to study informal collaboration, and to investigate the corresponding social networks.
Because of its widespread use, it surprises how little research is available on the impor-
tance of informal collaboration and how rarely acknowledgements are used as proxy for intel-
lectual collaboration. Going forward, I therefore plan to examine how the financial economics
academe evolves from a network perspective, using the data on informal collaboration. Two
groups of questions emerge, of which the first group aims at the network structure: How has
the network changed since the financial crisis? Is the degree of connectedness prone to favor
collusion? Can we identify schools of thought and if yes, how does this matter for the progress of
science? The financial crisis and the high quality of my data furthermore allows to study Kuhn’s
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statement that the scientific progress is due to paradigm shifts and the structure of the scien-
tific community. For example, Kuhn hypothesizes that only competition between segments of
the scientific community results in the rejection of one previously accepted theory or in the
adoption of another.
A second group of questions looks at individual network behavior and group formation:
Which researchers do authors choose to work with? Should individual networks of researchers
be taken into account in hiring decisions? Do authors and informal collaborators complement
or enhance each other e.g. by skill set? In particular, is skill match in groups dependent on
whether its members are generalists or specialists? How does group formation affect individual
careers? Do male and female researchers network differently? A particular concern arises from
the finding presented in chapter 2.3.6 that females are less central and less often acknowledged
regardless of academic prolificness and experience. This above all warrants more research.
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